RON CHAPMAN AND JANET CHAPMAN, APPELLANTS,
v.
SOVRAN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., ETC., APPELLEE
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The court held that the venue for an action on a guaranty agreement, which lacks a venue clause, is governed by the general venue statute, not a venue clause in the underlying subcontract agreement.
Chapmans appealed an order denying their motion to change venue from Orange County. Their action was based on a guaranty agreement for a subcontract, …
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PETERSON, Judge.
Ron and Janet Chapman appeal an order denying their motion to change venue from Orange County to either Collier County, where they reside, or Charlotte County, where the action may have accrued. We reverse.
Sovran Construction Company, Inc.’s, (Sovran) action against the Chapmans is based on a guaranty agreement the Chap-mans gave to Sovran to guaranty the performance of Anglo Steel, Inc., (Anglo), who had sub-contracted with Sovran, but who is not joined in this litigation. Although Anglo entered into a subcontract with Sovran designating Orange County as the appropriate venue for any actions on the subcontract, the Chapmans’ guaranty agreement did not contain a similar clause. Because this action is on the guarantee agreement, not the underlying subcontract agreement, the Chapmans’ motion to change venue to either Collier County, where they reside, or Charlotte County, where the action may have accrued,1 should have been granted. See Hastings v. General Electric Credit Auto Lease, Inc., 434 So. 2d 1020 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983) (because action was on guarantee agreement, and not on the underlying automobile leasing agreement, and there was no contract provision relating to venue in the guaranty agreement, the general venue statute, section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1981) applied). We reverse and remand with instructions to transfer venue to the circuit court in either Collier or Charlotte County.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
DAUKSCH and THOMPSON, JJ., concur. . The Chapmans’ uncontested affidavit stated the cause of action accrued either in Collier or Charlotte County.
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Cited By
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Se. Concrete Constructors v. W. Sur. Co., 331 So. 3d 763 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021)…into the surety bond."); Miller & Solomon Gen. Contractors v. Brennan's Glass Co., 837 So. 2d 1182, 1183 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) ("The venue provision in the subcontract, here, does not apply to the claim on the bond."); Chapman v. Sovran Constr. Co., 709 So. 2d 616, 616 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (holding that although the subcontract contained a choice of venue provision, that provision did not apply to a separate agreement guaranteeing performance under the subcontract where the separate guaranty did not specify ch…
Authorities Cited
- Hastings v. Gen. Elec. Credit Auto Lease, Inc., 434 So. 2d 1020 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)