THE DOLL HOUSE, INC., AND ARGONAUT INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANTS,
v.
JOHN DOUGLAS PORTER, TCB, INC., D/B/A SUGARS, AND THE TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEES
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The court reviews a deputy commissioner's workers' compensation order finding that an injured claimant was employed by The Doll House, Inc. and not by a co-defendant loaned-employee arrangement with T.C.B., Inc. Although such compensability-only orders are ordinarily non-final and non-reviewable, the court treats this appeal as a petition for certiorari because one party is removed from further proceedings.
Although orders determining compensability only and reserving jurisdiction on benefits are generally non-final and non-reviewable, this appeal is treated as a petition for certiorari because the order results in removal of one party from further proceedings. The deputy commissioner's findings and conclusion are supported by competent substantial evidence and do not constitute a departure from essential requirements of law.
[1] An order determining only the compensability of a claim and reserving jurisdiction to determine benefits is generally a non-reviewable, non-final order.
[2] An appeal from an order that removes a party from further proceedings may be treated as a petition for writ of certiorari.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“An order determining compensability only and reserving jurisdiction to determine benefits has generally been found to be a non-reviewable, non-final order.”
Establishes the general rule that such orders are not ordinarily subject to appellate review
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA claimant sustained an industrial injury while employed by The Doll House, Inc. The deputy commissioner found that claimant was injured within the co…
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PER CURIAM.
This cause is before us on appeal from an order of the deputy commissioner finding that claimant sustained an industrial accident arising out of and in the course and scope of his employment with The Doll House, Inc. and that there was no agreement between The Doll House, Inc. and T.C.B., Inc., d/b/a Sugars, to share claimant as a “loaned employee,” so that claimant was not an employee of T.C.B., Inc. at the time of the incident. In his order, the deputy retained jurisdiction to hold further hearings as necessary to determine what benefits were due claimant as a result of the accident; the parties stipulated that the hearing which resulted in the order appealed from would be limited to the sole issue of compensability of the claim, so as to determine whether claimant sustained injury in the course and scope of employment with either The Doll House, Inc. or T.C.B., Inc. An order determining compensability only and reserving jurisdiction to determine benefits has generally been found to be a non-reviewable, non-final order. See, Town of Palm Beach v. Watts, 426 So. 2d 1312 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); The Crown Hotel v. Friedman, 420 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Ray Roofing Co., Inc. v. Young, 419 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Special Disability Trust Fund v. Motor and Compressor Company, 417 So. 2d 1151 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Mills Electrical Contractors v. Marthens, 417 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); General Electric Company v. Hawkins, 413 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); and The Wash House v. Tucker, 413 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). However, because the order sought to be reviewed results in removal of one party, T.C.B., Inc., from further proceedings, we elect to treat the appeal as a petition for a writ of certiorari and to review the merits of the order below.
Competent substantial evidence in the record supports the deputy’s findings of fact and his conclusion that claimant was within the course and scope of his employment with The Doll House, Inc. at the time he was injured. The deputy has not been shown to have departed from the essential requirements of law, the petition for writ of certiorari is denied, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.
BOOTH, WENTWORTH and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.
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Hines Elec. & Fla. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. McCLURE, 616 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)…to orders of the circuit courts, it was determined that interlocutory appeals were no longer allowed in compensation cases. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Sloan, 410 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). . But see Doll House, Inc. v. Porter, 436 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (certiorari review allowed on coverage question, but only because the effect of order was to totally remove a party from the litigation). . But see All Weather Control v. Wawerczyk, 600 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (court dete…
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ESI and Riscorp v. Taylor, 588 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)…rlocutory workers’ compensation order. See United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Sloan, 410 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). The appellants have not demonstrated a basis for review by certiorari. This case is unlike Doll House, Inc. v. Porter, 436 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), where one party was removed from the case and jurisdiction was reserved for additional hearings “as necessary.” The decision in Porter does not reflect any further pending dispute between the remaining parties, unlike the presen…
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J.L. Manta, Inc. v. Ramos, 526 So. 2d 919 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)…erefore met the requirement set forth in section 440.09(1) Florida Statutes.1 Upon request from appellants, we elect to treat the appeal of the non-final order as a petition for a writ of certiorari. See The Doll House, Inc., v. Porter, TCB, [*921] 436 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). We affirm as to point one on the basis that there is competent substantial evidence that the contract at issue was made in Florida. The record reveals ample evidence supporting the deputy’s finding that the employment contract w…
Authorities Cited
- The Wash House & S.C. Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 413 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
- Seidlin v. State, 426 So. 2d 1312 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)
- Mills Elec. Contractors & Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Marthens, 417 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
- The Crown Hotel & Kent Ins. Co. v. Friedman, 420 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
- Gen. Elec. Co. & Elec. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Hawkins, 413 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
- Cast Crete Corp. & R. P. Hewitt & Assocs. v. Turner, 413 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
- RAY Roofing Co., Inc. v. Young, 419 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
- Special Disability Tr. Fund v. Motor & Compressor Co. & Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 417 So. 2d 1151 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
- J. D. v. State, 417 So. 2d 1151 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)