ELIZABETH GERVAIS, D/B/A THE STARDUST BAR, APPELLANT,
v.
DIVISION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO, APPELLEE
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Elizabeth Gervais appealed an emergency suspension of her liquor license for the Stardust Bar issued by the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco after officers observed drug transactions at the establishment. The court affirmed the emergency suspension, holding that the Division complied with statutory requirements by setting forth specific facts establishing an immediate danger to public welfare.
The court affirmed the emergency suspension order, finding that the Division satisfied the statutory requirement to set forth specific facts and reasons supporting a finding of immediate danger to public health, safety, or welfare necessitating emergency suspension.
[1] An agency may enter an emergency order summarily suspending a license if it finds that an immediate, serious danger to the public health, safety, or welfare requires such…
[2] An agency order of emergency suspension must set forth specific facts and reasons for the finding of immediate danger to the public welfare.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Section 120.60(7) authorizes an agency to enter an emergency order summarily suspending, restricting, or limiting a license if the agency finds that an immediate, serious danger to the public health, safety, or welfare requires such action.”
Establishes the statutory standard for emergency suspension of licenses
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBeverage officers observed ten drug transactions at the Stardust Bar over a five-day period, with three allegedly involving bar employees and others i…
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BOARDMAN, Acting Chief Judge.
Elizabeth Gervais, the owner of the Stardust Bar, filed a petition for writ of certiorari 1 seeking review of an emergency order entered by the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco which suspended operation of the bar’s liquor license. We affirm the suspension order.2
Pursuant to section 561.29 and section 120.60(7), Florida Statutes (1981), the Division entered its order of emergency suspension on June 29, 1983, after beverage officers observed ten drug transactions take place at the bar over a five-day period. Three of these transactions allegedly involved employees of the Stardust Bar, while the others involved bar patrons and a bartender whose employment status is disputed. The Division simultaneously issued a formal notice to show cause why appellant’s license should not be suspended or revoked or civil penalty imposed, and a full hearing was held on this matter on July 7, 1983.3
The only question presented here at this stage of the proceedings is the appropriateness of the emergency order of sus pension. Section 120.60(7) authorizes an agency to enter an emergency order summarily suspending, restricting, or limiting a license if the agency finds that an immediate, serious danger to the public health, safety, or welfare requires such action. An agency entering an order of emergency suspension must show compliance in its order with the requirements imposed by section 120.54(9) on agencies making emergency rules.
As is required by section 120.-54(9)(a)3, the order in the instant case clearly set forth specific facts and reasons for the Division’s finding of immediate danger to the public welfare necessitating emergency suspension of appellant’s license. We believe those reasons sufficiently support the Division’s order. See Lerro v. Department of Professional Regulation, 388 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Saviak v. Gunter, 375 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). Cf. Commercial Consultants Corp. v. Department of Professional Regulation, 363 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (temporary order’s conclusory prediction of harm found insufficient to satisfy statutory requirement). Therefore, we AFFIRM the emergency suspension of appellant’s license.
RYDER and DANAHY, JJ., concur. . We treat the petition for certiorari as an appeal from a nonfinal administrative order under § 120.68(1), Fla.Stat. (1981) and Rule 9.100, Fla.R.App.P. . We, of course, do not express any view as to the merits of the final revocation proceedings which are currently under way.
.Petitioner raises no complaint as to the constitutional validity of the Division’s postsuspension procedures.
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Witmer v. Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l Reg., 631 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)…Little v. Coler, 557 So. 2d 157, 158 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). The scope of review is limited to a determination of whether the emergency order complies with the requirements of section 120.54(9)(a)3. Gervais v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 438 So. 2d 90, 90-91 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). That section imposes the following requirements upon administrative agencies that seek to take emergency action which substantially affects a licensee or other individual: The agency publishes in writing at the time of, o…
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Stock v. Dep't OF Banking & Fin., 584 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)…of future harm. There is ample precedent supporting the suspension of a licensee upon showing of past harm when the harm is sufficiently serious and of a nature likely to be repeated. See, e.g., Gervais v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 438 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (ten drug transactions during five-day period, some of which involved liquor licensee’s employees); Aurora Enterprises, Inc. v. State, 395 So. 2d 604 (Principal of corporate liquor licensee violated narcotics laws.); Lerro v. Depa…
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Pinacoteca Corp. v. Dep't of Bus. Reg., 580 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)…ncy order sufficiently identifies particularized facts showing an immediate danger to the public welfare. See Pure Fresh, 510 So. 2d at 1020; Denney v. Conner, 462 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Gervais v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 438 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). An alcoholic beverage licensee is not an absolute insurer of the propriety of all conduct and human activities upon its premises, but it is held to high degree of accountability for a violation of law occurring during the operat…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Commercial Consultants Corp. & Linene Woods, Inc. v. Dep't of Bus. Reg., 363 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)
- Saviak v. Gunter, 375 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)
- Lerro v. Dep't OF Prof'l Reg., 388 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)