DONTRA MCNEIL, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court held that second-degree murder is not a capital or life felony, and therefore a defendant convicted of it may be eligible for youthful offender treatment.
Appellant sought post-conviction relief to be treated as a youthful offender, but the trial court denied his motion. The denial was based on a statute…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Capital Felony cases and more on FLexlaw
SHIVERS, Judge.
McNeil appeals the order of the trial court denying his Fla.R.Crim.P. 8.850 motion for post-conviction relief. Appellant contended in his 3.850 motion that he meets the criteria for treatment as a youthful offender under Chapter 958, Florida Statutes. The trial court denied the motion based on section 958.04(l)(c), Florida Statutes, which provides that no person who has been found guilty of a capital or life felony may be classified as a youthful offender. Because appellant was not convicted of a capital or life felony, we reverse and remand.
Appellant entered a plea of guilty and was adjudicated guilty of murder in the second degree. Under section 782.04(2), Florida Statutes (1981), murder in the second degree is a felony of the first degree punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life. As this court stated in Williams v. State, 405 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981): [Authorization of imprisonment for “a term of years not exceeding life” under § 782.04(2) does not reasonably support classification of the offense as a life felony for Chapter 958 purposes ....
Id. at 438. See also Brown v. State, 412 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). Therefore, the trial court erred in not considering whether appellant should be classified as a youthful offender. Appellant’s further contention that the court must sentence him under the provisions of the Youthful Offender Act is without merit. Bell v. State, 429 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).1
Accordingly, the order of March 9, 1983, is REVERSED and this cause REMANDED for further consistent proceedings.
MILLS and BOOTH, JJ., concur. . The offense in the instant case occurred on April 9, 1982. Thus, the 1980 amendment to section 958.04(2), Florida Statutes, discussed in Bell, applies here. We note, however, that consideration of the criteria contained in section 958.04(2), Florida Statutes (1981) is mandatory when a person meets the requirements of section 958.04(1).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
LEE v. State, 667 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)…(Supp.1980). The version of the statute which applied in Lee’s case only mandates “consideration of the criteria contained in section 958.04(2), Florida Statutes (1981) ... when a person meets the requirements of section 958.04(1).” McNeil v. State, 438 So. 2d 178, 179 n. 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).1 The statute2 does not dictate that the defendant be sentenced as a youthful offender in every case in which it appliés. In the order denying Lee’s motion to correct an illegal sentence, the circuit judge (who was not…
-
Springer v. State, 660 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)…v. State, 438 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983) (challenge to sentence based on trial court’s failure to consider defendant’s eligibility for Youthful Offender status cognizable on Rule 3.850 motion/petition for writ of habeas corpus); McNeil v. State, 438 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (same); Goodson v. State, 392 So. 2d 1335 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980) (alleged error in trial court’s failure to sentence defendant as youthful offender cognizable under Rule 3.800). We therefore certify the following question to the Flo…
-
Postell v. State, 971 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008)…, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life or as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.” Authorization of imprisonment for “a term of years not exceeding life” is not the same as a “life felony.” McNeil v. State, 438 So. 2d 178, 178-79 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). The State correctly concedes that none of Mr. Postell’s crimes were life felonies as the trial court concluded. The [*989] State also concedes that Mr. Postell’s crimes were not subject to a mandatory enhancement to life…1 / 2
Authorities Cited
- Holmes v. State, 405 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- Williams v. State, 405 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)
- Brown v. State, 412 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)