HARRY BERENTER, APPELLANT,
v.
RUTH E. STAGGERS ET AL., APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court held that the trial judge did not err in granting the motion for involuntary dismissal of the mechanic's lien claim.
Appellant sued to enforce a mechanic's lien for remodeling work on a property owned by the decedent. The appellant alleged the decedent's agent engage…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Enforcement Of Mechanic'S Lien cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM:
The District Court dismissed this appellant’s complaint to enforce a mechanic’s lien against premises located at 501 D Street, N. W. in the District of Columbia. He had alleged that the owner of the property, decedent, John W. Staggers, “by and through his agent and lessee, Diana Auger engaged” the appellant’s services in remodeling and repairing the premises for use as a restaurant “known as Colonial Inn.” His complaint further alleged that the decedent Staggers “by and through his agent, agreed to pay” for the labor and materials. The agreement was oral.
D.C.Code § 38-111 (1961) provides that if “the right of the complainant * * * to the lien * * * shall be established, the court shall decree a sale of the land and premises or the estate and interest therein of the person who, as owner, contracted [for the work done].” The District Judge found that there had been no testimony to establish that Diana Auger was the agent of the deceased; that the appellant’s testimony had been inconsistent, contradictory and improbable on the issue of whether or not the deceased agreed to pay for the work. The trier refused to accept as “creditable the testimony of the plaintiff that the deceased himself promised to pay for this work and materials.” Additionally, the findings are specific that “the testimony of the plaintiff that the deceased promised to pay for the labor and materials was not corroborated by the ambiguous testimony of * * * the only other witness, to the effect that the deceased would take care of the matter and see to it that Berenter got his money.” 1 We have been asked to set aside the order of dismissal on the ground that the record as a whole would demonstrate error on the part of the trial judge. Our examination leads us to conclude, however, that the trial judge did not err 2 in granting the appellees’ motion for involuntary dismissal.
The judgment is
Affirmed.
. Compare D.C.Code § 14-302 (1961).
. Certainly error is not to be presumed but must be made affirmatively to appear by the party asserting it, Wabash Ry. Co. v. Bridal, 94 F. 2d 117, 121 (8 Cir.), cert. denied 305 U.S. 602, 59 S.Ct. 63, 83 L. Ed. 382 (1938); cf. T.V.T. Corporation v. Basiliko, 103 U.S.App.D.C. 181, 183, 257 F. 2d 185, 187 (1958).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
McGRATH v. Zenith Radio Corp., 651 F.2d 458 (7th Cir. 1981)
-
United States v. Jones, 527 F.2d 817 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
-
United States For the Use of Ga. Elec. Supply Co., Inc. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 656 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1981)
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Gilliam v. United States, 257 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1958)
- Wabash Ry. Co. v. Bridal, 94 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1938)
- Wabash Ry. Co. v. Bridal, 305 U.S. 602 (U.S. 1938)