DONALD R. FIELDS, APPELLANT,
v.
JACK ECKERD CORPORATION, APPELLEE
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A Florida appellate court vacated a trial court's order denying an indigent appellant's right to proceed without paying filing fees on a second appeal in the same case, holding that the trial court lacked authority to sua sponte revoke the appellant's indigency status without notice, hearing, or evidence of changed circumstances.
The trial court's sua sponte revocation of the appellant's indigency status was unwarranted and without proper authority. The appellant's prior adjudication of indigency, made only 136 days before the second notice of appeal with no evidence of changed circumstances, entitled him to proceed as an indigent in the subsequent appeal with the concessions granted under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.430.
[1] A trial court's sua sponte order revoking an appellant's indigency status without notice or an evidentiary hearing is unwarranted when there is no indication that the app…
[2] An order of indigency granted for appellate purposes in a case does not automatically carry over to subsequent appellate proceedings without further consideration.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Appellant was adjudged insolvent for purposes of appellate action in the same case only 136 days prior to the filing of his second notice of 'appeal.' Appellee was not given notice to requalify and no evidentiary hearing was held. There was no evidence, indication, or suggestion that appellant's status as an indigent had changed.”
Establishes the temporal proximity of the indigency adjudication and demonstrates the absence of procedural safeguards and evidentiary basis for revocation.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant Fields, proceeding in proper person, filed a complaint against his former employer Jack Eckerd Corporation alleging breach of contract, frau…
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OTT, Chief Judge.
This is a proceeding in proper person. Appellant filed a complaint against appel-lee, his former employer, charging breach of employment contract, fraud, deceit, slander, and invasion of privacy.
On October 15, 1982, the trial court granted appellee’s motion to compel discovery. Appellant timely petitioned this court for a writ of certiorari.
On November 29, 1982, in conjunction with the petition for certiorari, the trial court adjudged appellant to be indigent within the meaning of section 57.081, Florida Statutes (1981), and ordered that appellant could proceed pursuant to rule 9.430 of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Appellant’s petition for certiorari was denied by this court without opinion. Fields v. Jack Eckerd Corp., 424 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982).
Upon remand of the case to the trial court, appellee’s motion to dismiss with prejudice was ultimately granted. Appellant timely filed his notice to appeal from the final order of dismissal on April 14,1983, without payment of filing fees. The following day, the trial court sua sponte entered an order, advising appellant that the order of insolvency in the prior “appeal” did not carry over to further appellate proceedings. The instant case involves review of the trial court’s April 15, 1983 order. Appellant was adjudged insolvent for purposes of appellate action in the same case only 136 days prior to the filing of his second notice of “appeal.” Appellee was not given notice to requalify and no evidentiary hearing was held. There was no evidence, indication, or suggestion that appellant’s status as an indigent had changed. Given these facts, we think the sua sponte action of the trial court was unwarranted.
Accordingly, the trial court’s April 15, 1983 order is VACATED, and appellant is granted the right to pursue his appeal in Fields v. Jack Eckerd Corp., No. 83-1338, with the concessions granted indigents in rule 9.430.
It is so ORDERED.
RYDER and LEHAN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Keene v. Nudera, 661 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)
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Fields v. Jack Eckerd Corp., 439 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
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Martin v. State, 530 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)…n for insolvency, counsel complied with section 57.081(1), Florida Statutes, by including an affidavit stating he had received no fee for his representation. We find the facts in this case analogous to those presented in Fields v. Jack Eckerd Corp., 439 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1983), and, absent a showing of change in the status of appellant, the trial court incorrectly denied her request. We therefore reverse and remand this cause to the trial court to reconsider its decision to deny certification of appell…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Fields v. Jack Eckerd Corp., 439 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)