DANNY CHARLES COLLINS, APPELLANT,
v.
FLORIDA PAROLE AND PROBATION COMMISSION, APPELLEE
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Danny Collins challenged the Florida Parole and Probation Commission's computation of his presumptive parole release date, arguing that the Commission improperly relied on a juvenile probation offense from Arkansas in calculating his salient factor score. The court affirmed the Commission's decision, holding that Collins' challenge was barred because he had already raised the identical issue in a prior administrative review.
The Court affirmed the Commission's decision, holding that Collins' salient factor score challenge was barred because it was identical to an issue already raised and considered by the Commission in his first administrative review in 1979. The Commission's special action in reestablishing the presumptive parole release date pursuant to Holston did not reopen questions already decided by the Commission.
[1] A juvenile offense resulting in probation without a specific finding of guilt does not count in the salient factor score for parole release date computation.
[2] A prior administrative decision by the Parole and Probation Commission, which was not judicially reviewed, forecloses relitigation of the same issue in subsequent proceed…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Conduct resulting in diversion from the judicial process without a specific finding of guilt (e.g., deferred prosecution, informal probation, pretrial intervention, probation without plea, adjudication withheld) is not counted in scoring (the salient factor score).”
This administrative rule citation establishes Collins' legal argument that juvenile probation without a specific finding of guilt should not be counted in the salient factor score.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCollins was an inmate whose parole release date was initially set at August 11, 1987 based on a salient factor score of '1'. The Commission later modi…
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ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., Chief Judge.
Appellant Collins contends, among other things, that the Florida Parole and Probation Commission erred in computing his presumptive parole release date by using an improper salient factor score. Specifically, he urges that the Commission cannot rely upon a juvenile offense for which he was placed on probation in Arkansas to support its finding in the salient factor score that he has a prior conviction. See Fla.Admin.Code Rule 23-19.04(l)(e):
Conduct resulting in diversion from the judicial process without a specific finding of guilt (e.g., deferred prosecution, informal probation, pretrial intervention, probation without plea, adjudication withheld) is not counted in scoring (the salient factor score).
We disagree and affirm.
On August 27, 1979, a parole examiner initially recommended a presumptive parole release date of August 11, 1987. The full Commission, however, modified Collins’ salient factor score from “1” to “2” and set his presumptive parole release date at “life.” Collins then sought administrative review before the Commission and argued, as one of his issues, that the salient factor score had been improperly modified by use of this alleged juvenile probation in Arkansas. The Commission affirmed, and Collins sought no judicial review of the Commission’s order. Compare Canter v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 409 So. 2d 227 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
On May 20, 1981, the Commission on its own initiative held a hearing to establish a proper presumptive parole release date to replace the improper “life” designation. See Holston v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 394 So. 2d 1110 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).1 Upon administrative review before the Commission, Collins again unsuccessful ly urged error in the Commission’s computation of his salient factor score. This appeal ensued.
Considering this sequence of events, we conclude that the contention now made is foreclosed because it is identical to the issue raised by Collins and considered by the Commission at his first section 947.173 review in 1979. See Broxson v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 425 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); McClain v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 416 So. 2d 1209 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Gatto v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 415 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). The Commission’s special action in reestablishing his presumptive parole release date pursuant to the dictates of Holston did not reopen questions already decided by the Commission.
We have considered the other issues raised and find them to be without merit.
AFFIRMED.
LARRY G. SMITH and THOMPSON, JJ., concur. . In Holston, this court held that the Commission may not simply set an inmate’s presumptive parole release date at “life,” as here, but must instead establish a date certain. 394 So. 2d at 1111.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- State v. Colli, 415 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
- Canter v. Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm'n, 409 So. 2d 227 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
- McCLAIN v. Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm'n, 416 So. 2d 1209 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
- Holston v. Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm'n, 394 So. 2d 1110 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)
- Broxson v. Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm'n, 425 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)