THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
VARGAS VILA JIMENEZ, APPELLEE
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The State appeals a trial court's sentencing of a defendant convicted of sexual battery of a child under Florida law. The court held that despite the death penalty for this offense being struck down, the mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years before parole eligibility still applies under Florida Statutes § 775.082(1), and reversed the lenient sentence imposed.
A defendant convicted under § 794.011(2) must be automatically punished by life imprisonment with a mandatory requirement to serve no less than 25 years before becoming eligible for parole, as mandated by § 775.082(1), regardless of whether the offense is technically no longer a capital crime after the death penalty was struck down.
[1] A defendant convicted of sexual battery under Section 794.011(2), Florida Statutes, must be sentenced to life imprisonment with a mandatory minimum of twenty-five years b…
[2] A plea agreement based on a misapprehension of the mandatory minimum sentence may be grounds for a motion to vacate the conviction and plea.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“even though sexual battery under Section 794.011(2) is not a capital crime in the sense that it may result in the imposition of the death penalty, the punishment for that crime must still be imposed under Section 775.082(1) to its constitutional limits. This means that one convicted under Section 794.011(2) must be automatically 'punished by life imprisonment and shall be required to serve no less than 25 years before becoming eligible for parole.'”
Establishes the core holding that mandatory minimum sentences apply regardless of capital status
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDefendant Jimenez, an adult, was charged with sexual battery of a person eleven years old or younger under § 794.011(2). He entered a guilty plea base…
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PER CURIAM.
The defendant, a person over the age of eighteen, was charged with sexual battery of a person eleven years of age or younger in violation of Section 794.011(2), Florida Statutes (1981). He entered a plea of guilty to this charge in reliance on the trial court’s pre-plea ruling that since the death penalty for this offense had been struck down as unconstitutional,1 and the offense was thereby no longer a capital crime, the defendant would be sentenced to life imprisonment without any requirement that he serve a minimum mandatory prison term of twenty-five years before becoming eligible for parole. The trial court, true to its earlier ruling, imposed a life sentence with no minimum mandatory prison term. The State appeals.
While the ruling of the trial court is not without support, see Hogan v. State, 427 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) (defendant charged with sexual battery under Section 794.011(2) not entitled to twelve-person jury, since offense no longer capital crime after death penalty abolished); see also Rowe v. State, 417 So. 2d 981 (Fla.1982), we agree with the decision of the Second District in Rusaw v. State, 429 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), that
“even though sexual battery under Section 794.011(2) is not a capital crime in the sense that it may result in the imposition of the death penalty, the punishment for that crime must still be imposed under Section 775.082(1) to its constitutional limits. This means that one convicted under Section 794.011(2) must be automatically 'punished by life imprisonment and shall be required to serve no less than 25 years before becoming eligible for parole.’ ” 429 So. 2d at 1380.
Accordingly, we reverse the sentence imposed and remand the cause for the imposition of the sentence mandated by Section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes (1981), without prejudice, of course, to the right of the defendant to file an appropriate motion to vacate his conviction and plea as being made under a misapprehension of the sentence he would receive.
We hereby certify to the Supreme Court the following question as being one which will have a great effect on the administration of justice throughout the state:
Must a defendant convicted of a violation of Section 794.011(2), Florida Statutes (1981), be sentenced to life imprisonment with the requirement that he serve no less than twenty-five years before becoming eligible for parole, as provided in Section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes?
Reversed and remanded.
. See Buford v. State, 403 So. 2d 943 (Fla.1981).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Leduc v. State, 448 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)…ains applicable for the crime of sexual battery regardless of the elimination of the death penalty for that crime. See Buford v. State; Donaldson v. Sack, 265 So. 2d 499 (Fla.1972); Duke v. State, 444 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); State v. Jimenez, 443 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); State v. Mendoza, 444 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). But see, Hogan v. State, 427 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED. We certify, however, to the Supreme Court of Florida th…
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State v. Mendoza, 444 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)…e that it may result in the imposition of the death penalty, it must nonetheless be punished by life imprisonment with the requirement that the defendant serve no less than twenty-five years before becoming eligible for parole, see State v. Jimenez, 443 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), we reverse the thirty-year sentence imposed and remand the cause for the imposition of the sentence originally and correctly imposed as being mandated by Section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes (1981). As we did in State v. Jimenez,…
Authorities Cited
- Buford v. State, 403 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 1981)
- Rowe v. State, 417 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 1982)
- COX v. State, 427 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)
- Myrick Graham v. State, 429 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Rusaw v. State, 429 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)