THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
ROBERTO MENDOZA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1984-01-31
No. 83-1738
Before NESBITT, DANIEL S. PEARSON and FERGUSON, JJ.
444 So. 2d 570 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1984) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Holding

The court held that a conviction for sexual battery under Section 794.011(2) mandates a life sentence with a minimum of twenty-five years before parole eligibility, regardless of whether the death penalty can be imposed.


Facts & Procedural History

Mendoza was convicted of sexual battery and sentenced to life imprisonment with a 25-year minimum mandatory term. After the death penalty was removed …

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Mendoza, a person over the age of eighteen, was charged, tried and convicted of the offense of sexual battery of a person eleven years of age or younger, a violation of Section 794.011(2), Florida Statutes (1981). The trial court sentenced Mendoza to life imprisonment, requiring him to serve a minimum mandatory prison term of twenty-five years before becoming eligible for parole.

After his conviction was affirmed on appeal, see Mendoza v. State, 427 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), Mendoza moved in the trial court to correct his sentence, asserting that since the death penalty can no longer be imposed for sexual battery, the offense is no longer a capital crime punishable by a denial of eligibility of parole for twenty-five years. The trial court granted Mendoza’s motion and changed the sentence to a term of imprisonment of thirty years. The State appeals.

Having recently held that notwithstanding that sexual battery is not a capital crime in the sense that it may result in the imposition of the death penalty, it must nonetheless be punished by life imprisonment with the requirement that the defendant serve no less than twenty-five years before becoming eligible for parole, see State v. Jimenez, 443 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), we reverse the thirty-year sentence imposed and remand the cause for the imposition of the sentence originally and correctly imposed as being mandated by Section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes (1981). As we did in State v. Jimenez, we certify to the Supreme court the following question as being one which will have a great effect on the administration of justice throughout the state:

Must a defendant convicted of a violation of Section 794.011(2), Florida Statutes (1981), be sentenced to life imprisonment with the requirement that he serve no less than twenty-five years before becoming eligible for parole, as provided in Section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes?

Reversed and remanded.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Cooper v. State, 453 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
    …. 2d at 954. See also Duke v. State, 444 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1984). The Third District agrees with Ru-saw with respect to the appropriate sentence under Section 794.011(2). State v. Jimenez, 445 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1983); State v. Mendoza, 444 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1984). There being no error in the state’s reliance upon an information as the appropriate charging document and in the use of a [*69] 6-member jury, the judgment is AFFIRMED. We certify the following as a question of great public im…
  • Leduc v. State, 448 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
    …dless of the elimination of the death penalty for that crime. See Buford v. State; Donaldson v. Sack, 265 So. 2d 499 (Fla.1972); Duke v. State, 444 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); State v. Jimenez, 443 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); State v. Mendoza, 444 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). But see, Hogan v. State, 427 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED. We certify, however, to the Supreme Court of Florida the following as questions of great public importance,…

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