LEONARD J. OSTERINK, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
JACK R. MOON, TRUSTEE AND INDIVIDUALLY, BARNETT BANK OF NAPLES, TRUSTEE, PATENT CONCERN, N.V., A FOREIGN CORPORATION, WILLIAM E. TOWNSEND, WALTER R. ROGERS, WILLIAM T. BARRETT, JR., ROBERT T. BENSON, JR., J. THAD MOSS, WILLIAM H. BUCHANNAN, III, BENNY RUTH GOODMAN, AND WALTER ROGERS, APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS, V. LEE COUNTY BANK & TRUST COMPANY, AS TRUSTEE UNDER THE WILL OF WILLIAM DAY HIXON, DECEASED, MARY JO HIXON, AND FLAGSHIP NATIONAL BANK OF MIAMI, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF WILLIAM DAY HIXON, CROSS-APPELLEES
LEONARD J. OSTERINK, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
JACK R. MOON, TRUSTEE AND INDIVIDUALLY, BARNETT BANK OF NAPLES, TRUSTEE, PATENT CONCERN, N.V., A FOREIGN CORPORATION, WILLIAM E. TOWNSEND, WALTER R. ROGERS, WILLIAM T. BARRETT, JR., ROBERT T. BENSON, JR., J. THAD MOSS, WILLIAM H. BUCHANNAN, III, BENNY RUTH GOODMAN, AND WALTER ROGERS, APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS, V. LEE COUNTY BANK & TRUST COMPANY, AS TRUSTEE UNDER THE WILL OF WILLIAM DAY HIXON, DECEASED, MARY JO HIXON, AND FLAGSHIP NATIONAL BANK OF MIAMI, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF WILLIAM DAY HIXON, CROSS-APPELLEES
443 So. 2d 388
Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1983)
Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases
Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.
Finding support in the record for the trial court’s ruling that no contract existed between the parties, we affirm that decision. We also affirm the trial court’s requirement of the return to the purchaser of his deposit money, plus expenses, and the denial of interest and attorney’s fees. We find no error in the trial court’s ruling that Hixon was not bound by the trust agreement.
AFFIRMED.
RYDER, A.C.J., and DANAHY and LE-HAN, JJ., concur.
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