ESTHER R. COX, APPELLANT,
v.
JACK A. COX, APPELLEE
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In this divorce enforcement case, the wife appeals the dismissal of her contempt motion and modification petition after her ex-husband stopped making mortgage payments labeled as 'lump sum alimony' under their property settlement agreement. The court reverses, holding that payments designated as alimony are enforceable through contempt proceedings regardless of whether they benefit a third party.
The court holds that payments explicitly labeled as alimony in a divorce agreement are enforceable through contempt proceedings, and that alimony can constitute proper payments to a third party. The trial court erred in characterizing the mortgage payments as a mere monetary inducement to the property settlement rather than alimony.
[1] A court retains jurisdiction to enforce executory provisions of a final judgment of dissolution of marriage that incorporates a property settlement agreement.
[2] Payments designated as lump sum alimony in a property settlement agreement are enforceable through contempt proceedings, even if paid to a third party.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We find nothing in the record establishing that the payments required in paragraph 13 were anything other than what they were labeled — lump suip alimony. Therefore, contempt is an appropriate means for enforcing the provisions of the paragraph.”
Establishes the holding that payments designated as alimony are enforceable through contempt regardless of characterization by the trial court.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties' 1981 divorce decree incorporated a Property Settlement Agreement requiring the husband to pay the wife's second mortgage as 'lump sum ali…
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DANAHY, Judge.
In these consolidated appeals, the wife challenges orders dismissing her motion for contempt and her petition for modification of the final judgment of dissolution of marriage. We reverse.
The marriage of the parties was dissolved by a final judgment entered on September 29, 1981. That judgment approved and incorporated an agreement of the parties entitled “Property Settlement Agreement” and retained jurisdiction for the enforcement of executory provisions. Paragraph 18 of the agreement provided as follows:
The Husband shall pay the Second Mortgage on the Wife’s house ..., as lump sum alimony, as they become due, and the Wife shall be held harmless by the Husband for any liability associated with the Second Mortgage owed to Southeast Bank of Pasco with the approximate balance due of $19,921.60. The husband made payments pursuant to paragraph 13 until September of 1983. On September 26, 1983, the wife obtained an agreement from the Southeast Bank of Pasco to accept a certificate of deposit from the wife as collateral in lieu of the second mortgage, so as to assist the wife in selling the property. Subsequently, the wife did sell the property. Apparently, it was these events which caused the husband to stop making the mortgage payments.
Because of the husband’s refusal to make any further payments, the wife filed a motion for contempt seeking enforcement of paragraph 13. She also filed a motion to modify the terms of the final judgment so as to direct the husband to make the paragraph 13 payments directly to the wife. The trial judge ruled that as a matter of law the obligation of the husband under paragraph 13 did not constitute alimony, but rather represented a monetary inducement to the property settlement agreement. Accordingly, the trial judge granted the husband’s motion to dismiss the wife’s motion for contempt and the motion was dismissed. By separate order, the trial judge dismissed the petition for modification on the same grounds.
We find nothing in the record establishing that the payments required in paragraph 13 were anything other than what they were labeled — lump suip alimony. Therefore, contempt is an appropriate means for enforcing the provisions of the paragraph. Witter v. Witter, 443 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Masters v. Masters, 443 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Brisco v. Brisco, 355 So. 2d 506 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). Payments may be a proper form of alimony even though they are to be made to a third party. Stith v. Stith, 384 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
Accordingly, we reverse both orders under review and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
RYDER, C.J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Hobbs v. Hobbs, 518 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)…, if the debt owed by the husband in the case at bar can fairly be characterized as unpaid lump sum alimony, directed to be paid in a final judgment of dissolution, contempt can then be appropriately utilized to enforce the judgment. See Cox v. Cox, 462 So. 2d 122 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). The $30,000-debt of the husband was not, however, labeled as lump sum alimony in the judgment, and the wife explicitly waived her right to any alimony. As in Marks, we consider that the parties’ agreements were part of an overall…
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Borchard v. Borchard, 730 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)…t term marriage” and discussing the proper weight to be given to the factors of need and ability to pay in short-term marriages). . An award of lump sum alimony can generate several complex issues, including: (1) how the award is taxed, Cox v. Cox, 462 So. 2d 122 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); (2) whether the award is dis-chargeable in bankruptcy, Masters v. Masters, 443 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), Doerflein v. Doerflein, 724 So. 2d 153, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D2721 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998), Montgomery v. Montgomery, 169 B.R.…
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Pipitone v. Pipitone, 23 So. 3d 131 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)…hat it was part of an exchange of property rights). The lack of evidence suggesting that the payments are in exchange for property rights or obligations renders contempt an available remedy for nonpayment. See English, 462 So. 2d at 878; Cox v. Cox, 462 So. 2d 122, 123 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). Modifiability “[A] true property settlement agreement, in which one party gives up valuable property rights in exchange for the right to receive periodic payments, is not subject to modification.” O’Hara v. O’Hara, 564 So.…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Brisco v. Brisco, 355 So. 2d 506 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)
- Stith v. Stith, 384 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)
- Edwards v. Yellow CAB Co. OF Lakeland, Inc., 443 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)
- Osterink v. Moon, 443 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Masters v. Masters, 443 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)