UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
STIG B. THUNE, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

5th Cir. | 1969-05-22
No. 26962
411 F.2d 620 Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (1969) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.


Holding

The court held that the district judge's advice regarding the impeachment use of prior convictions was not grounds for reversal.


Facts & Procedural History

Appellant was convicted of transporting a stolen automobile in interstate commerce. The sole assignment of error concerned the judge's advice during a…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM:

PER CURIAM:

Pursuant to new Rule 18 of the Rules of this court, we have concluded on the merits that this case is of such character as not to justify oral argument and have directed the clerk to place the case on the Summary Calendar and to notify the parties in writing. See Murphy v. Houma Well Service, 5 Cir., 1969, 409 F. 2d 804.

This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction entered on a jury verdict finding appellant guilty of transporting a stolen automobile in interstate commerce. Title 18 U.S.C.A., § 2312. The sole assignment of error is based on advice given by the district judge during a recess with respect to the extent to which appellant’s prior criminal record might be brought out should he testify. In a general discussion of the subject with counsel, instigated by the prosecution, the court indicated that for impeachment purposes the prosecution might inquire of the defendant as to the number of his prior convictions and the name of the crime committed.1 The court also indicated that a recent prior conviction for the same offense would be admissible on the question of defendant’s intent once the elements of possession and transportation were found. The recess took place after the Government had rested. Appellant then rested without presenting any evidence.

Appellant’s criminal record was not introduced nor is it otherwise disclosed in the record and thus is not before us. It does appear, based on the conversation with the court, that appellant was released from prison on the day of the theft in question and that he was in prison on a judgment of conviction entered on a previous Dyer Act charge. This prior conviction would have been admissible on the question of intent just as the district court stated. Miller v. United States, 5 Cir., 1968, 397 F. 2d 272; Brumley v. United States, 5 Cir., 1967, 379 F. 2d 327; Weiss v. United States, 5 Cir., 1941, 122 F. 2d 675.

Affirmed.

. On the merits of the admissibility of prior convictions against an accused for impeachment purposes, see Reese v. United States, 5 Cir., 1965, 353 F. 2d 732; and Hurst v. United States, 5 Cir., 1964, 337 E.2d 678. Where the witness to be impeached is not the accused, see Beaudine v. United States, 5 Cir., 1966, 368 F. 2d 417, 420-421, and particularly footnotes 8 and 9. See also Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts and Magistrates, March 1969, Rule 4-04 (b), and Rule 6-09.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw