LEONARD A. SANTOPOLO, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT

Fla. 2d DCA | 1984-01-13
No. 83-2442
BOARDMAN and LEHAN, JJ., concur.
443 So. 2d 1059 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1984) Negative Treatment
Cited by 9 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Petitioner Santopolo sought a writ of certiorari challenging the trial court's denial of an adversary preliminary hearing after the state declined to proceed. The court held that once an information was filed after the 21-day deadline and the defendant received release on his own recognizance (the maximum available relief), no further adversary preliminary hearing was required.


Holding

A defendant is entitled to an adversary preliminary hearing when not charged within 21 days of arrest, but when the state declines to proceed and the defendant receives release on his own recognizance (the maximum relief available), the trial court's refusal to reset the hearing for presentation of material witnesses does not constitute a departure from essential requirements of law.


Headnotes

[1] A defendant is entitled to an adversary preliminary hearing on a felony charge if no information or indictment has been filed within twenty-one days of arrest or service…

[2] If probable cause is not established at an adversary preliminary hearing after the twenty-one-day period, and an information has been filed, the magistrate shall release…

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Key Quotes

“Under rule 3.133(b)(1), a defendant is entitled to an adversary preliminary hearing on any felony charge pending against him where he has not been charged with an information or indictment within twenty-one days from the date of his arrest or service of the capias. The subsequent filing of an information or indictment shall not eliminate a defendant's entitlement to this proceeding.”

Establishes the foundational right to an adversary preliminary hearing after 21 days without charges

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Facts & Procedural History

Santopolo was arrested on August 30, 1983, and remained in custody for 21 days without an information or indictment. His motion for an adversary preli…

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Opinion of the Court
OTT, Chief Judge.

OTT, Chief Judge.

In this petition for writ of certiorari, petitioner contends that the trial court’s order denying his request for an adversary preliminary hearing represents a departure from the essential requirements of the law. He cites Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.133(b)(1) and Bell v. State, 361 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), in support of his position. We disagree and therefore deny the petition but do so with opinion.

Petitioner was arrested on August 30, 1983. He remained in custody for twenty-one days without an information or indictment being filed. Petitioner’s motion for an adversary preliminary hearing was granted. Prior to the actual hearing, petitioner was released on a surety bond in the amount of $100,000. At the beginning of the scheduled hearing, the state attorney declined to proceed with the adversary preliminary hearing. However, the state attorney did establish that an information had been filed against petitioner after the twenty-one-day period and before the hearing on petitioner’s motion for an adversary preliminary hearing. The trial court thereafter ordered petitioner released on his own recognizance.

Petitioner maintains that under the facts of this case he is entitled to an adversary preliminary hearing at which the state must present all witnesses which will be material to this case. We disagree.

Under rule 3.133(b)(1), a defendant is entitled to an adversary preliminary hearing on any felony charge pending against him where he has not been charged with an information or indictment within twenty-one days from the date of his arrest or service of the capias. The subsequent filing of an information or indictment shall not eliminate a defendant’s entitlement to this proceeding. Id. In cases where probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it is not established and an information has been filed after the twenty-one-day period, the magistrate shall release the defendant on his own recognizance subject to the condition that he appear at all court proceedings. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.133(b)(5). The defendant could also be released under a summons to appear before the appropriate court at a time certain. Id.

In the instant case, after the prosecutor chose not to proceed with the adversary preliminary hearing, the trial court granted defendant all available relief by releasing him on his own recognizance. Indeed, defendant could have realized no greater relief had the prosecutor presented insufficient proof of probable cause. Because the relief sought has been realized, we find that the trial court’s decision not to reset a date for another adversary preliminary hearing at which the state would be required to present all material witnesses did not amount to a departure from the essential requirements of the law.

We believe that our holding does not conflict with the court’s decision in Bell v. State, supra. There, an information was filed on the twenty-third day after the defendant’s arrest. Although a nonadver-sary preliminary hearing had previously been held and the defendant was released on bond, he demanded an adversary preliminary hearing. Reluctantly, the court agreed that he was entitled to such a hearing. We believe that the distinguishing factor between Bell and the instant case is that Bell, who was released on bond, could possibly realize some gain if a lack of probable cause were found at the adversary preliminary hearing, i.e., he could be released on his own recognizance.

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari is hereby DENIED.

BOARDMAN and LEHAN, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Dumlar v. State, 808 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)
    …t any restraint on liberty other than appearing for trial. In Bell v. State, 361 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), the court held that a defendant was entitled to a hearing on facts similar to those in the case at bar. However, in Santopolo v. State, 443 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), the court reached a contrary conclusion when the defendant was already on release on his own recognizance, reasoning that all the relief to which the defendant could be entitled had been realized. The Santopolo court distinguishe…
  • Kennedy v. Crawford, 479 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
    …We need not decide whether Rule 3.133(a) would apply to a defendant who is not in custody. Compare Bell (defendant who is not in custody may demand an adversary preliminary hearing pursuant to the provisions of Rule 3.133(b) with Santopolo v. State, 443 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 451 So. 2d 850 (Fla.1984) (when information is filed after the twenty-one-day period, but defendant is released on his own recognizance, the court need not furnish adversary preliminary hearing upon defendant’s demand).…
  • Kyshonda Williams v. State, 271 So. 3d 1248 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019)
    …ng of the rule, however, this Court has held that no adversary preliminary hearing is required where a defendant has posted bail and is already on pretrial release. Dumlar v. State, 808 So. 2d 272, 273 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); contra Santopolo v. State, 443 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 2d DCA ---PAGE 3--- 3 1984). In Dumlar, we concluded that because a defendant’s remedy at such a rule 3.133(b)(5) hearing—release on recognizance—is essentially the same as what the defendant already has received— pretrial release after pos…

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