S.L.W., A CHILD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A juvenile was adjudicated delinquent for burglary and committed to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services based partly on inculpatory statements made to police. The Florida appellate court reversed because the police officer failed to obtain a written waiver of counsel with attesting witnesses as required by the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure.
The court held that Fla.R.Juv.P. 8.290(d)(4) applies to police interrogations of juveniles and that compliance with the rule is mandatory. The failure to obtain a written waiver with attesting witnesses renders the inculpatory statements inadmissible. Although the evidence was sufficient to sustain the burglary conviction, the admission of the statements violated proper procedure.
[1] A juvenile's out-of-court waiver of counsel must be in writing and attested by at least two witnesses who attest to the voluntary execution thereof.
[2] A juvenile's inculpatory statements made in violation of the rule requiring a written, witnessed waiver of counsel are inadmissible.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A waiver of counsel made in court shall be of record; a waiver made out of court shall be in writing with not less than two attesting witnesses. Said witnesses shall attest the voluntary execution thereof.”
Statement of the mandatory procedural requirement for waiving counsel in juvenile cases, which the lower court failed to follow.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOfficer Padgett interrogated S.L.W. after informing him of his rights, including the right to counsel. S.L.W. appeared to understand these rights. How…
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JOANOS, Judge.
In this appeal of a juvenile adjudication and commitment to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, S.L.W. contends the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to sustain a conviction for burglary, and that the court erred in overruling a defense objection to admission of testimony by a police officer as to inculpatory statements by S.L.W. to him, because the alleged waiver of counsel by S.L.W. prior to discussion with the officer did not comply with Fla.R.Juv.P. 8.290(d)(4), and the waiver was otherwise involuntary. As to the first issue, we have determined from a review of the record that the evidence was sufficient as a matter of law to sustain the burglary conviction, however, we agree with S.L.W. as to the second issue and ^therefore reverse.
Officer Padgett said that before questioning S.L.W. he informed him of his rights, including the right to assistance of counsel, and S.L.W. appeared to understand them. Officer Padgett did not obtain from S.L.W. a written waiver of the right to counsel. Fla.R.Juv.P. 8.290(d)(4) provides:
A waiver of counsel made in court shall be of record; a waiver made out of court shall be in writing with not less than two attesting witnesses. Said witnesses shall attest the voluntary execution thereof, (e.s.)
In the present case the lower court was of the view that this rule applied only to waivers before the court, the public defender, or an intake officer, but was not applicable to police officers in general, therefore he overruled S.L.W.’s objection. The State reasserts this argument and also contends that Section 39.03(l)(b) rather than the rule of procedure governs this case. This interpretation is incorrect. The rule applies to situations involving police officers and therefore to the present case. In addition, compliance with the rule is mandatory, see M.L.H. v. State, 399 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). The failure to comply in this case renders inadmissible the inculpatory statements, which defense counsel sought to suppress, made by S.L.W. to the police officer. Therefore the order of adjudication and commitment is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ERVIN, C.J., and TILLMAN PEARSON (Ret.), Associate Judge, concur.
JOANOS, Judge.
The motion for rehearing is denied, however, we acknowledge a conflict between our decision in this case and In the Interest of H.D., 443 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). On the basis of this conflict and because we believe the question presented to be one of great public importance, we certify the following question to the Florida Supreme Court:
Whether the failure to comply with Fla. R.Juv.P. 8.290(d)(4) renders inadmissible inculpatory statements obtained from a child absent a valid waiver of counsel obtained pursuant to that rule?
ERVIN, C.J., and TILLMAN PEARSON (Ret.), Associate Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (11 total)
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State v. S.L.W., 465 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 1985)…PER CURIAM. The State of Florida petitions for review of S.L.W. v. State, 445 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), wherein the district court certified the following question: Whether the failure to comply with Fla. RJuv.P. 8.290(d)(4) [*] renders inadmissible inculpatory statements obtained from a child absent a valid waiver of counsel obt…
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State v. Cartwright, 448 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)…counsel (in an out-of-court context). Jordan v. State, 334 So. 2d 589 (Fla.1976); In re H.D., 443 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). Our determination based on Jordan and In re H.D., creates a direct (hereby made express) conflict with S.L. W v. State, 445 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). If the objectionable confession is to be offered into evidence in a trial of the juvenile, it will be incumbent upon the trial court to make an independent inquiry into the voluntariness of the confession prior to such admissio…
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C.T. v. State, 460 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)…in writing, T.J. v. State, 460 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); see State v. Cartwright, 448 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); In re H.D., 443 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); see also Jordan v. State, 334 So. 2d 589 (Fla.1976); contra S.L.W. v. State, 445 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); and (3) the juvenile was otherwise fully apprised of his right to counsel and right to remain silent, the juvenile voluntarily waived those rights notwithstanding a prior assertion of the right to remain silent, and the trial co…
Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- In the Interest of H.D., 443 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)
- Snyderman v. State, 443 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)
- In the Interest of M. L. H. v. State, 399 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)