STATE OF FLORIDA, PETITIONER,
v.
S.L.W., A CHILD, RESPONDENT
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The Florida Supreme Court held that Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.290(d)(4), which requires written waivers of counsel with two attesting witnesses, is not a prerequisite for admissibility of inculpatory statements from juveniles. Instead, the totality-of-circumstances test from Miranda v. Arizona governs whether a juvenile has validly waived rights.
The failure to comply with Fla. RJuv.P. 8.290(d)(4) does not render statements inadmissible. A juvenile can validly waive Miranda rights without a written waiver with two attesting witnesses, applying instead the totality-of-circumstances test to determine whether the waiver was knowing and voluntary.
[1] A written waiver of counsel with two attesting witnesses is not required for the admissibility of inculpatory statements obtained from a child.
[2] The admissibility of statements obtained during custodial interrogation is determined by an inquiry into the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the determination whether statements obtained during custodial interrogation are admissible against the accused is to be made upon an inquiry into the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, to ascertain whether the accused in fact knowingly and voluntarily decided to forgo his rights to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel.”
Establishes the governing totality-of-circumstances standard for evaluating waiver of Miranda rights, applicable to both adults and juveniles.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceS.L.W., a 14-year-old child, made inculpatory statements in two settings: first in the driveway of a temporary foster family home, and second at a pol…
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PER CURIAM.
The State of Florida petitions for review of S.L.W. v. State, 445 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), wherein the district court certified the following question:
Whether the failure to comply with Fla. RJuv.P. 8.290(d)(4) [*] renders inadmissible inculpatory statements obtained from a child absent a valid waiver of counsel obtained pursuant to that rule?
We have jurisdiction, article V, section 3(b)(4), Florida Constitution, and we answer in the negative.
The issue is whether a juvenile can validly waive his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), without doing so in writing with two attesting witnesses. We held in Jordan v. State, 334 So. 2d 589 (Fla.1976), that the corresponding Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111(d)(4) imposes no such requirement, and we see no need to hold otherwise regarding the juvenile rules. The Miranda decision imposes no such requirement:
[T]he determination whether statements obtained during custodial interrogation are admissible against the accused is to be made upon an inquiry into the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, to ascertain whether the accused in fact knowingly and voluntarily decided to forgo his rights to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel.
This totality-of-the-circumstances approach is adequate to determine whether there has been a waiver even where interrogation of juveniles is involved. We discern no persuasive reasons why any other approach is required where the question is whether a juvenile has waived his rights, as opposed to whether an adult has done so. The totality approach permits — indeed, it mandates — inquiry into all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. This includes evaluation of the juvenile’s age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, and into whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights.
Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724-25, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 2571-72, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979) (citations omitted).
S.L.W.’s first statement, given in the driveway of the temporary foster family with whom he was staying, not only has the attributes of voluntariness, but also lacks the characteristics of custody. Assuming without deciding that his second statement given at the police station in the presence of a second police officer was custodial, it also appears to have been given voluntarily. Officer Padgett testified that he readvised S.L.W., age fourteen, of his rights, that he asked the same questions he had previously asked, that he tried to avoid frightening him and that S.L.W. “carried on a conversation and had a vocabulary as great as if not greater than mine. He seemed to know what the words meant.” At the conclusion of questioning, S.L.W. was taken back home. We conclude that his waiver was knowingly and intelligently given as required by Miranda.
We quash the decision of the district court and remand with directions that the judgment of the trial court, adjudicating S.L.W. delinquent and committing him to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, be reinstated.
It is so ordered.
BOYD, C.J., and ADKINS, OVERTON, ALDERMAN, McDONALD, EHRLICH and SHAW, JJ., concur. *
A waiver of counsel made in court shall be of record; a waiver made out of court shall be in writing with not less than two attesting witnesses. Said witnesses shall attest the voluntary execution thereof.
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Citator
Cited By (15 total)
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Ramirez v. State, 739 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 1999)…Miranda rights were administered, including any cajoling or trickery; see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476, 86 S.Ct. 1602; Brewer v. State, 386 So. 2d 232, 237 (Fla.1980); (2) the suspect’s age, experience, background and intelligence, see State v. S.L.W., 465 So. 2d 1231, 1232 (Fla.1985) (quoting Fare, 442 U.S. at 724-25, 99 S.Ct. 2560); Doerr v. State, 383 So. 2d 905, 907 (Fla.1980); (3) the fact that the suspect’s parents were not contacted and the juvenile was not given an opportunity to consult with his parents…
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Snipes v. State, 733 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 1999)…concluded that such failure was but one factor to be considered in determining whether the confession was voluntary. We noted that the younger the juvenile, the more likely the confession would be found to be inadmissible. See also State v. S.L.W., 465 So. 2d 1231 (Fla.1985) (under Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979), totality of circumstances includes evaluation of juvenile’s age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, and of whether juvenile has capacity to u…
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J.G. a child v. State, 883 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)…A defendant may waive Miranda rights “provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Juveniles are subject to Miranda protections. See Ramirez, 739 So. 2d at 575-76; State v. S.L.W., 465 So. 2d 1231, 1232 (Fla.1985). Whether Appellant validly waived his Miranda rights is to be determined according to the following general inquiry: First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of free and d…
Previewing 3 of 15 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966)
- Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (U.S. 1979)
- Jordan v. State, 334 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 1976)
- S.L.W. v. State, 445 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)