THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
JERRY LEE LAWSON, APPELLEE
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Florida appealed a suppression order in a firearm case, arguing that police had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant's vehicle based on his suspicious driving pattern near a location with a history of criminal activity. The court reversed, holding that the combination of factors—slow driving in a 30 mph zone at 4-4:30 a.m., circling the same block four or five times near an all-night gas station with a history of burglaries—provided founded suspicion to justify the stop.
The court held that the officers had well-founded suspicion of criminal activity to justify stopping the defendant's vehicle. Although individual factors such as slow driving, late hour, and area crime history might not independently justify a stop, their combination—particularly the defendant's pattern of circling the block and repeatedly passing the gas station at an unusually slow speed—provided sufficient founded suspicion.
[1] A police officer may stop a vehicle based on founded suspicion of criminal activity.
[2] Driving slowly and repeatedly circling a block late at night in an area with a history of crime can constitute founded suspicion for a vehicle stop.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“where, as here, all of these factors are present and, most significantly, the defendant is observed not merely driving through the area, but instead circling a block and passing the open gas station four or five times at a speed of ten to fifteen miles per hour, the officers had a well-founded suspicion of criminal activity to justify stopping the defendant's vehicle”
Articulates the court's holding that the combination of factors, particularly the defendant's specific pattern of circling and repeatedly passing a known crime location, provided justified suspicion
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceTwo Miami police officers conducting routine patrol between 4:00 and 4:30 a.m. observed the defendant driving slowly (10-15 mph in a 30 mph zone) arou…
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PER CURIAM.
The only issue on appeal is whether the stop of the defendant’s vehicle which began the chain of events leading to the otherwise lawful seizure of the allegedly concealed firearm was based on founded suspicion. We find that it was and reverse the order granting the defendant’s motion to suppress.
While on routine patrol between 4:00 and 4:30 in the morning, two City of Miami police officers observed the defendant driving a car. There were no passengers in the defendant’s vehicle. The officers watched the defendant for about five to ten minutes. During that time, the defendant drove very slowly (between ten and fifteen miles per hour in a thirty-mile-per-hour speed zone) around the same block four or five times. On one of the corners of the city block was an all-night gas station. The streets were deserted except for an occasional car passing through. The only people in the vicinity, apart from the officers and the defendant, were the gas station attendants. The gas station and neighboring buildings had been the scene of burglaries and other criminal activity within the past six months. Based upon the foregoing, the officers suspected that the defendant was about to commit a burglary or robbery or that he was acting as a look-out for someone who was committing a like crime in the immediate area.
Conceding, arguendo, that the act of driving slowly, the late hour, the history of past crime in the area, and other such innocent factors do not in themselves or sometimes even in combination give rise to a founded suspicion, see, e.g., Mullins v. State, 366 So. 2d 1162 (Fla.1978); Coladonato v. State, 348 So. 2d 326 (Fla.1977); Freeman v. State, 433 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Parker v. State, 363 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); State v. Brooks, 281 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973), we have little difficulty concluding that where, as here, all of these factors are present and, most significantly, the defendant is observed not merely driving through the area, but instead circling a block and passing the open gas station four or five times at a speed of ten to fifteen miles per hour, the officers had a well-founded suspicion of criminal activity to justify stopping the defendant’s vehicle. See In the Interest of G.T., 387 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); State v. Boutwell, 367 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Laster v. State, 354 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
Reversed and remanded.
FERGUSON, Judge
(dissenting).
The operative facts show only that a citizen, in the early morning hours, drove his automobile slowly around the block four or five times in a high crime area where a business establishment was open. The majority finds on those facts a founded suspicion of criminal activity which justified a detention. Our courts have, in the past, consistently rejected similar arguments. See Kearse v. State, 384 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Keenan v. State, 372 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). The only unique fact here is that a business establishment in the area was open rather than closed — a nebulous distinction. A better case could be made if all the businesses had been closed. The trial court heard the testimony then correctly found the facts unsupportive of founded suspicion. I would affirm.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (12 total)
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State v. Kehoe, 498 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)…en viewed along with some but not all of the other factors, would not support founded suspicion, where all of the factors are taken together a founded suspicion of criminal activity is supported. An example of this genre of cases is State v. Lawson, 446 So. 2d 202 (Fla.3d DCA), rev. denied, 453 So. 2d 44 (Fla.1984), in which the trial court’s granting of a motion to suppress a firearm was reversed where the officer’s stop of defendant’s vehicle was based upon his observation of defendant driving slowly around…
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State v. Tamer, 449 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)…ficer had been informed that day, had been the subject of several arsons in the area; and then very quickly in an apparent attempt to evade the officer, provided ample “founded suspicion” to justify his stop and temporary detention. State v. Lawson, 446 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). The order under review, which was based on the trial judge’s plainly erroneous rulings to the contrary, and which suppressed (a) the items seized from the vehicle under the warrant and (b) those discovered in a search of the defe…
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Q.E.G. v. State, 569 So. 2d 1313 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)…e cases relied upon by the state are materially distinguishable. E.g., Johnson v. State, 537 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (initial stop approved as a valid traffic stop because of traffic infraction — obstructing flow of traffic); State v. Lawson, 446 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1984) (car circled block four or five times at 4:00 A.M. in an area of burglaries); State v. King, 485 So. 2d 1312 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) (observations of drug activity); Goodman v. State, 399 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) (direct obser…
Previewing 3 of 12 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Coladonato v. State, 348 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 1977)
- Mullins v. State, 366 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 1978)
- Newman v. State, 384 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Keenan v. State, 372 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)
- Freeman v. State, 433 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- State v. Brooks, 281 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973)
- Parker v. State, 363 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)
- In the Interest of G. T., 387 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)
- Goodson v. State, 354 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)
- State v. Boutwell, 367 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)