THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
THEODORE S. TAMER, APPELLEE
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Florida's appellate court reversed a suppression order, holding that a search warrant for a vehicle was not fatally defective despite a one-digit VIN error and incorrect license plate designation, and that the defendant's suspicious driving behavior provided founded suspicion for the stop.
A search warrant for a vehicle is not rendered fatally defective by a one-digit error in the VIN and an incorrect license plate designation when the vehicle is in police custody and readily identifiable.
[1] A search warrant for a vehicle in police custody is not fatally defective when it contains a one-digit error in the vehicle identification number and designates an incorr…
[2] A defendant's operation of a vehicle at 1:00 a.m. …
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePolice stopped a vehicle being operated at 1:00 a.m. very slowly at the rear of an office building with physicians' offices that had been subject to r…
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SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.
We hold that (a) the search warrant issued for a designated vehicle in police custody was not rendered fatally defective merely because one of the seventeen digits of the car’s vehicle identification number (VIN) was incorrectly stated and the warrant designated the number of a spurious license plate which had been placed over the authentic one but which had been removed by the time the warrant was executed; United States v. Strauss, 678 F. 2d 886 (11th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 911, 103 S.Ct. 218, 74 L.Ed.2d 173 (1982); United States v. Rytman, 475 F. 2d 192 (5th Cir.1973); Carlton v. State, 449 So. 2d 250 (FIa.1984); Line v. State, 395 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); and (b) the defendant’s operation of his vehicle at 1:00 a.m., first very slowly at the rear of an office building with many physicians’ offices which, as the apprehending officer had been informed that day, had been the subject of several arsons in the area; and then very quickly in an apparent attempt to evade the officer, provided ample “founded suspicion” to justify his stop and temporary detention. State v. Lawson, 446 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984).
The order under review, which was based on the trial judge’s plainly erroneous rulings to the contrary, and which suppressed (a) the items seized from the vehicle under the warrant and (b) those discovered in a search of the defendant’s person when he was arrested after a license check undertaken subsequent to the stop revealed that the car was stolen, is, in its entirety, therefore
Reversed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Tamer v. State, 463 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)…held applicable in United States v. Workman, 585 F. 2d 1205 (4th Cir.1978). . We note that in collateral criminal proceedings, the state successfully appealed an order suppressing the evidence seized from Mr. Tamer’s automobile. See State v. Tamer, 449 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). Thus, we are in any event compelled to affirm the denial of appellant’s motion to suppress by principles of collateral estoppel. See Brown v. State, 397 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); see also Spencer v. State, 438 So. 2d 864 (Fl…
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State v. Tamer, 475 So. 2d 918 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)…BITT, Judge (dissenting): I must respectfully dissent. This court has previously determined that the items seized from the defendant, including his clothing, were properly seized incident to the lawful arrest of the defendant. In State v. Tamer, 449 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 455 So. 2d 1033 (Fla.1984), we reversed the trial court’s previous attempt to suppress the clothing at issue here. This court held: The order under review, which was based on the trial judge’s plainly erroneous ruling…1 / 3
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Lightfoot v. State, 720 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)…3d DCA 1984)(stop justified where car circled block and passed open gas station four or five times at a speed of ten to fifteen miles per hour, at a late hour, in area which had been scene of burglaries and other criminal activity); State v. Tamer, 449 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)(stop justified where, at 1:00 a.m., car drove first very slowly at the rear of an office building and then very quickly, in an apparent attempt to evade the officer, who had been informed that day of several arsons in [*546] the a…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Strauss v. United States, 459 U.S. 911 (U.S. 1982)
- Ochoa-Sanchez v. United States, 459 U.S. 911 (U.S. 1982)
- Carlton v. State, 449 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 1984)
- United States v. Strauss, 678 F.2d 886 (11th Cir. 1982)
- State v. Lawson, 446 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
- United States v. Rytman, 475 F.2d 192 (5th Cir. 1973)
- Line v. State, 395 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)