J.J. WIGGINS, PETITIONER,
v.
FLORA E. WIGGINS, RESPONDENT
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The Florida Supreme Court held that a trial court retains jurisdiction to award attorney's fees in a dissolution of marriage case even after the husband voluntarily dismisses the action, reversing prior precedent that suggested otherwise.
A trial court has authority to enter an order assessing both costs and reasonable attorney's fees in a dissolution of marriage action even after the petitioner files a voluntary dismissal, because the statute specifically authorizes courts to order one party to pay the other's attorney's fees after considering the parties' financial resources.
[1] A trial court retains jurisdiction to award attorney's fees after a voluntary dismissal in a dissolution of marriage action.
[2] Statutory authority for awarding attorney's fees in dissolution of marriage cases allows for such awards even after a voluntary dismissal.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“when the legislature has specifically defined attorney's fees as part of the costs, then the assessment of attorney's fees after a case has been voluntarily dismissed is within the purview of Rule 1.420(d).”
Establishes the key principle that statutory authorization of attorney's fees allows courts to award them post-dismissal
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJ.J. Wiggins filed for dissolution of marriage. His wife Flora Wiggins requested attorney's fees in her response. The husband then filed a notice of v…
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BOYD, Justice.
This cause is before the Court on petition for review of the decision below, reported as Wiggins v. Wiggins, 417 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). Review is sought on the ground of conflict of decisions. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. Petitioner J.J. Wiggins instituted an action for dissolution of marriage. His wife Flora Wiggins filed a response in which she asked for an order of attorney’s fees. Subsequently the husband filed a notice of voluntary dismissal as permitted under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(a). After the husband’s dismissal of the action, the wife filed a motion for assessment of costs and attorney’s fees. The trial court granted the motion for costs but held that it was without jurisdiction to consider an order awarding attorney’s fees.
On appeal the district court reversed and held the trial court had jurisdiction to consider the request for an award of attorney’s fees.
The district court recognized that past decisions of this Court have indicated that a voluntary dismissal divests the court of jurisdiction to award attorneys fees. See Randle-Eastern Ambulance Service v. Vasta, 360 So. 2d 68 (Fla.1978); Campbell v. Maze, 339 So. 2d 202 (Fla.1976). In Randle-Eastern this Court said that Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(d) provides “authority for defendants to recoup their court costs when a voluntary dismissal has been taken. There is no recompense, however, for a defendant’s inconvenience, his attorney’s fees* or the-instability to his daily affairs which are caused by a plaintiffs self-aborted lawsuit.” 360 So. 2d at 69 (footnote omitted).
The district court’s majority opinion pointed out that the language in Randle-Eastern, to the effect that attorney’s fees cannot be ordered after a voluntary dismissal, was obiter dicta.
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(d) provides for the assessment of costs upon the dismissal of an action. The rule does not, however, contemplate the assessment of attorney’s fees.
Moreover, the term “costs” is not generally understood as including attorney’s fees. State ex rel. Royal Insurance Co. v. Barrs, 87 Fla. 168, 99 So. 668 (1924).
However, when the legislature has specifically defined attorney’s fees as part of the costs, then the assessment of attorney’s fees after a case has been voluntarily dismissed is within the purview of Rule 1.420(d). City of Hallandale v. Chatlos, 236 So. 2d 761 (Fla.1970); Gordon v. Warren Heating & Air Conditioning, 340 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976).
Thus at the time the Randle-Eastern ease was decided, this Court had recognized that a trial court could retain jurisdiction to award attorney’s fees after a voluntary dismissal, at least in cases where attorney’s fees were defined by statute as part of the costs.
This Court’s decision in Campbell v. Maze, 339 So. 2d 202, 203 (Fla.1976), was not based on the holding that the voluntary dismissal divested, the court of jurisdiction to award attorney’s fees, but, rather, on the fact that there was no authority whatsoever for an award of attorney’s fees, regardless of the dismissal.
In an action for dissolution of marriage, the trial court is authorized by statute to order one party to pay the other’s attorney’s fees “from time to time, after considering the financial resources of both parties.” § 61.16, Fla.Stat. (1981). We therefore hold that when a dissolution of marriage action is terminated upon the filing of a voluntary dismissal by the petitioner, the court has the authority to enter an order assessing not only costs, but also a reasonable attorney’s fee. See Turnipseed v. Turnipseed, 158 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963).
Accordingly, we approve the decision of the district court of appeal.
It is so ordered.
ALDERMAN, C.J., and OVERTON, MCDONALD, EHRLICH and SHAW, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By (17 total)
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Wilson v. Rose Printing Co., Inc., 624 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1993)…to be assessed in the dismissed suit. Further, this Court has consistently held that where a statute or agreement of the parties provides that the term “costs” includes attorneys’ fees such fees are taxable under rule 1.420(d). Wiggins v. Wiggins, 446 So. 2d 1078 (Fla.1984); Campbell v. Maze, 339 So. 2d 202 (Fla.1976); City of Hallandale v. Chatlos, 236 So. 2d 761 (Fla.1970). The present employment agreement is unambiguous: In connection with any litigation arising out of this agreement the prevailing party…
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Price v. Avery L. Tyler, 890 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 2004)…in these declaratory judgment actions, and provides that the circuit court may award such “costs” as are equitable. See § 86.081, Fla. Stat. (2001). However, “costs” are not generally understood as including attorneys’ fees. See Wiggins v. Wiggins, 446 So. 2d 1078, 1079 (Fla.1984); see also Edgar v. Cape Coral Med. Ctr., Inc., 664 So. 2d 1068, 1069 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (holding appellants were not entitled to attorney’s fees under section 86.081, Florida Statutes (1993)); Suwannee County v. Garrison, 417 So. 2d…
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Simmons v. Lawrence Schimmel, M.D., 476 So. 2d 1342 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)…contain a provision making the fees a part of costs. See § 768.56, Fla. Stat. (1981). Since the attorney’s fees in the present case are not made a part of costs by the statute, they are not taxable costs under Rule 1.420(d), see Wiggins v. Wiggins, 446 So. 2d 1078 (Fla.1984); Bankers Multiple Line Insurance Co. v. Blanton, 352 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), and Gordon and its progeny are not applicable. . This section provides in pertinent part: Each unit owner and each association shall be governed by, and…
Previewing 3 of 17 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Randle-Eastern Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. Vasta, 360 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 1978)
- The State of Fla. ex rel. Royal Ins. Co. v. Burton Barrs, 87 Fla. 168 (Fla. 1924)
- Allie William Campbell v. Maze, 339 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1976)
- Gordon v. Warren Heating & AIR Conditioning, Inc., 340 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)
- Press v. Press, 340 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)
- Culbertson v. Seacoast Towers E., Inc., 236 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 1970)
- City OF Hallandale v. Wiliam F. Chatlos, 236 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 1970)
- Turnipseed v. Turnipseed, 158 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963)
- Wiggins v. Wiggins, 417 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)