STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
JUAN YANES, APPELLEE
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An insured is not covered under uninsured motorist provisions when they have completed alighting from a vehicle and commenced a new, independent activity.
[1] The term "alighting from" an insured vehicle, for purposes of uninsured motorist coverage, is limited to the time and place at which the insured shows an intention, evide…
[2] An insured is not considered "occupying" a vehicle for uninsured motorist coverage purposes when they have ceased the activity of alighting from the vehicle and commenced…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA delivery driver was struck by an uninsured motorist after alighting from his employer's van and crossing the street. The driver prevailed in a decla…
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NESBITT, Judge.
Yanes was the operator of a delivery van owned by his employer. In the course of his employment, he parked the vehicle in a space adjacent to the company’s warehouse, got off the truck, unloaded a package and was crossing the street when he was struck by an uninsured motor vehicle. It was upon these salient facts that he prevailed in an action for declaratory judgment against the State Farm policy issued to his employer. We reverse.
The policy defines insured, for purposes of uninsured motorist coverage, as:
any other person while occupying:
1. your car, a temporary substitute car or a newly acquired car. Such car has to be used within the scope of the consent of the first person named in the declarations or that person’s spouse or .... 1
It also states that the word “occupying” means “in, on, entering or alighting from.”
This court, in considering almost identical policy language, has stated:
We think that a rational limit to the activity that may be said to be encompassed within the term “alighting from” is the time and place at which the insured shows an intention, evidenced by an overt act based on that intention, to undertake a new direction or activity, (citations omitted)
Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Garcia, 368 So. 2d 1313 at 1315 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 378 So. 2d 344 (Fla.1979). The evidence in this case shows that the plaintiff had ceased the activity of “alighting from” the truck and had commenced the new activity of walking across the street.2 Accordingly, we hold that he was not an insured under the uninsured motorist provision of the policy.
Reversed and remanded with directions to enter judgment for the insurer. . There are .other definitions of insured under the uninsured motorist section of the policy, none of which are applicable here.
. We reject the insured’s claim that we must look to the subjective intent of the party in order to determine the commencement of a new activity. Were we to adopt such a test, there would be no limit to an insurer’s responsibility.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Above ALL Roofing, LLC, 924 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)…ld that there was no UM coverage for the Class II insured because, at the time she had exited the vehicle, she was engaged in a new activity of walking toward her home. Id. at 1315. Similarly, in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Yanes, 447 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), the Third District held that a delivery van operator was not an insured under the UM policy because he “had ceased the activity of ‘alighting from’ the truck and had commenced the new activity of walking across the street” when h…
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Progressive Am. Ins. Co. v. Wladimir Tanchuk, 616 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)…us, I cannot agree the injured party in this case was “occupying” the tow truck when he was injured. See Davis v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 463 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 471 So. 2d 43 (Fla.1985); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Yanes, 447 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). Davis reached the opposite conclusion from that of the majority here, under virtually identical circumstances. I also note the injured party is not completely without relief, since it appears his claim is covered by his own perso…
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Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Hayward, 858 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)…uity, waiver, estoppel or contradiction of public policy. None of these exceptions were proved in the trial court. Id. at 428 (citations omitted). Similar exclusions have been found valid in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Yanes, 447 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), and Davis v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company, 463 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), review denied, 471 So. 2d 43 (Fla.1985). In Yanes, an employee was the operator of a delivery van owned by his employer and while in the course of…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Fid. & Cas. Co. OF NEW York v. Garcia, 368 So. 2d 1313 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)