DIANA JEAN PILCH, APPELLANT,
v.
EDWARD MICHAEL PILCH, JR., APPELLEE
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In a divorce proceeding, the trial court denied a wife's request to restore her maiden name, reasoning that it would stigmatize the minor children by giving them a different surname than their mother. The First District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that meeting statutory requirements for name restoration is sufficient and that mere speculation about potential harm to children cannot justify denial of the restoration right.
A woman has an established right to restore her birth-given name absent injury to the rights of others. The trial court's reliance on speculative concerns about stigma to the children is insufficient to deny restoration of maiden name when statutory requirements are met, particularly where no evidence demonstrates actual adverse effects on the children.
[1] A trial court may not deny a former spouse's statutory right to restore their prenuptial name solely on the grounds that it is not in the best interest of the minor child…
[2] The potential for a child to experience stigma or disadvantage at school or social functions due to bearing a different surname than their custodial parent is insufficien…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The right of a woman to her birth-given name, notwithstanding marriage, is established under Florida Law.”
Establishes the fundamental legal principle that women have a recognized right to restore their maiden names.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDiana Jean Pilch sought restoration of her prenuptial name in a dissolution of marriage proceeding. She had met all statutory requirements under Flori…
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PER CURIAM.
In this dissolution of marriage proceeding, the trial court denied the wife restoration of her prenuptial name on the sole ground that even though she had met all the statutory requirements of Section 68.07, Florida Statutes, it was not in the best interest of the minor children of the parties to bear a name different than their mother because such would cause a stigma 1 upon them. We conclude that the reason advanced by the trial judge is insufficient in and of itself to deny restoration of one’s maiden name and is unsupported by the evidence.
In so concluding, we adopt the reasoning of the Second District Court of Appeal in In re the Petition of Hooper, 436 So. 2d 401, 403 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), as follows:
The right of a woman to her birth-given name, notwithstanding marriage, is established under Florida Law. See Marshall v. State, 301 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); Davis v. Roos, 326 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). See also Egner v. Egner, 133 N.J.Super. 403, 337 A. 2d 46 (N.J.1975). Absent injury to the rights of others, there appears to be no reason why a woman’s failure to assert that right upon her marriage should prevent her from doing so later, i.e., at the time of her divorce or thereafter. A divorced mother’s remarriage apparently is “a substantial probability.” Egner, 337 A. 2d at 48. The dissimilarity of a divorced mother’s and her children’s names is not prohibited upon her remarriage and her assumption of her new husband’s name. Arnett v. Matthew, 259 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972). Rela tive to the interests of the children, we can see no distinction between that situation and the facts of this case. Lazow v. Lazow, 147 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962).
Furthermore, we note that there was no evidence presented below which would support the finding that the children would be adversely affected if they bore a name different than the custodial parent. Mere speculation as to the harmful effect which might be caused by such a situation is insufficient reason to deny a name change, Moskowitz v. Moskowitz, 118 N.H. 199, 385 A. 2d 120 (N.H.1978), and, in this day and age, is perhaps unfounded. See Klein v. Klein, 36 Md.App. 177, 373 A. 2d 86 (1977).
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial judge denying the ex-wife restoration of her maiden name is reversed and the cause remanded with directions that the requested relief be granted.
BOOTH, WIGGINTON and ZEHMER, JJ., concur. . The trial judge orally stated that "I think it casts a stigma upon the children, it sets them at a disadvantage at school and other social'functions.”
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Clemons v. Clemons, 456 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)…PER CURIAM. We reverse and remand on authority of Pilch v. Pilch, 447 So. 2d 989 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). ANSTEAD, C.J., and HERSEY and GLICKSTEIN, JJ., concur.…
Authorities Cited
- Lazow v. Eleanore Lazow, 147 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962)
- Marshall v. State, 301 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)
- Horn v. Mar. Overseas Corp., 326 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)
- Davis v. Roos, 326 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)
- Arnett v. Matthews, 259 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972)
- In re the Petition of Kerry Mack Hooper, 436 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)