HORACE CALLINS, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Horace Callins appeals the denial of his motion to discharge based on a speedy trial violation under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191. The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding that notice to defense counsel is imputed to the defendant for purposes of establishing his unavailability during the pre-trial delay.
The court held that notice to defense counsel is imputed to the defendant for speedy trial analysis purposes, and the defendant's non-appearance after such notice to counsel was sufficient evidence that he was not continuously available for trial, warranting denial of the motion for discharge.
[1] Notice to defense counsel is imputed to the defendant for purposes of determining availability for trial, absent specific rules to the contrary.
[2] A defendant's failure to appear at a juvenile court hearing, after notice to counsel, constitutes evidence of unavailability for trial, tolling the speedy trial period.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the defendant's non-appearance after notice to counsel was sufficient evidence that he was not continuously available for trial so as to warrant the denial of his motion for discharge”
Establishes the core holding that notice to counsel suffices for speedy trial analysis and supports denial of the discharge motion.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCallins was arrested as a juvenile on October 30, 1981, for burglary and grand theft. On December 3, 1981, he failed to appear for a scheduled juvenil…
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PER CURIAM.
We affirm the judgments of conviction and sentences entered upon the defendant’s nolo contendere plea reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion for discharge.
On October 30, 1981, the defendant, then a juvenile, was arrested for burglary and grand theft. Shortly thereafter, the Public Defender was appointed to represent him. On December 3, 1981, the defendant failed to appear for a scheduled hearing in the juvenile court and a pick-up order issued. About a year later, the defendant was located and brought before the court. After his case was transferred to the Criminal Division of the Circuit Court for prosecution as an adult, the defendant moved for discharge on the ground that his right to speedy trial under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191 had been violated.
Relying on L.G. v. State, 405 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), the defendant contends that since his only non-appearance was at a hearing in Juvenile Court, the State’s failure to establish that he, rather than his counsel, was notified of this hearing is fatal to the State’s effort to show the de fendant’s non-availability for trial. Although it is true L. G. held that the general rule that notice to counsel is the equivalent of notice to the defendant, see Sherrod v. Franza, 427 So. 2d 161 (Fla.1983); State v. Grooms, 389 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980), is inapplicable to juvenile adjudication hearings by virtue of former Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.190(a), which expressly required the juvenile to be noticed by summons of the adjudication hearing, we find L.G. inapposite to the case at bar, because, first, the hearing at which the defendant did not appear was not an adjudicatory hearing; and, second, after January 1, 1981, the effective date of the amendment to Rule 8.190(a), notice by summons was not a requirement of the rule. See In re Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, 393 So. 2d 1077 (Fla.1980).
Thus, the rule that notice to defense counsel is imputed to the defendant controls here, and the defendant’s non-appearance after notice to counsel was sufficient evidence that he was not continuously available for trial so as to warrant the denial of his motion for discharge. The defendant’s remaining point on appeal is without merit. See Dixon v. State, 451 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984).
Affirmed.
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J.G. v. State, 680 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)…PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See Callins v. State, 447 So. 2d 1043 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); State v. C.R.S., 584 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). W. SHARP, GRIFFIN and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.…
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State v. C.R.S., 584 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)…puted notice through L.G.’s attorney was insufficient for speedy trial purposes. Subsequent to L.G., in January 1981, Rule 8.190(a) was amended and the state is no longer required to notify the juvenile of a hearing by summons. Callins v. State, 447 So. 2d 1043 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) noted this change and held that absent the summons requirement, notice to the juvenile’s counsel is imputed to the juvenile, following the above general rule. Thus, Callins’ nonappearance at hearing after notice to his counsel was…
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In the Interest of R.P.T. v. State, 529 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)…PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See Callins v. State, 447 So. 2d 1043 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1984). SHIVERS, JOANOS and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur.…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Sherrod v. The Honorable Arthur J. Franza, 427 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1983)
- State v. Grooms, 389 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)
- Dixon v. State, 451 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
- L. G. v. State, 405 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- In re Florida Rules OF Juvenile Procedure. Petition of THE Florida BAR, 393 So. 2d 1077 (Fla. 1980)