CHARLES FORREST THAMES, APPELLANT,
v.
LINDA THAMES, APPELLEE
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Charles Forrest Thames appealed the denial of his motion for change of venue in a dissolution of marriage action filed by his wife in Pinellas County. The court reversed, holding that venue was improper in Pinellas County and should be transferred to Alachua County, where the parties' marital residence was located and where they were last present with the common intent to remain married.
The court held that venue was improper in Pinellas County and proper in Alachua County. Under Florida Statutes § 47.011 and the precedent in Smith v. Smith, in a dissolution of marriage action, the cause of action arises in the county where the parties were last present with the common intent to remain married, which in this case was Alachua County.
[1] A dissolution of marriage action may be brought in the county where the cause of action arises.
[2] In dissolution of marriage actions, the cause of action arises in the county where the parties were last present with the common intent to remain married.
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Establishes the governing legal standard for determining proper venue in dissolution cases
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties married on April 4, 1979, and established their marital residence in Alachua County, Florida on July 15, 1982. In June 1983, the appellee …
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CAMPBELL, Acting Chief Judge.
Appellant, Charles Forrest Thames, seeks review of the order denying his motion for change of venue in a dissolution of marriage action. We reverse.
The parties were married on April 4, 1979. According to appellant’s uncontro-verted affidavit, the parties established their marital residence in Alachua County, Florida on July 15,1982. On or about June 22, 1983, appellee, Linda Thames, moved from the marital residence in Alachua County, Florida. Appellant continued to reside in the marital home in Alachua County, Florida. On June 27, 1983, appel-lee filed a petition for dissolution of marriage and other relief in Pinellas County, Florida.
On July 7, 1983, appellant filed a motion for change of venue. The motion was denied and this appeal followed.
Appellant argues that Pinellas County, Florida was not the proper forum for this dissolution of marriage action because the marriage was broken in Alachua County, Florida. We agree.
Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1981), provides that actions may be brought in the county where the defendant resides, where the property in litigation is located, or where the cause of action arises. In Smith v. Smith, 430 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), this court held that in a dissolution of marriage action, the cause of action arises in the county where the parties were last present with the common intent to remain married. Smith citing Carroll v. Carroll, 322 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), affirmed 341 So. 2d 771 (Fla.1977).
There is no property in litigation in this cause. Appellant’s sworn affidavit indicates that he continues to reside in Alachua County, Florida. Thus, the remaining basis for venue is where the cause of action arose. Again, according to appellant’s un-controverted affidavit, the last county where both parties were present with the common intent to remain married was Ala-chua County, Florida. Therefore, on the basis of Smith, venue is proper in Alachua County, Florida, not Pinellas County, Florida.
For these reasons, we reverse the trial court and remand the case for transfer to Alachua County, Florida.
SCHOONOVER and LEHAN, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Goedmakers v. Goedmakers, 504 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)…or any other reason, should have ordered the case tried in Broward County. See § 47.011, Fla.Stat. (1985); Groome v. Abrams, 448 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (trial court has broad discretion in dealing with matters of venue); cf. Thames v. Thames, 449 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (dissolution of marriage action was improperly brought in Pinellas County where evidence showed that the place where the parties last resided with the intent to remain married was Alachua [*25] County, and there was no property su…
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Goedmakers v. Goedmakers, 520 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 1988)…parties property. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 430 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (where husband resides in Pinellas County and all the parties’ property is located in Pinellas County, only question is where cause of action accrued); Thames v. Thames, 449 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (noting “[t]here is no property in litigation in this cause”). Even in Crawford, the court stated that Leon County was "where the property in litigation, for the most part, is located.” 415 So. 2d at 871. . We do not consider res…
Authorities Cited
- Carroll v. Vernell Carroll, 322 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)
- Vernell Carroll v. Carroll, 341 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1977)
- Smith v. Smith, 430 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)