M.C., A CHILD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A person may be guilty of obstructing a police officer under Florida Statute § 843.02 if they flee or prevent lawful detention after a lawful stop under § 901.151 when they know the officer intends to detain them for identification purposes.
A person who flees or takes intentional action to prevent lawful detention after a lawful stop under Florida's Stop and Frisk statute may be guilty of obstructing or opposing a police officer in violation of § 843.02.
[1] A person may be convicted of obstructing a police officer under Florida Statute § 843.02 if they flee or prevent lawful detention after a lawful stop under § 901.151 when…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA police officer lawfully encountered and attempted to detain a person under Florida's Stop and Frisk statute for purposes of ascertaining identity an…
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COWART, Judge.
When (1) a police officer encounters a person under circumstances1 that authorize the officer to temporarily detain that person under Florida’s Stop and Frisk statute (§ 901.151, Fla.Stat. (1983)) and (2) in the lawful execution of his legal duties the police officer intends to detain that person for the purpose of ascertaining the person’s identity and to learn the circumstances surrounding his presence, and (3) under the facts and circumstances of the particular case that person learns, knows, or understands that the officer desires to detain that person, then if that person flees or takes other intentional action that prevents lawful detention, he may be guilty of obstructing or opposing such officer in violation of section 843.02, Florida Statutes (1983). See Price v. State, 318 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), cert. denied, 334 So. 2d 607 (Fla.1976). See also Johnson v. State, 433 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). Burgess v. State, 313 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975), relates to the constitutional right to refuse to provide information and is distinguishable.
AFFIRMED.
DAUKSCH and SHARP, JJ., concur. . As to reasonable suspicion justifying detention and inquiry, see State v. Hunt, 391 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); as to probable cause, see State v. Jones, 417 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (13 total)
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State v. Ramsey, 475 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1985)…So. 2d 1345 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). I believe the conduct shown by the facts of this case was obviously intended by the legislature to be punished as the offense of resisting an officer under section 843.02, Florida Statutes (1981). See M. C. v. State, 450 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). It is an error to allow that conduct to be punished as the more serious offense of escape. I believe that under the facts of this case, there arises an ambiguity in the language of the escape statute. The ambiguity calls for ju…
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F.E.C. v. State, 559 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)…being out late. An individual may be guilty of unlawfully obstructing an officer if he flees while knowing of the officer’s intent to detain him and the officer is justified in making a stop pursuant to the Stop and Frisk Statute. M. C. v. State, 450 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). This is true because the flight frustrates the officers’ statutory right to make the stop and attending inquiries. Flight alone, however, does not constitute obstructing an officer, nor does it give rise to a well-founded suspic…
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Huntley v. State, 575 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)…of the officer’s conduct is an essential element of resisting an officer without violence. The conviction for resisting an officer without violence must be reversed. In the Interest of T.M.M., 560 So. 2d 805, 806 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); M.C. v. State, 450 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part. COBB, PETERSON and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur. . The fact of flight does not support "the founded suspicion” because the officer ordered the two men to stop before they began to move away.…
Previewing 3 of 13 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Jones, 417 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)
- Bryant v. State, 313 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)
- State v. Hunt, 391 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)
- Johnson v. State, 433 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Price v. State, 318 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)