F.E.C., A CHILD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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F.E.C., a minor, was charged with obstructing a law enforcement officer by running away. The Florida appellate court reversed, holding that flight without the officer having any well-founded suspicion of criminal activity does not constitute unlawful obstruction.
Flight does not constitute unlawful obstruction of an officer absent a well-founded suspicion of criminal activity in the officer's mind. Because Deputy Burnham had no suspicion that F.E.C. had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a felony or misdemeanor, F.E.C.'s flight did not constitute unlawful obstruction, and his motion for judgment of acquittal should have been granted.
[1] Flight alone does not constitute obstructing a law enforcement officer.
[2] Flight accompanied by knowledge of an officer's intent to detain does not constitute obstruction absent a well-founded suspicion of criminal activity.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“An individual may be guilty of unlawfully obstructing an officer if he flees while knowing of the officer's intent to detain him and the officer is justified in making a stop pursuant to the Stop and Frisk Statute.”
Establishes the legal standard that flight can constitute obstruction only when the officer is justified in making a stop
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn May 21, 1988, at 12:30 a.m., Deputy Sheriff Burnham observed F.E.C. and another child in a business district where burglaries had occurred. When th…
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PATTERSON, Judge.
F.E.C., a child, was charged in an amended delinquency petition with having unlawfully obstructed a law enforcement officer in the execution of his legal duty by running away from the officer. We reverse.
On May 21, 1988, F.E.C. and another child were observed at 12:30 a.m. by Deputy Sheriff Burnham, who was driving a fully marked police cruiser. As he made a U-turn, they disappeared from sight. He then observed them at the end of a dead-end street and illuminated the area with a spotlight. They ran into a trailer park. On observing them again in the trailer park, he illuminated his flashing lights and identified himself as a deputy sheriff. They ran again. A K-9 unit was called and F.E.C.’s companion was taken into custody. F.E.C. was subsequently identified and charged. Burnham testified that he wanted to talk to the boys because they were in a business district in which burglaries had occurred in the recent past. He conceded that he had no reports of immediate crime in the vicinity and that he had no suspicion that they were doing anything wrong. He simply wanted to find out what they were doing in the area. Both F.E.C. and his companion, in statements made after a Miranda warning, admitted that they knew they were running away from a police officer but were doing so to avoid getting in trouble with their parents for being out late.
An individual may be guilty of unlawfully obstructing an officer if he flees while knowing of the officer’s intent to detain him and the officer is justified in making a stop pursuant to the Stop and Frisk Statute. M. C. v. State, 450 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). This is true because the flight frustrates the officers’ statutory right to make the stop and attending inquiries. Flight alone, however, does not constitute obstructing an officer, nor does it give rise to a well-founded suspicion of criminal activity. Nelson v. State, 543 So. 2d 1308 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). Likewise, flight accompanied by knowledge of the officers’ intent to detain does not constitute obstructing absent a well-founded suspicion in the mind of the officer. C.K. v. State, 487 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986).
In this case, Deputy Burnham had no suspicion that F.E.C. had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a felony or misdemeanor. F.E.C.’s knowing flight to avoid confrontation by the officer, therefore, did not constitute unlawfully obstructing an officer in the legal exercise of his duty and his motion for judgment of acquittal should have been granted by the trial court.
The judgment and sentence of the lower court is vacated with directions that F.E.C. be discharged.
DANAHY, A.C.J., and SCHOONOVER, J., concur.
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Citator
Cited By (16 total)
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Slydell v. State, 792 So. 2d 667 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…said: “An individual may be guilty of unlawfully obstructing an officer if he flees while knowing of the officer’s intent to detain him and the officer is justified in making a stop pursuant to the Stop and Frisk Statute.” [e.s.] F.E.C. v. State, 559 So. 2d 413, 414 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); see also D.M., 681 So. 2d at 798 (state must show defendant fled “with knowledge of the officer’s intent to detain him”); S.G.K, 657 So. 2d at 1248 (“[T]he State failed to show appellant had any reason to believe he was bein…
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S.G.K. v. State, 657 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)…d arrested appellant solely because he ran away and he needed to complete an accident report. Flight, standing alone, does not constitute obstructing an officer nor does it give rise to a well-founded suspicion of criminal activity. F.E.C. v. State, 559 So. 2d 413, 414 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (citing Nelson v. State, 543 So. 2d 1308 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)). Moreover, a defendant’s mere presence at the scene of a crime and flight therefrom is insufficient evidence to support an adjudication of delinquency. F.B. v. Stat…1 / 2
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Harris v. State, 647 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)…hich did not take place is a fundamental error, which the appellate court should correct even when no timely objection or motion for acquittal was made below. See, e.g. Burrell v. State, 601 So. 2d 628, 629 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). Under F.E.C. v. State, 559 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) and Nelson v. State, 543 So. 2d 1308, 1309 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) the crime of resisting an officer without violence did not take place if either Sergeant Franks lacked an articulable well founded suspicion of criminal activity to jus…
Previewing 3 of 16 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Nelson v. State, 543 So. 2d 1308 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)
- M.C. v. State, 450 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)
- C.K. v. State, 487 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)