CHARLES R. EVANS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Charles Evans was convicted of battery on a law enforcement officer. On appeal, he contended that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because his intoxication negated the specific intent required for the crime. The appellate court affirmed, holding that while battery on a law enforcement officer is a specific intent crime, the question of whether Evans's intoxication negated his intent was properly left to the jury.
The trial court did not err in denying the motion for judgment of acquittal. Although battery on a law enforcement officer is a specific intent crime, the question of whether the defendant's intoxication negated his intent was a matter for the jury to determine. The jury instruction on intoxication was proper, and the jury could have concluded the defendant was not intoxicated.
[1] Intoxication may be a defense to a specific intent crime, but the determination of whether a defendant was intoxicated to the extent that it negated intent is a question…
[2] The question of whether a defendant's intoxication negated their intent to commit battery on a law enforcement officer is a factual issue for the jury.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Regardless of whether battery on a law enforcement officer is a specific intent crime, the question of whether defendant's intoxication negated his intent was for the jury.”
Establishes that the jury is the proper fact-finder for intoxication defenses regardless of the crime's classification.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceEvans was convicted of battery on a law enforcement officer. He was taken into custody under the Myers Act, section 396.072(1), Florida Statutes. At t…
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LEHAN, Judge.
Defendant was convicted of battery on a law enforcement officer. On appeal defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying the motion for judgment of acquittal because the defendant was intoxicated and battery on a law enforcement officer is a specific intent crime to which intoxication is a defense. We affirm. Regardless of whether battery on a law enforcement officer is a specific intent crime, the question of whether defendant’s intoxication negated his intent was for the jury. Harris v. State, 415 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). The jury was instructed on the defense of intoxication and could have concluded that defendant was not intoxicated at the time he committed the offense. The fact that defendant was taken into custody under the aegis of the Myers Act, section 396.072(1), Florida Statutes (1983), did not necessarily foreclose a jury determination that he was not intoxicated.
As to whether battery on a law enforcement officer is a specific intent crime, we conclude that it is. Russell v. State, 373 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). Linehan v. State, 442 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), discusses the often nebulous distinction between specific intent crimes and general intent crimes and explains why the mere inclusion of words like “intentionally” and “willfully” in a statutory definition of a crime does not ipso facto make the crime a specific intent crime. In Linehan we receded from Russell only “[t]o the extent that Russell ... may appear to be inconsistent with our present holding.” Linehan at 251. Russell was inconsistent with Linehan to the extent that “Russell found that the inclusion of the word ‘intentionally’ in section 784.03, Florida Statutes (1977), made battery a specific intent crime to which voluntary intoxication was a defense.” Linehan at 251. Battery on a law enforcement officer is a specific intent crime, as Russell holds, because the crime prohibited is “an act ... accompanied by some intent other than the intent to do the act itself or the intent (or presumed intent) to cause the natural and necessary consequences of the act.” Linehan at 247. It is “a crime encompassing a requirement of a subjective intent to accomplish a statutorily prohibited result,” Linehan at 248, to wit, not simply battery but battery on a law enforcement officer. The battery on a law enforcement officer statute, section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1983), requires that the perpetrator knowingly commit the offense on a law enforcement officer. On the other hand, “[a] person’s subjective intent to cause the particular result is irrelevant to general intent crimes_” Linehan at 248.
AFFIRMED.
BOARDMAN, A.C.J., and DANAHY, J., concur.
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Mordica v. State, 618 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)…ly battery but battery on a law enforcement officer. The battery on a law enforcement officer statute, section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1983), requires that the perpetrator knowingly commit the offense on a law enforcement officer. Evans v. State, 452 So. 2d 1093, 1094 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). Thus, simple battery under section 784.03, Florida Statutes (1989), is a necessarily lesser included offense of battery of a law enforcement officer. Brown v. State, 608 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). The doctrine of tran…
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Parker v. State, 471 So. 2d 1352 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)…ry on a law enforcement officer is a specific intent crime to which intoxication would be a defense. There was evidence indicating that defendant might have been intoxicated. Therefore, defendant was entitled to the jury instruction. Evans v. State, 452 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (decided after the trial court’s disposition of this case). Since defendant did not request the intoxication instruction for the charge of resisting arrest with violence, we need not address whether that charge alleged a specific…
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Burnham v. State, 497 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)…t he was going to rely on the defense of voluntary intoxication as it related to the charges of attempted first degree murder and aggravated battery, which are specific intent crimes. See Gurganus v. State, 451 So. 2d 817 (Fla.1984); Evans v. State, 452 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Russell v. State, 373 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). Because voluntary intoxication is a valid defense to specific intent crimes, Cirack v. State, 201 So. 2d 706 (Fla.1967); Britts v. State, 158 Fla. 839, 30 So. 2d 363 (1947), tes…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Linehan v. State, 442 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Russell v. State, 373 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
- W. Am. Ins. Co. v. Wenger, 415 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)
- Quincy L. Harris v. State, 415 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)