JOHN CALDWELL BROOKS, APPELLANT,
v.
JOAN R. BROOKS AND MARY F. MARTIN, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court reversed summary judgment dismissing a foreclosure action, holding that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the title company's failure to timely mail a mortgage payment, precluding summary judgment.
Genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the circumstances surrounding the title company's failure to timely mail the October 31, 1982 payment, precluding summary judgment.
[1] On review of summary judgment, the court must view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and summary judgment is improper when genuine issues of…
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJohn Brooks, a mortgagee, appealed a summary judgment dismissing his foreclosure action against Joan Brooks and Mary Martin. The dispute centered on t…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Unconscionable Conduct cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
John Brooks, the mortgagee in this foreclosure action, appeals the final order of dismissal granting summary judgment in favor of appellees Mary Martin and Joan Brooks. We reverse.
Reviewing the record in a light most favorable to appellant, as we must, we hold that genuine issues of material fact exist with respect to the circumstances surrounding the failure of the title company to timely mail the October 31, 1982, payment. Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.510(c); Holl v. Talcott, 191 So. 2d 40 (Fla.1966). For instance, it is not clear whether appellant did in fact change his address; and, if he did, there is no evidence of a forwarding address. Assuming appellant did not relocate, the record does not indicate why appellees were under the opposite impression. Further, the record does not reveal why Mr. Lord, the closing agent representing the title company, was unable to acquire appellant’s address prior to November 7, 1982, the day Mr. Lord’s mother-in-law died. Finally, no explanation is found for appellee Brooks’ failure to provide the title company or Martin with the address that she used to make the prior mortgage payments. In view of these unresolved material facts, we are unable to determine whether the circumstances of this case would render the foreclosure unconscionable or inequitable.
Accordingly, we REVERSE the summary judgment entered against appellant and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
HOBSON, A.C.J., and BOARDMAN and SCHOONOVER, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Pennco, Inc. v. Meritor Savings, 617 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)…ortgage and whether the evidence establishes the legal insufficiency of the affirmative defenses asserted. Accordingly, we reverse the order granting summary judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Brooks v. Brooks, 454 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Howdeshell v. First Nat’l Bank of Clearwater, 369 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). Historically, parties have pursued mortgage foreclosures in summary judgment proceedings through the presentation of affidavits. However, if the r…
Authorities Cited
- Gory Roofing Tile Mfg., Inc. v. Davison, 191 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1966)