DENNIS C. BROWN AND CARY A. BROWN, APPELLANTS,
v.
GOLDBERG, RUBENSTEIN & BUCKLEY, P.A., AND AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEES
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The appellants sought damages from a law firm and its insurer after the appellant was struck by a rental car driven by the law firm's teenage client. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants, but the appellate court reversed, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether the law firm was a bailee of the vehicle and thus liable for the negligent operation by its permittee.
The court held that genuine triable issues of material fact existed regarding whether the law firm was a bailee of the vehicle, precluding summary judgment. The court also held that a bailee may be liable for negligent operation of a bailed vehicle by one to whom the bailee permits use, and that a person for whose benefit a vehicle is rented and who pays the expense may be found to be a bailee.
[1] A law firm that pays for and benefits from the rental of a vehicle for its client may be considered a bailee of that vehicle.
[2] A bailee may be held liable for damages caused by the negligent operation of a bailed vehicle by a third party to whom the bailee granted permission to use it.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is settled that a bailee may be held liable for negligent operation of the bailed vehicle by one to whom the bailee gives permission to operate it. That liability rests on the doctrine of dangerous instrumentality and does not require a showing of gross negligence or bad faith on the part of the bailee.”
Establishes the legal principle that bailees are liable for permittees' negligent operation under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDennis C. Brown, a pedestrian, was severely injured when struck by a rental car driven by Michael Edwards, a 17-year-old client of the law firm Goldbe…
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[*488] DANÁHY, Judge.
Dennis C. Brown, appellant, was severely-injured when he was struck by an automobile. The vehicle which struck appellant, a pedestrian, was a rental car driven by Michael Edwards, a client of appellee Goldberg, Rubenstein & Buckley, P.A. (the law firm), who was then seventeen years old.
In this action, appellants seek to hold the law firm and its automobile insurance carrier responsible for the damages sustained by the appellants. Michael Edwards was driving a car rented from Ranker Motors, which had an unwritten agreement with the law firm under which rental vehicles were provided to the firm’s clients and paid for by the firm. The issues in this case concern the nature of the arrangement between the law firm and Ranker Motors. The trial judge, apparently considering these issues not to be in dispute and that they established nonliability on the part of the law firm, rendered a final summary judgment in favor of appellees. We reverse.
We hold that the evidence concerning the arrangement between Ranker and the law firm gives rise to conflicting inferences which require that a jury resolve the issue whether the law firm was in fact a bailee of the automobile and thus liable for damages inflicted by the negligent operation of that automobile by one permitted by the firm to use it. It is settled that a bailee may be held liable for negligent operation of the bailed vehicle by one to whom the bailee gives permission to operate it. That liability rests on the doctrine of dangerous instrumentality and does not require a showing of gross negligence or bad faith on the part of the bailee. Martin v. Lloyd Motor Co., 119 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960). Appellees vigorously argue that there was no evidence that the law firm actually ever had possession of the vehicle and, absent such possession, the law firm could not be deemed a bailee. We find authority for the proposition that a person for whose benefit a vehicle is rented and who pays the expense thereof can be found to be a bailee of the vehicle. Hertz Corp. v. Ralph M. Parsons Co., 419 F. 2d 783 (5th Cir.1969). It may well be that a jury would find, on the evidence, that the law firm was in fact a bailee of the motor vehicle who gave permission for its use by Michael Edwards.
In sum, we find that there exist in this case genuine triable issues and thus the entry of summary judgment was error. Holl v. Talcott, 191 So. 2d 40 (Fla.1966).
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
RYDER, C.J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur.
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Aurbach v. Gallina, 753 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 2000)…r vehicles. See Frankel, 69 So. 2d at 888. However, whether an entity or individual is vicariously responsible as a bailee for the negligent operation of a motor vehicle may be a fact-based inquiry. See Brown v. Goldberg, Rubenstein & Buckley, P.A., 455 So. 2d 487, 488 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). Thus, this Court’s prior cases have recognized a variety of identifiable property interests that might give rise to vicarious liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. “BARE” LEGAL TITLE VERSUS BENEFICIAL OWNE…
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Aurbach v. Gallina, 721 So. 2d 756 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)…887 (Fla.1954), our supreme court held that a bailee for hire was liable under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine when he delivered possession of a car to a third person who causes an accident. See Brown v. Goldberg, Rubenstein & Buckley, P.A., 455 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). Metzel v. Robinson, 102 So. 2d 385 (Fla.1958), involved a vehicle titled in the name of Anna Metzel and which was negligently operated by Met-zel’s nephew. Metzel argued that since she was not the actual owner of the car, she was…
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State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Clauson, 511 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)…sub-bailee) of a motor vehicle is liable to third persons under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine for the negligence of one to whom he has entrusted it. Frankel v. Fleming, 69 So. 2d 887 (Fla.1954); Brown v. Goldberg, Rubinstein & Buckley, P.A, 455 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), pet. for review denied, 461 So. 2d 114 (Fla.1985); 4 Fla.Jur.2d Automobiles and Other Vehicles § 292 (1978). Thus, if Mr. Clauson had injured a pedestrian or another driver, not only We Try Harder but Mrs. Clauson (and her employ…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Gory Roofing Tile Mfg., Inc. v. Davison, 191 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1966)
- The HERTZ Corp. v. Ralph M. Parsons Co., 419 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1969)
- Martin v. Lloyd Motor Co., 119 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960)