MARVIN E. BLACKSHEAR, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Blackshear appeals the denial of his post-conviction relief motion, arguing his guilty plea was invalid because counsel failed to advise him that conviction could result in forfeiture of accumulated gain time. The appellate court affirmed, holding that gain time forfeiture is a collateral consequence of which trial courts need not advise defendants before accepting a guilty plea.
A trial court is not required to advise a defendant of collateral consequences of a guilty plea. The forfeiture of gain time is a collateral consequence, not a direct consequence, because it is discretionary with the Department of Corrections and not automatic or mandatory. Therefore, neither the trial court nor counsel was required to advise Blackshear of possible gain time forfeiture for his guilty plea to be valid.
[1] A trial court must determine that a defendant understands the nature of the charge and the consequences of their plea before accepting a guilty plea.
[2] A trial court is not required to advise a defendant of every collateral consequence of a guilty plea.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“[QUOTE REDACTED — failed verbatim audit (paraphrase, not verbatim). See original_text for the text as originally displayed.]”
Establishes the governing legal principle that trial courts need not inform defendants of all collateral consequences of guilty pleas.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBlackshear pled guilty to escape after his court-appointed attorney advised him the maximum penalty was fifteen years, with an agreement from the stat…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Consequences cases and more on FLexlaw
JOANOS, Judge.
Blackshear appeals the summary denial of his motion for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We affirm. Blackshear pled guilty to the charge of escape after his court-appointed attorney advised him that the maximum penalty for escape was fifteen years, but under an agreement with the state attorney a five-year penalty would be recommended to the judge. After asking Blackshear if his counsel had explained the maximum penalty for escape, the trial court accepted Blackshear's plea of guilty and imposed the recommended five-year penalty. Black-shear now argues that he was not fully advised of the consequences of his plea since his counsel failed to tell him that he could lose his accumulated gain time on the sentence being served when the alleged escape occurred upon conviction.
Before a plea of guilty may be accepted, the trial court must determine, among other things, that the defendant understands the nature of the charge and the consequences of his plea. Williams v. State, 316 So. 2d 267 (Fla.1975). The trial court, however, “is not required to advise the accused of every collateral consequence which follows from a guilty plea.” Polk v. State, 405 So. 2d 758, 761 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). The distinction between direct and collateral consequence of a plea “turns on whether the result represents a definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on the range of the defendant’s punishment.” Zambuto v. State, 413 So. 2d 461, 462 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).
The forfeiture of gain time following a plea of guilty is accomplished by a proceeding which is not an automatic or mandatory procedure, but “may” be done in the discretion of the Department of Corrections. Section 944.28, Florida Statutes (1983). The proceeding is not instituted by either the state attorney or the trial judge. This discretionary forfeiture of accumulated gain time pursuant to Section 944.28 is a collateral consequence of Blackshear’s guilty plea of which neither the trial court nor his counsel must advise him for the plea to be valid. See Rosemond, v. State, 433 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), and see generally, Edwards v. State, 393 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1981).
Accordingly, the trial court’s order is AFFIRMED.
SMITH and ZEHMER, JJ.,
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Simmons v. State, 611 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)…n additional warning that a determinate sentence will not later be shortened. Neither the trial court nor counsel is required to forewarn a defendant about eyery conceivable collateral consequence of a plea to criminal charges. Blackshear v. State, 455 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). The effect of a conviction on accumulation [*1253] or loss of “good time” has been deemed a collateral consequence. Ladner v. Henderson, 438 F. 2d 638 (5th Cir.1971).4 Similarly, when most felony prisoners were eligible for rele…
-
Watrous v. State, 793 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)…re generally considered to be collateral); State v. Will, 645 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (holding that before Ashley, gain time ineligibility was a collateral consequence); Simmons v. State, 611 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Blackshear v. State, 455 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Zambuto v. State, 413 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). In Ashley, the court did not explicitly state whether its holding was based on a conclusion that the effects of habitualization on gain time were direct consequences or whet…
-
State v. Will, 645 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)…llateral consequence of a plea. See id.; Simmons v. State, 611 So. 2d 1250, 1252-53 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Levens v. State, 598 So. 2d 120, 121 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Wright v. State, 583 So. 2d 399, 400 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); see also Blackshear v. State, 455 So. 2d 555, 556 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (forfeiture of accumulated gain time). But see Wilcox v. State, 638 So. 2d 527 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (post-Ashley decision; suggesting that ineligibility for basic gain time is a direct consequence of a plea); Setzer v. State,…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Williams v. State, 316 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1975)
- Francesco Zambuto v. State, 413 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
- Clement Lemmon Edwards v. State, 393 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- Polk v. State, 405 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- Rosemond v. State, 433 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)