EDDIE LEE ROSEMOND, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Rosemond appealed the summary denial of his Rule 3.850 postconviction relief petition following his guilty plea to three counts of conspiracy to sell cocaine. The court affirmed the denial, rejecting various claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and other constitutional violations.
The court held that: (1) failure to advise of subsequent habitual felon enhancement is not grounds for invalidating a plea as such enhancement is a collateral consequence; (2) claims regarding illegally gathered evidence are waived by guilty plea; (3) brevity of counsel consultation is not grounds for postconviction relief; (4) overlooking issues that were without merit or case-specific is not measurably below competent counsel performance; and (5) the jurisdictional claim was wholly without merit.
[1] A subsequent sentence enhancement is a collateral consequence of a prior offense, not an incident of the prior offense itself.
[2] A defendant is not entitled to be advised of potential future sentence enhancements as a condition for a valid guilty plea.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Any enhancement of a subsequent unrelated sentence is an incident of the last offense, not the prior offenses [...] Subsequent enhancement is a collateral consequence of Rosemond's plea and neither court nor counsel must advise him for the plea to be valid.”
Establishes that habitual felon enhancement is a collateral rather than direct consequence, and thus failure to advise does not invalidate a guilty plea.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRosemond pleaded guilty to three counts of conspiracy to sell cocaine. He subsequently sought postconviction relief claiming his plea was not knowing …
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MILLS, Judge.
Rosemond appeals the summary denial of his petition for Rule 3.850 postconviction relief. We affirm.
Rosemond pled guilty to three counts of conspiracy to sell cocaine. He now argues that his plea was not made with full understanding and that his counsel was inadequate because he wasn’t advised of the potential for subsequent treatment as a habitual felon. Any enhancement of a subsequent unrelated sentence is an incident of the last offense, not the prior offenses. Eutsey v. State, 383 So. 2d 219 (Fla.1980); Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 32 S.Ct. 583, 56 L.Ed. 917 (1912). Subsequent enhancement is a collateral consequence of Rosemond’s plea and neither court nor counsel must advise him for the plea to be valid.
Rosemond further argues that his conviction was obtained with illegally gathered evidence. This issue is waived by a guilty plea. Harvin v. State, 385 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
Rosemond contends that counsel was ineffective due to having consulted with Rosemond only seven times of ten minutes each. Brevity of consultation is not grounds for postconviction relief, Byrd v. State, 243 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971).
Rosemond next contends that his counsel was ineffective in missing an issue concerning the legality of a wiretap. Rose-mond’s eoconspirator Daniels was successful in this issue, State v. Daniels, 389 So. 2d 631 (Fla.1980). However, a panel of this court in Epps v. State, 354 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), disposed of this issue as without merit without discussion in another cocon-spirator’s appeal. See, Daniels v. State, 381 So. 2d 707 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), opinion on rehearing. Overlooking this issue cannot be considered a serious deficiency measurably below that of competent counsel.
Similarly, Rosemond argues that counsel overlooked the same transaction rule issue which resulted in a partial reversal in Epps. As noted in Epps, a same transaction rule issue depends upon the unique circumstances of each case. In Daniels, three separate convictions were affirmed. Assuming counsel did overlook the issue, overlooking is not under these circumstances measurably below competent counsel.
Finally, Rosemond states that the trial court was without jurisdiction. This is wholly without merit.
AFFIRMED.
BOOTH and SHIVERS, JJ., concur.
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Bates v. State, 818 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)…on the future sentence-enhancing consequences of his plea. We note that this Court has long held that neither the trial court nor trial counsel must advise a defendant of possible subsequent enhancement for a plea to be valid. See Rosemond v. State, 433 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1st DCA .1983). Moreover, trial counsel need only advise Appellant of the direct consequences of his plea. See Fla.R.Crim. P. 3.172.3 In affirming on this issue, we follow the Third District Court of Appeal’s reasoning in Rhodes v. State, 701…
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Kilgore v. State, 55 So. 3d 487 (Fla. 2010)…e how he was prejudiced by this supposed failure. We deny relief on this claim. Third, Kilgore alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to sufficiently communicate with Kilgore. The postcon-viction court, relying on Rosemond v. State, 433 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), and Byrd v. State, 243 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971), held that brevity of consultation is not grounds for postconviction relief. We agree. Even if it is established that trial counsel’s communication with his client was brief, a…
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Blackshear v. State, 455 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)…s discretionary forfeiture of accumulated gain time pursuant to Section 944.28 is a collateral consequence of Blackshear’s guilty plea of which neither the trial court nor his counsel must advise him for the plea to be valid. See Rosemond, v. State, 433 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), and see generally, Edwards v. State, 393 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1981). Accordingly, the trial court’s order is AFFIRMED. SMITH and ZEHMER, JJ.,…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Fredford James Eutsey v. State, 383 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1980)
- Graham v. State of W. Va., 224 U.S. 616 (U.S. 1912)
- Norris Epps v. State, 354 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)
- State v. Daniels, 389 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 1980)
- Daniels v. State, 381 So. 2d 707 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)
- Harvin v. State, 385 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Lewis v. Rein, 243 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971)
- Byrd v. State, 243 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971)