ROGER H. DEAN, APPELLANT/CROSS APPELLEE,
v.
JON FREDERIC COYNE, APPELLEE/CROSS APPELLANT
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Dean, maker of a promissory note, appealed an attorney's fee award of $15,000 as excessive, while Coyne, the payee, cross-appealed claiming it was inadequate. The court affirmed both the main appeal and cross-appeal on the fee amount, but reversed the trial court's finding that Florida Statute § 687.06 was unconstitutional, holding that the statute permits judicial inquiry into fee reasonableness when a contract allows for fees exceeding 10%.
The court affirmed the $15,000 attorney's fee award as supported by substantial competent evidence and affirmed the cross-appeal based on the parties' stipulation. The court reversed the finding that § 687.06 is unconstitutional, holding that the statute does not prevent judicial inquiry into fee reasonableness when a contract permits fees exceeding 10%, but merely provides that no inquiry is required when fees are capped at 10% or less.
[1] A trial court's award of attorney's fees will be affirmed if supported by substantial competent evidence.
[2] Parties may stipulate that the trial court may determine both entitlement to and the amount of attorney's fees.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the statute, assuming its applicability outside of the context of usury, does not prevent the court from looking into the reasonableness of the contract's provision for attorney's fees; it merely says there does not have to be such an inquiry when the provision calls for no more than a fee of 10%”
Establishes the court's interpretation that § 687.06 does not prohibit judicial inquiry into fee reasonableness, but only provides that no inquiry is required when fees do not exceed 10%.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDean executed a promissory note to Coyne containing a provision for attorney's fees of either 10% or such greater fee as may be just and reasonable. U…
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PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal by the maker of a promissory note, claiming the award of an attorney’s fee of $15,000.00 to be excessive and a cross appeal by the payee, claiming the award to be inadequate. Subject to the discussion hereinbelow, we affirm the main appeal, there being substantial competent evidence to support the award. Similarly, we affirm the issue on cross appeal because the parties stipulated that the trial court could determine the issues of entitlement and amount.
However, we reverse the trial judge’s determination that section 687.06, Florida Statutes (1983), is unconstitutional. The statute, assuming its applicability outside of the context of usury, does not prevent the court from looking into the reasonableness of the contract’s provision for attorney’s fees; it merely says there does not have to be such an inquiry when the provision calls for no more than a fee of 10%.
We conclude this means when the contract flatly calls for a fee of 10% or less, there should be no judicial inquiry into the fee’s fairness or reasonableness absent some plea for equitable consideration, e.g., un-conscionability, but that when the contract is not limited to such ceiling on the fee, such adjudication is appropriate. Here the contract called for a 10% fee or such greater fee as may be just and reasonable. That provision left appellee free to seek a greater fee than 10%. While he did not do so, he could have; and the statute should not be read, in such circumstance, to permit him to try to show that a just and reasonable fee of more than 10% should be taxed, without also permitting appellant to show that a fee of less than 10% was in fact proper. Were it so construed, the statute might then be found to be applied unconstitutionally because it might violate the maker’s right to equal protection or access to the courts.,
In Sepler v. Emanuel, 388 So. 2d 28 (Fla.3d DCA 1980), the court said that if the statute is construed to permit the plaintiff to show a fee of more than 10% to be reasonable, it might be construed also to permit the defendant to show that a fee of less than 10% was reasonable; else the statute would be unconstitutional. Although this was stated in a factual context where the stated note provision called for an attorney’s fees but failed to specify the amount, and the trial court assumed the 10% rate, mentioned in the statute, to be applicable, we believe we can extrapolate the foregoing to the instant situation.
DOWNEY and GLICKSTEIN, JJ., and SCOTT, ROBERT C., Associate Judge, concur.
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Donofro v. Dick, 680 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)…than the contracted fee would be reasonable. Sepler v. Emanuel, 388 So. 2d 28, 29 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); A & E International Enterprises, Inc. v. Gold Credit Company, 450 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 461 So. 2d 113 (Fla.1984); Dean v. Coyne, 455 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). Accordingly, the declaratory judgment is AFFIRMED, the order on attorney’s fees is REVERSED, and the cause is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. JOANOS and BENTON, JJ., concur. . The promissory not…
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Sand Dollar Invs., Inc. v. Anja, Inc., 492 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)…a.1985). The mortgage required appellants to pay a reasonable fee. There being no percentage recited in the instrument, section 687.06, Florida Statutes (1985) does not apply.1 See Sepler v. Emanuel, 388 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Dean v. Coyne, 455 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). We affirm the cross appeal. GLICKSTEIN and GUNTHER, JJ., concur. LETTS, J., dissents with opinion. . 687.06 Attorney’s fee in enforcing nonusurious contracts; proviso; insurance premiums; attorney’s fee provided in note…
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Coastal Cmty. Bank v. Jones, 23 So. 3d 757 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)…5. Once the note holder has presented evidence of its obligation to pay fees, the court should refrain from inquiry “into the fee’s fairness or reasonableness absent some plea for equitable consideration, e.g., unconscionability, ...” Dean v. Coyne, 455 So. 2d 576, 576 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). In the present case, however, the bank declined an opportunity to provide any evidence concerning its obligation to pay fees to its lawyers. Under these circumstances, we do not reach the question whether the fee sought was…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Sepler v. Annalee Emanuel, 388 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)