DIANNE JANNEY LAYMAN, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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The Florida District Court of Appeal reviewed a DUI conviction via petition for certiorari to clarify the proper charging and jury verdict framework under Florida's amended DUI statute. The court held that section 316.193(1) describes a single offense with two alternative methods of violation: driving under the influence of substances impairing normal faculties, or driving with a blood alcohol level of 0.10% or above.
Section 316.193(1) describes a single offense that can be violated in either of two ways: (a) driving under the influence with impaired normal faculties, or (b) driving with a blood alcohol level of 0.10% or above. A citation alleging violation of section 316.193 without specifying the subsection is sufficient, and jury verdict forms may present alternative guilty verdicts corresponding to the methods charged.
[1] Section 316.193(1), Florida Statutes (1983), describes a single offense of driving or being in actual physical possession of a vehicle while under the influence or with a…
[2] A Florida Uniform Traffic Citation alleging a violation of section 316.193 is sufficient to charge the offense, regardless of whether it specifies subsection (1)(a) or (1…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“section 316.193(1), Florida Statutes (1983), as it exists after July 1, 1982, the effective date of Chapter 82-155, Laws of Florida, describes but one offense which can be committed by either or both of two methods”
Establishes the core holding that DUI is a single offense with two alternative violation methods
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePetitioner Dianne Janney Layman was convicted in county court of violating section 316.193(1), Florida Statutes. The conviction was affirmed without o…
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COWART, Judge.
By petition for certiorari we are asked to review the appellate decision of the circuit court affirming, without opinion, the conviction of petitioner in the county court.
We have exercised discretion1 and have reviewed the issues presented. We hold that section 316.193(1), Florida Statutes (1983), as it exists after July 1, 1982, the effective date of Chapter 82-155, Laws of Florida,2 describes but one offense which can be committed by either or both of two methods, i.e., the driving or being in the actual physical possession of a vehicle within this state by a person (a) who is under the influence of alcoholic beverages, chemical substances or control substances to the extent that normal faculties are impaired (§ 316.193(l)(a)), or (b) with a blood alcohol level of 0.10 percent or above (§ 316.193(l)(b)), or both driving under the influence (DUI) and with an unlawful blood alcohol level (DUBAL).
A Florida Uniform Traffic Citation or Notice to Appear, alleging a violation of section 316.193, without specification of either subsection (l)(a) or (l)(b), is sufficient to charge a violation of this statute in either of the two ways it can be violated. Of course, the State may more specifically charge that both subsections have been violated or it may charge the violation of one subsection without charging the violation of the other. The issues presented to the jury by verdict forms should not exceed the issues presented by the charging document. If a violation of both subsections is charged, then, in addition to the alternative of not guilty, the jury verdict may submit the issue of guilt as a violation of section 316.193(1) or, separately, as either a violation of section 316.193(l)(a) (DUI) or a violation of section 316.193(l)(b) (DUBAL). If the charging document is sufficient to charge both ways of violating this statute, the theoretical verdict alternatives are that the accused violated both subsections (guilty) or either subsection (guilty) or neither subsection (not guilty).
Finding no error at either the trial or appellate level the petition for certiorari is
DENIED.
SHARP, J., concurs.
COBB, C.J., concurs in result with opinion.
. Combs v. State, 436 So. 2d 93 (FIa.1983).
. We are not here concerned with the construction of section 316.193, Florida Statutes, as it existed before the amendment made by chapter 82-155, Laws of Florida, or the right to a jury trial involved in Whirley v. State, 450 So. 2d 836 (Fla.1984).
COBB, Chief Judge,
concurring in result:
In the exercise of the discretion of this court, I would simply deny certiorari review of this matter on authority of Combs v. State, 436 So. 2d 93 (Fla.1983).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Ivory v. State, 588 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)…ires deposit of the traffic citation with the court, after which judicial proceedings commence, with the state attorney or his assistant actually prosecuting the charges. See also Gardner v. State, 468 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Layman v. State, 455 So. 2d 607 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 459 So. 2d 1040 (Fla.1984). We agree with the state that the cited Florida Rules for Traffic Courts evince a clear intent that the uniform traffic citation constitute the charging document. When issued and served, a u…
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State v. Miller, 555 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…under that statute for driving under the influence if it is proven either that the person was affected by the alcohol to the extent that his normal faculties were impaired or that his blood alcohol level was .10 per cent or higher.2 Layman v. State, 455 So. 2d 607 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 459 So. 2d 1040 (Fla.1984). But cf. Frazier v. State, 530 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (Instruction that .10 per cent or more blood alcohol content was prima facie evidence that motorist was under the influence creat…
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Gardner v. State, 468 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)…fficiently to inform him of the wrong with which he was charged. The county court correctly denied Gardner’s motion to dismiss. In affirming the county court’s order, the circuit court relied on the decision of our sister court in Layman v. State, 455 So. 2d 607 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), in which it was held that a “Florida Uniform Traffic Citation or Notice to Appear, alleging a violation of § 316.193, without specification to either subsection (1)(a) or (1)(b) is sufficient to charge a violation of this statut…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Combs v. State, 436 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 1983)
- Whirley v. State, 450 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 1984)