JAMES W. STRANIGAN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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James Stranigan challenged his sentence imposed after entering a nolo contendere plea to burglary. He was promised probation but received community control instead, and the court held he was entitled to withdraw his plea because the sentence violated the terms of his plea agreement.
When a plea agreement is not honored, either by mistake, inadvertence, or by a subsequent judge's change of position, the defendant should have the opportunity to withdraw his plea. Because Stranigan tendered his plea with the understanding he would receive probation but instead received community control, he was entitled to withdraw his plea.
[1] Community control is a more severe sanction than probation.
[2] When a plea agreement is not honored, a defendant should have the opportunity to withdraw his plea.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When a plea agreement is not honored, either by mistake, inadvertence, or subsequent change in the trial judge's concurrence with the plea bargain, the defendant should have the opportunity to withdraw his plea.”
Establishes the core legal principle that unmet plea agreements justify withdrawal of pleas
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceStranigan was charged with burglary and entered a nolo contendere plea with the understanding he would receive probation. A different judge at sentenc…
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DANAHY, Judge.
The defendant challenges the propriety of the sentence imposed upon him pursuant to his plea of nolo contendere. The defendant was charged with burglary and subsequently entered a nolo contendere plea to the charge on the understanding that he would receive probation. However, at sentencing, a different judge presided and sentenced the defendant to three years’ incarceration, then suspended the three-year sentence and instead placed the defendant on three years of community control. The defendant protested the sentence on the ground that community control was not the same as probation and asked that he be permitted to withdraw his plea on the ground that he was promised probation and did not receive it. The trial judge denied the motion, indicating his belief that community control was at least consistent with probation. Later the defendant made a motion for reconsideration of the sentence or, in the alternative, to withdraw the plea of nolo contendere. The trial judge denied the defendant’s motion but modified the original sentence to two years’ community control followed by one year of probation. This appeal followed.
We agree with the defendant that community control is a more severe sanction than probation. Section 948.001, Florida Statutes (1983), defines community control and probation as follows:
(1) “Community control” means a form of intensive, supervised custody in the community, including surveillance on weekends and holidays, administered by officers with restricted caseloads. Community control is an individualized program in which the freedom of an offender is restricted within the community, home, or noninstitutional residential placement and specific sanctions are imposed and enforced.
(2) “Probation” means a form of community supervision requiring specified contacts with parole and probation officers and other terms and conditions as provided in s. 948.03.
[Emphasis added.]
When a plea agreement is not honored, either by mistake, inadvertence, or subsequent change in the trial judge’s concurrence with the plea bargain, the defendant should have the opportunity to withdraw his plea. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.171(d); Odom v. State, 310 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). Since, in this case, the defendant tendered his plea of nolo contendere on the understanding that he would receive probation and since he received, instead, three years’ community control followed by one year probation, the defendant should have the opportunity to withdraw his plea.
Accordingly, the judgment and sentence are hereby set aside and vacated to give the defendant the opportunity to withdraw his plea of nolo contendere.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
OTT, A.C.J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur.
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Ogden v. State, 605 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)…offender). In State v. Mestas, 507 So. 2d 587, 588 (Fla.1987), the court noted that community control is a “harsh and more severe alternative to ordinary probation.” See also Braxton v. State, 524 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); Stranigan v. State, 457 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). More recently, the supreme court stated that community control was “a more coercive deprivation of liberty and a more serious penalty than probation.” Fraser v. State, 602 So. 2d 1299, 1300 (Fla.1992). The court held in Fraser th…
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Gill v. State, 550 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)…this case, the incarcerative portion of Gill’s sentence would be five and one-half years, which exceeds the guidelines and is a violation of the plea agreement. Thus, Gill should be given the opportunity to withdraw his plea. See Stranigan v. State, 457 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Odom v. State, 310 So. 2d 770, 771 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). Gill, however, never moved to withdraw his plea in the trial court. Accordingly, this court is without jurisdiction to grant relief as to this issue. See McGinty v. State, 46…
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Swain v. State, 553 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)…that it is less restrictive than prison, but is considered more severe and harsh than ordinary probation. See State v. Mestas, 507 So. 2d 587, 588 (Fla.1987), quashed on other grounds in Welch v. State, 536 So. 2d 225 (Fla.1988); Stranigan v. State, 457 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). In Tal-Mason v. State, 515 So. 2d 738 (Fla.1987), in its consideration of the degrees of coerciveness exerted by different forms of supervision and detention, the court found that involuntary commitment to a mental institution f…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Smith v. State, 310 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)
- Odom v. State, 310 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)