THE SCHOOL BOARD OF COLLIER COUNTY, FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
NANCY SALTER, APPELLEE
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The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed an attorney fee award of $8,500 in a workers' compensation case, finding that the deputy's order lacked necessary findings regarding benefits obtained and adequate explanation of how statutory fee-calculation factors were applied. The court remanded for recalculation using the correct present-value methodology under the four percent statutory discount factor.
The deputy's order was reversed because it failed to make adequate findings of the benefits obtained for the claimant and failed to adequately explain how the statutory factors were applied. On remand, the deputy must use the present value of claimant's compensation payments, calculated using the four percent statutory discount factor under the Deese methodology, to determine the statutory schedule amount of attorney's fees.
[1] An award of attorney's fees must be reversed if the deputy fails to make a finding of the benefits obtained for the claimant by the attorney.
[2] An award of attorney's fees must be reversed if the deputy fails to adequately explain how the statutory factors for determining attorney's fees were applied.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The deputy's order awarding claimant's attorney a fee of $8,500.00 is reversed for failure to make a finding of the benefits obtained for claimant by the attorney and for failure to adequately explain how the factors in Lee Engineering and Construction Co. v. Fellows, 209 So. 2d 454 (Fla.1968), were applied to arrive at the fee awarded.”
Establishes the primary grounds for reversal: inadequate findings and explanation of fee calculation
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAn attorney was awarded $8,500 in fees in a workers' compensation claim. The claimant's date of accident was May 24, 1978. The School Board of Collier…
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PER CURIAM.
The deputy’s order awarding claimant’s attorney a fee of $8,500.00 is reversed for failure to make a finding of the benefits obtained for claimant by the attorney and for failure to adequately explain how the factors in Lee Engineering and Construction Co. v. Fellows, 209 So. 2d 454 (Fla.1968), were applied to arrive at the fee awarded. Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Porter, 452 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); and Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services/Division of Blind Services v. Bean, 435 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
We hasten to add that this reversal should not be interpreted as an indication that we view the award of $8,500.00 as excessive and/or an abuse of discretion. The order simply does not contain the necessary findings to permit an orderly review by this court, in the face of the specific questions raised by the E/C concerning the extent to which the amount of the award was affected by the method of calculating benefits obtained for the claimant. Upon remand, the deputy is directed to consider Deese v. Oolite Rock Company, IRC Order 2-1045 (1961), affirmed, 134 So. 2d 241 (Fla.1961), which requires the present value of claimant’s compensation payments to be determined and used for purposes of calculating the statutory schedule amount of attorney’s fees due under Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1977).
Deese provides that the four percent (4%) statutory dis count factor may be utilized to compute the present value of claimant’s compensation payments. Since the date of accident in this case is May 24, 1978, the newly enacted eight percent (8%) statutory discount factor, which has been held by this court to be prospective only, would not apply. Cone Brothers Contracting v. Gordon, 453 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
Accordingly, the deputy’s order is REVERSED and the cause REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BOOTH, SMITH and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Locke v. Rooney, 508 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)…present value of future benefits for purposes of assessing the reasonable amount of attorney fees to be awarded. The four percent discount rate in effect at the time of the accident should have been applied. School Board of Collier County v. Salter, 457 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). The order is therefore REVERSED and REMANDED for redetermination of the amount of the attorney fee award. [*468] Appellant’s motion for attorney’s fee is provisionally granted. In accordance with the rationale of Sierra v. Sierr…
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Baron Transp. & Claims Ctr. v. Riley, 526 So. 2d 1028 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)…that the e/c acted in bad faith. Nor does the order adequately address all the statutory factors. In such a case, the order should be reversed and the cause remanded because meaningful review is impossible. School Board of Collier County v. Salter, 457 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Porter, 452 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services/Division of Blind Services v. Bean, 435 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). [*1029] The order awarding attorney…
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Rolle v. Metro. Dade Cnty. & Metro. Dade Cnty. Self-Insurance Fund, 642 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)…ue of benefits obtained for the claimant in determining a reasonable fee. See Tri State Motor Transit Company v. Judy, 566 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Locke v. Rooney, 508 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); School Board of Collier County v. Salter, 457 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). However, after careful analysis of these cases, we see no logical reason to require the strict application of the statutory discount factor to the calculation of an attorney’s fee. Rather the determination of present value shoul…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Gray v. Attorney Gen., State of Fla. and/or State Attorney, Cir. Court, Volusia Cnty., Fla., 209 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 1968)
- Cone Bros. Contracting & Whiting Nat'l Servs. v. Gordon, 453 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
- Oolite Rock Co. v. Deese, 134 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 1961)
- Dep't OF Health & Rehabilitative Service/Division OF Blind Servs. & Div. of Risk Mgmt. v. Bean, 435 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)
- Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Elliott L. Porter, 452 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
- Collier Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Salter, 440 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)