JACK E. LOCKE, APPELLANT,
v.
FRANK J. ROONEY AND AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY, APPELLEES
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The court reversed and remanded a workers' compensation case because the deputy commissioner applied an incorrect discount rate when calculating the present value of future benefits for attorney fee purposes, requiring use of the four percent rate in effect at the time of the accident.
The deputy commissioner erred by applying the wrong discount rate in calculating the present value of future benefits for determining reasonable attorney fees in a workers' compensation case.
[1] In calculating the present value of future benefits for purposes of determining reasonable attorney fees in workers' compensation cases, the discount rate in effect at th…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJack Locke appealed a workers' compensation decision in which the deputy commissioner determined attorney fees based on the present value of future be…
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BARFIELD, J.
In this workers’ compensation appeal, we find that the deputy commissioner applied the wrong discount rate in determining the present value of future benefits for purposes of assessing the reasonable amount of attorney fees to be awarded. The four percent discount rate in effect at the time of the accident should have been applied. School Board of Collier County v. Salter, 457 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
The order is therefore REVERSED and REMANDED for redetermination of the amount of the attorney fee award. Appellant’s motion for attorney’s fee is provisionally granted. In accordance with the rationale of Sierra v. Sierra, 505 So. 2d 432 (Fla.1987), the parties may file within twenty (20) days of this date either a stipulation as to the amount of the fee to be assessed or affidavits as to the value of services on appeal. If there is no response within twenty (20) days, or if either party objects to proceeding on affidavits, Lyle v. Lyle, 167 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. denied, 172 So. 2d 601 (Fla.1964); Thoni v. Thoni, 179 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965), the case will be remanded to the deputy commissioner for determination of the amount of the appellate attorney fee.
MILLS and WENTWORTH, JJ., concur.
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Tri-State Motor Transit Co. v. Judy, 566 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)…Fla.Stat. (1983).2 These sections pertain to lump sum advances but the rate indicated in them has also been customarily applied to attorney’s fee computations when the fees are either partly or wholly based on future benefits. E.g., Locke v. Rooney, 508 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); see also J. Feuer Florida Workers’ Compensation Practice, section 4.19, Attorney’s Fees (3d ed. 1986). In determining the value of claimant’s future attendant care benefits to arrive at a fee, the JCC declined to reduce them to…
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Cherri J. Greene v. Maharaja OF India, Inc., 558 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)…ny, and that no attempt was made to reduce future medical costs to the maximum fee schedule, and claimant’s attorney used a two percent, rather than a four percent discount factor to reduce further medical benefits to present value. Locke v. Rooney, 508 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Department of Health and Rehabilitation, Division of Risk Management v. Lucas, 466 So. 2d 1269 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). The JCC concluded the amount in controversy for the purpose of determining an attorney’s fee was $320,000.00. He…
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Rolle v. Metro. Dade Cnty. & Metro. Dade Cnty. Self-Insurance Fund, 642 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)…s, the rate set forth therein has also been applied to compute the present value of benefits obtained for the claimant in determining a reasonable fee. See Tri State Motor Transit Company v. Judy, 566 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Locke v. Rooney, 508 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); School Board of Collier County v. Salter, 457 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). However, after careful analysis of these cases, we see no logical reason to require the strict application of the statutory discount factor to the ca…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Lyle v. Lyle, 167 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964)
- Sierra v. Sierra, 505 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 1987)
- Clark v. State, 172 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1965)
- Famous Brands Distribs., Inc. v. Hoke, 179 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965)
- Thoni v. Marine Parrish Thoni, 179 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965)
- The Sch. Bd. OF Collier Cnty. v. Salter, 457 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)