THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
LIZANDRO DELGADILLO, APPELLEE
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The State appealed the suppression of incriminating statements made by defendant Delgadillo to an undercover police officer (Garcia) during a narcotics transaction and subsequent detention. The trial court suppressed the statements under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, but the appellate court reversed, holding that no constitutional violation occurred because the defendant did not know Garcia was a police officer and his statements were not compelled or deliberately elicited.
The court held that the statements were not barred by the Fifth Amendment because the defendant did not know Garcia was a police officer and therefore the statements were not 'compelled' or subject to governmental coercion, and because the statements were not made in response to interrogation or its functional equivalent. The court also held that no Sixth Amendment violation occurred because the right to counsel had not attached at the time the statements were made.
[1] A defendant's incriminating statements made to an undercover officer, who the defendant believes to be a fellow participant in a crime, are not considered compelled or su…
[2] Incriminating statements are not barred under the Fifth Amendment when they are not made in response to interrogation or its functional equivalent.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“since Delgadillo did not know that Garcia was a police officer, the statement may not be deemed to have been 'compelled' or subject to any sort of governmental coercion”
Establishes that Fifth Amendment protection does not apply when a suspect unknowingly speaks to an undercover officer
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDelgadillo and undercover officer Garcia were apprehended during a narcotics transaction in which both were involved. Garcia maintained his undercover…
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SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.
Delgadillo and an undercover police officer, Garcia, were apprehended in the course of a narcotics transaction in which they were both involved. Maintaining his cover, Garcia submitted to the “arrest.” During the trip in the police car, and later the same day in jail, the defendant made highly incriminating admissions to and in the presence of the officer. The statements were suppressed by the trial judge “based on the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the Constitution,” and the state appeals. We reverse.
The order under review is entirely unsupportable on any basis. Although the appellee invoked his Miranda rights when he was taken into custody, his admissions were not barred under the Fifth Amendment both because (a) since Delgadillo did not know that Garcia was a police officer, the statement may not be deemed to have been “compelled” or subject to any sort of governmental coercion; Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303-304, 87 S.Ct. 408, 414-415, 17 L.Ed.2d 374 (1966); see United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 100 S.Ct. 2183, 65 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980); and (b) none of the statements were made in response to “interrogation” or its functional equivalent by Garcia, Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980).1 Just as plainly, no violation of Delgadillo’s United States or Florida constitutional rights to counsel was involved because no such rights had attached when the statements were made. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964);2 State v. Douse, 448 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984).3 Finally, we reject the trial court’s view that Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights are, as it said, “solidly intertwined,” with the apparent result that a situation like this one, which involves some of the features of both, but not all of the requirements of either, may be thought to give rise to a sort of new and different hybrid or amalgamated constitutional right. The Fifth and Sixth Amendments and the interests they protect are separate and subject to separate analyses. Rhode Island v. Innis, supra; Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 480 n. 7, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1883, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981); United States v. Miller, 432 F.Supp. 382, 388 (E.D.N.Y.1977), aff’d, 573 F. 2d 1297 (2d Cir.1978); Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What is “Interrogation”? When does it matter?, 67 Geo.L.J. 1, 41 (1978). So far as we know, there is no amendment no. 5V2 to the United States Constitution.
Reversed.
.According to Garcia, who was the only witness at the motion to suppress, Delgadillo’s first statement was spontaneously made after Garcia had said nothing at all. The others, respectively, followed the officer’s remark that "I can’t believe this is happening to me,” and his admonition to Delgadillo, while they were both in the cell, that he should not answer the questions "they were probably going to ask you.” It is obvious that neither of these sets of words was of the kind that "the police should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. at 303, 100 S.Ct. at 1691.
. In addition, we do not believe, for much the same reason outlined in note 1, that the statements were "deliberately elicited" by Garcia as is also required to establish a Sixth Amendment violation. U.S. v. Henry, supra; Massiah v. United States, supra.
. Because no first appearance had occurred or was required when the statements were made, we need not decide whether we agree with the majority in Douse that the right to counsel under Article I, Section 16 of the Florida Constitution is broader than that under the Sixth Amendment and attaches at that time. No formulation of the right to counsel suggests that it arises at the time of arrest.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Peoples v. State, 576 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)…roceedings had been initiated against him, we hold that his right to counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments was not violated. Peoples also claims a violation of his right to counsel under the Florida Constitution. In State v. Delgadillo, 458 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), rev. denied, 467 So. 2d 999 (Fla.1985), the defendant, apprehended with an undercover police officer, was arrested and placed in a police cruiser with the undercover officer. During the trip in the car and later that same day in…
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State v. Johnson, 949 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)…ed his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Because, however, it is uncon-troverted that the appellee’s statement was spontaneous, and not “deliberately elicited” by the police, we reverse the trial court’s suppression of same. See State v. Delgadillo, 458 So. 2d 20, 22 n. 2 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), citing U.S. v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 100 S.Ct. 2183, 65 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980) and Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964). Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.…
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Hernando Pinzon v. State, 559 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)…. 2d 911 (Fla.1989); Kemp v. State, 541 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); State v. Fisher, 529 So. 2d 1256 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); State v. Wells, 516 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987); Palmer v. State, 467 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); State v. Delgadillo, 458 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); P.L.R. v. State, 455 So. 2d 363 (Fla.1984); Von Horn v. State, 334 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Stunson v. State, 228 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969).…
Authorities Cited
- Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (U.S. 1981)
- Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (U.S. 1964)
- Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (U.S. 1966)
- Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (U.S. 1980)
- Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (U.S. 1972)
- United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (U.S. 1980)
- State v. Douse, 448 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)