TAMMY ANN DUQUE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Tammy Ann Duque was convicted of first-degree murder, but the Florida District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for a new trial due to prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument, including improper references to excluded evidence and inappropriate personal appeals to the jury.
The trial court erred in not granting appellant's mistrial motion because the prosecutor's comments referencing excluded testimony were so fundamentally tainted that neither objection nor retraction could destroy their prejudicial effect. Additionally, the prosecutor's personal comments about his conscience were improper and should not be repeated on retrial.
[1] A prosecutor's closing argument is improper when it refers to statements made by the defendant to a psychiatrist that were excluded from evidence due to discovery violati…
[2] Improper prosecutorial comments during closing argument may be so fundamentally tainted that a mistrial is warranted even without a contemporaneous objection.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Because appellant's statement to Dr. Afield went beyond the evidence before the jury, we find that the trial court erred in not granting appellant's motion.”
Establishes that the prosecutor's reference to excluded evidence constituted reversible error
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant was charged with first-degree murder. During trial, the state attempted to introduce testimony from a court-appointed psychiatrist, Dr. Afie…
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BOARDMAN, Acting Chief Judge.
Appellant appeals the trial court’s order adjudicating her guilty of first degree murder. We reverse and remand.
On - appeal, appellant argues, inter alia, that the trial court erred in failing to declare a mistrial because the prosecutor’s closing argument was improper and went beyond the evidence before the jury. We agree.
During the trial, the state attempted to introduce the testimony of a court-appointed psychiatrist, Dr. Afield. The purpose of that testimony was to elicit statements allegedly made by appellant to Dr. Afield. Dr Afield was not permitted to testify because of discovery violations ruled prejudicial to appellant. During closing argument, the prosecutor referred to what appellant allegedly told Dr. Afield by stating:
Think about the testimony of that Defendant. Think about what she told Dr. Afield. After he presented her with a statement of the facts in the case. Then she said, “Tony and Stanley” — changes her tune a little bit. What does she tell Dr. Mussenden on August 22nd, 1983? I am sorry, Dr. Afield. “I don’t have a defense. I don’t know what it is.” She sat in that jail thinking about this. Now there is a criminal mind. She sat in that jail from September 11th, 1982, until September 21, 22, sorry — I am like Excilia, I am not good with dates — September 21, yesterday, and thought about a story. She had time. What do you do in jail? You sit there and think about a story.
Because appellant’s statement to Dr. Afield went beyond the evidence before the jury, we find that the trial court erred in not granting appellant’s motion. See United States v. Vera, 701 F. 2d 1349 (11th Cir. 1983). Although defense counsel did not make a contemporaneous objection to the prosecutor’s comments but, rather, moved for a mistrial at the conclusion of the prosecutor’s argument, we find the improper comments “so fundamentally tainted that neither an objection nor retraction could entirely destroy that sinister influence.” Coleman v. State, 420 So. 2d 354, 356 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982).
Additionally, the prosecutor stated in closing argument: Mr. Rocha, I don’t come into a courtroom with the wrong persons. That is on my conscience. If that woman goes to jail that is on my conscience. That is on Baker’s conscience. I stand before the bar of justice. And I take it seriously. You’d better believe it. This badge, I don’t need it. ’Cause I would cry at night if that girl is innocent behind bars. I wouldn’t sleep.
[Emphasis added.] This comment, although not objected to by appellant, was improper and should not be repeated on retrial. See McGuire v. State, 411 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).
We also find merit in appellant’s argument that the trial court erred by ruling that a defense witness could not testify to statements made to her by the witness’ husband, a coconspirator, which was consistent with appellant’s theory of defense, to wit, that the participants intended to scare the deceased rather than kill him. Appellant testified at trial that her cocon-spirators were only supposed to talk to appellant’s father and perhaps scare him. Therefore, further testimony which would corroborate appellant’s defense became important to the issue of appellant’s credibility. See Reddick v. State, 443 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Campos v. State, 366 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
We have considered appellant’s remaining points on appeal and find them to be without merit.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
OTT and CAMPBELL, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Riley v. State, 560 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)…n v. State, 377 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), incompetent, Green v. State, 427 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 438 So. 2d 834 (Fla.1983), improper, Wilson v. State, 371 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), and highly prejudicial, Duque v. State, 460 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), rev. denied, 467 So. 2d 1000 (Fla.1985). A prosecutor may not ridicule a defendant or his theory of defense, Rosso v. State, 505 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), or express a personal belief in the guilt of the accused. Williamson…
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Adams v. State, 585 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)…not naturally inferable therefrom. Huff v. State, 437 So. 2d 1087 (Fla.1983); Johnson v. State, 88 Fla. 461, 102 So. 549 (1924); Tyson v. State, 87 Fla. 392, 100 So. 254 (1924); Restrepo v. State, 552 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Duque v. State, 460 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), review denied, 467 So. 2d 1000 (Fla.1985); Williamson v. State, 459 So. 2d 1125 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Williams v. State, 548 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989); Libertucci v. State, 395 So. 2d 1223 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Mulford v. State,…
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Duque v. State, 498 So. 2d 1334 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)…LEHAN, Judge. Defendant appeals from her conviction for the first degree murder of her father. The conviction came upon defendant’s retrial after this court’s reversal of her prior conviction. Duque v. State, 460 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). We reverse and remand for a new trial. Defendant’s contentions on appeal are as follows: I. The trial court’s refusal to allow the defendant to use a remaining peremptory challenge to strike a juror who informed the court of hi…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- United States v. Vera, 701 F.2d 1349 (11th Cir. 1983)
- Thorndike v. State, 420 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)
- M.P. v. State, 443 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)
- Campos v. State, 366 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)
- McGUIRE v. State, 411 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)