HENRY J. RILEY, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Henry Riley was convicted of first-degree murder, but the Florida District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for a new trial because the prosecutor's closing arguments were so prejudicial and improper that they violated established standards governing prosecutorial conduct. The court found that while Riley was clearly guilty of some homicide, the prosecutor's comments—which stated the defendant was guilty, ridiculed the defense, and expressed personal beliefs about guilt—required a new trial.
The court held that the prosecutor's closing arguments were prejudicial and improper, requiring reversal and a new trial. Prosecutors may not state personal beliefs in a defendant's guilt, ridicule a defendant or defense theory, or make statements that go beyond permissible advocacy.
[1] A prosecutor may not express a personal belief in the guilt of the accused.
[2] A prosecutor may not ridicule a defendant or their theory of defense.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A prosecutor may not ridicule a defendant or his theory of defense, Rosso v. State, 505 So.2d 611 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), or express a personal belief in the guilt of the accused.”
Establishes the core legal principle that prosecutors are prohibited from ridiculing defendants or expressing personal beliefs about guilt.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRiley was involved in a post-drinking-spree altercation with Robert Lee Anders that resulted in Anders's death. Riley was charged with first-degree mu…
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PER CURIAM.
The defendant appeals a conviction for first-degree murder. There is not much room for doubt that the defendant is guilty of a homicide. Because there is a justiciable question as to the degree of the offense, which followed a post-drinking-spree altercation between the two men, the prejudicial comments of the assistant state attorney in closing arguments require a new trial. Parts of that argument are lifted from the record:
[PROSECUTOR]: Why would I charge him with first-degree murder? Why would the grand jury return the indictment against him, the grand jury of this county?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, your Honor, move for a mistrial, request sidebar. [PROSECUTOR]: That was read to them.
THE COURT: I'm going to deny the motion, you can make further motion later. Go ahead.
[PROSECUTOR]: Because he’s guilty of first-degree premeditated murder. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, renew my motion for a mistrial, your Hon-or. [Emphasis added].
* * * * * *
[PROSECUTOR]: Because he is guilty of first-degree premeditated murder. I am prosecuting him for it gladly because what happened to Robert Lee An-ders was a cold, brutal, senseless death that happened at the hands of man who knew darn well what he was doing when he did it. [Emphasis added],
* * * * * *
[PROSECUTOR]: I don’t prosecute people who have legitimate self-defense claims. I wouldn’t have prosecuted B.B. B.B. had a gun in his pocket. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, move for a mistrial,, your Honor. THE COURT: Denied. [Emphasis added].
[PROSECUTOR]: You know, what does [the defense attorney] tell you? Because her client comes off like a liar, it’s my fault. Everybody, everybody here is at fault except for Riley. Everybody else is at fault.
B.B.’s at fault that he got killed, I’m at fault for bringing the charges, I’m at fault that he comes off like a liar that he is.
Well, I’ll tell you something. I hope and I pray that one day I can be as smart as my defendant. I really do. I really do. [Emphasis added].
[PROSECUTOR]: What happened, did we forget about the other part we said? Yeah, because that’s what happens when you lie. You lie and you lie and you lie and you lie more and you cover up and you can’t remember all the lies you said, so you can’t keep your story straight. That’s what happens when you lie. [Emphasis added],
The statements excerpted above are a compilation of several overzealous arguments the courts have consistently labeled as rude, Glassman v. State, 377 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), incompetent, Green v. State, 427 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 438 So. 2d 834 (Fla.1983), improper, Wilson v. State, 371 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), and highly prejudicial, Duque v. State, 460 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), rev. denied, 467 So. 2d 1000 (Fla.1985). A prosecutor may not ridicule a defendant or his theory of defense, Rosso v. State, 505 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), or express a personal belief in the guilt of the accused. Williamson v. State, 459 So. 2d 1125 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); McGuire v. State, 411 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
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Citator
Cited By (17 total)
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Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. 2000)…2d 125 (Fla.1989). . See Gore v. State, 719 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1998)(prosecutor violated a pretrial agreement limiting the scope of collateral crime evidence by soliciting facts in a collateral crime that were extremely prejudicial); Riley v. State, 560 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)(prosecutor called defendant a "liar” and continually stated his opinion that the defendant was guilty of first-degree murder). . First, Freeman argues it was improper for Ms. Epps to testify. This argument was presented on direct…
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Terance Valentine v. State, 98 So. 3d 44 (Fla. 2012)…a, 608 F. 2d 659, 662 (5th Cir.1979)). Similarly, a prosecutor may not ridicule a defendant or his theory of the case, nor may a prosecutor express personal belief in the accused’s guilt in a case. See Ruiz, 743 So. 2d at 4; see also Riley v. State, 560 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). However, “prosecutorial comments are not improper where, incident to evaluating a witness’ credibility, jurors are told to ask themselves what motive the [witness] would have to deceive them.” Johnson v. State, 801 So. 2d 141, 14…
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Lewis v. State, 711 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)…vidence and it is their job to question the evidence. But you know, the manner with which they’re questioning it, there’s no other term for it, it’s just lame. This comment constituted an impermissible attack on defense counsel. See Riley v. State, 560 So. 2d 279, 280 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)(a prosecutor may not ridicule a defendant or his theory of defense); Rosso v. State, 505 So. 2d 611, 612 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Briggs v. State, 455 So. 2d 519, 520-21 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). See also Alvarez v. State, 574 So. 2d 1…
Previewing 3 of 17 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Rosso v. State, 505 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)
- Williamson v. State, 459 So. 2d 1125 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
- Adelita Quejado Green v. State, 427 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
- Bryant v. State, 377 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)
- Glassman v. State, 377 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Wilson v. State, 371 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)
- Duque v. State, 460 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)
- McGUIRE v. State, 411 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)