HEWITT, COLEMAN & ASSOCIATES, APPELLANT,
v.
WILLIAM LYMAS AND ALICE LYMAS, HIS WIFE, APPELLEES
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Hewitt, Coleman & Associates sought reimbursement of worker's compensation benefits paid when an employee settled a third-party tort claim for less than the alleged full value. The court reversed the trial court's partial reimbursement award, holding that the employer is entitled to 100% reimbursement unless the employee presents competent evidence that comparative negligence or insurance limits reduced the claim's value.
The trial court erred by awarding less than 100% reimbursement because the employee failed to introduce competent evidence that comparative negligence reduced the value of the claim. Argument of counsel alone does not constitute evidence sufficient to meet the statutory burden of proof. The employer is entitled to 100% reimbursement ($3,518.19) absent proper evidence supporting the employee's comparative negligence defense.
[1] An employer or carrier seeking reimbursement for worker's compensation benefits paid to an employee who has recovered from a third party is entitled to 100 percent of its…
[2] The burden of proof rests on the employee to demonstrate that the settlement amount was less than the full value of damages sustained due to comparative negligence or ins…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The employer or carrier shall recover from the judgment, after attorney's fees and costs incurred by the employee or dependent in that suit have been deducted, 100 percent of what it has paid and future benefits to be paid, unless the employee or dependent can demonstrate to the court that he did not recover the full value of damages sustained because of comparative negligence or because of limits of insurance coverage and collecti-bility.”
The statutory standard governing reimbursement of worker's compensation benefits from third-party settlements.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn September 29, 1979, the employee suffered a work-related injury when a motor vehicle ran over his foot. The employer paid $3,518.19 in benefits. Th…
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DELL, Judge.
Hewitt, Coleman & Associates appeal from an order denying its claim for full reimbursement of worker’s compensation benefits paid to or on behalf of appellee.
On September 29,1979, appellee, while in the course and scope of his employment, suffered personal injuries when a motor vehicle ran over his foot. Appellant paid $3,518.19 in medical and other compensation benefits. Appellee settled his third party claim for $6,500 less attorney’s fees of $2,600 and costs of $305.75 (resulting in a net recovery of $3,594.25). Appellee filed a sworn motion for equitable distribution. At the hearing on appellee’s motion, appellant stipulated to the admissibility of appel-lee’s sworn motion and did not object to the admission of certain medical bills, medical reports and the accident report. Appellee offered no other evidence. Appellee’s counsel argued that the full value of the claim ranged between $15,000 and $18,000 but that comparative negligence caused him to accept a settlement of $6,500. After hearing argument of counsel, the trial court awarded appellant $1,250.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred because it failed to comply with the requirements of Section 440.39(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1981). We agree and reverse. Section 440.39(3)(a) provides in part:
The employer or carrier shall recover from the judgment, after attorney’s fees and costs incurred by the employee or dependent in that suit have been deducted, 100 percent of what it has paid and future benefits to be paid, unless the employee or dependent can demonstrate to the court that he did not recover the full value of damages sustained because of comparative negligence or because of limits of insurance coverage and collecti-bility. The burden of proof will be upon the employee.
Appellee agreed that no issue existed as to limits of insurance coverage and collecti-bility. Although there is some evidence in the record which would support appellee’s counsel’s argument that the case had a value greater than $6,500, there is no evidence in the record to show that appellee accepted less than full value of his damages because of comparative negligence. The only evidence in the record is appel-lee’s sworn motion for equitable distribution which contains appellee’s assertion that “this case is being compromised for less than the full value of the case, .... ” Appellee relies on the argument of his counsel to carry his burden that comparative negligence reduced the value of his claim. This court has clearly and unequivocally stated that argument of counsel does not constitute evidence.
[T]he practice we wish to see terminated is that of attorneys making unsworn statements of fact at hearings which trial courts may consider as establishing facts. It is essential that attorneys conduct themselves as officers of the court; but their unsworn statements do not establish facts in the absence of stipulation. Trial judges cannot rely upon these unsworn statements as the basis for making factual determinations; and this court cannot so consider them on review of the record. If the advocate wishes to establish a fact, he must provide sworn testimony through witnesses other than himself or a stipulation to which his opponent agrees.
Leon Shaffer Golnick Advertising, Inc. v. Cedar, 423 So. 2d 1015, 1016-17 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); see also, Chrysler Corp. v. Miller, 450 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). Appellee’s failure to introduce competent evidence or testimony to establish that comparative negligence reduced the full value of his claim requires us to reverse the trial court’s order which awarded appellant less than 100% of its lien. See § 440.39(3)(a); Whitely v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 454 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
Therefore, we reverse and remand this cause to the trial court with directions to enter judgment for appellant, Hewitt, Cole man & Associates in the amount of $3,518.19.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
HERSEY and GLICKSTEIN, JJ., concur.
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Nat'l Advertising Co. v. Broward Cnty., 491 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)…nsel was the only “evidence” presented in support of petitioner’s contention that it had met the necessary criteria. This court has repeatedly admonished that “argument of counsel does not constitute evidence.” Hewitt, Coleman & Associates v. Lymas, 460 So. 2d 467, 468 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), rev. denied, 471 So. 2d 43 (Fla.1985); see also Leon Shaffer Gol-nick Advertising, Inc. v. Cedar, 423 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). We agree, however, with petitioner’s contention that the circuit court exceeded the sco…
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Associated Home Health Agency, Inc. v. Lore, 484 So. 2d 1389 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)…se from the employer’s claim of lien under section 440.39, Florida Statutes (1983). AFFIRMED. WALDEN, J., concurs. GLICKSTEIN, J., concurs specially with opinion. . Appellants also argue, in reliance upon Hewitt, Coleman and Associates v. Lymas, 460 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), that the trial court should not have considered the testimony of the attorney for the third party tort-feasor. Reliance upon the Hewitt case as authority to support that argument is misplaced and fails to recognize the differenc…
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Pantry Pride & Crawford & Co. v. Hayes, 477 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)…la.1982); State v. Caldwell, 388 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Fireman’s Insurance Co. v. Phillips, 368 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); §§ 90.703, 90.704, Fla.Stat. (1983); § 440.39(3)(a), Fla.Stat. (1975); cf. Hewitt, Coleman & Associates v. Lymas, 460 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), review denied, 471 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 1985) (argument of appellee’s counsel, without sworn testimony, insufficient to establish that value of claim reduced by comparative negligence). Affirmed.…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Leon Shaffer Golnick Advertising, Inc. v. Cedar, 423 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
- Whitely v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 454 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
- Chrysler Corp. v. Miller, 450 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)