CHARLES E. NASH, III, APPELLANT,
v.
FORT LAUDERDALE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT AND CITY OF FORT LAUDERDALE, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Nash challenged the application of Fort Lauderdale's zoning setback ordinances to a roofed but open-sided tiki hut on his property. The trial court granted declaratory relief recognizing the tiki hut as a structure but denied injunctive relief, finding it violated setback requirements. The appellate court reversed, holding that setback ordinances apply only to buildings, not structures, and the tiki hut qualified as neither.
The setback ordinances apply only to buildings, not structures. Since the tiki hut is not a fully enclosed structure, it does not meet the definition of a building and therefore cannot violate the setback ordinances. Nash is entitled to both declaratory and injunctive relief preventing the city from applying setback ordinances to the tiki hut.
[1] Municipal ordinances are construed upon the same basis as statutes, with legislative intent determined primarily from the language of the ordinance.
[2] Property owners are entitled to rely upon the clear and unambiguous language of municipal ordinances.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The language of the ordinances before us is clear and unambiguous and speaks only of "buildings" not "structures."”
The court's central holding that setback requirements apply only to buildings, not the broader category of structures.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceNash owned property in Fort Lauderdale containing a single-family residence and a roofed tiki hut. The tiki hut encroached upon the rear and side yard…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Structure Definition cases and more on FLexlaw
BARKETT, Judge.
Appellant Nash sought declaratory and injunctive relief from the application of certain zoning ordinances to a structure upon his property. The trial court granted Nash’s request for declaratory relief, and denied his request for injunctive relief. Because both forms of relief should have been granted, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
Nash owns property in Fort Lauderdale that contains a single family residence and a roofed structure referred to as a tiki hut. The tiki hut encroaches upon the rear and side yard “setback” lines imposed by city zoning ordinances. In granting declaratory relief, the trial court found that the tiki hut was a “structure” within the meaning of the provisions of the zoning code. The court, however, denied Nash’s request for injunctive relief, finding that the tiki hut violated rear yard and side yard setback requirements.
The relevant definitional provisions of section 47-2, Fort Lauderdale Code of Ordinances, are:
Setback. A “setback” is the minimum horizontal distance between a building and the boundary lines of the lot on which situated, (emphasis added).
Building. A “building” is a roofed and walled structure that is completely enclosed ... the use of which demands a permanent location on the land, (emphasis added).
Structure. A “structure” is anything constructed or erected, the use of which requires more or less permanent location on the land, or attached to something having a permanent location on the land.
Additionally, section 47-6.5, Fort Lauder-dale Code of Ordinances, provides:
There shall be a side yard on each side of the building of not less than ten feet (10') for one and two story buildings not exceeding 22 feet in height. Where a building exceeds 22 feet in height that portion of the building above 22 feet in height shall be set back an additional one foot per foot of additional height.
Finally, section 47-6.7, Fort Lauderdale Code of Ordinances, provides:
There shall be a rear yard, which shall not be less than fifteen feet (15'), and where the lot abuts upon a waterway, the rear yard shall be not less than twenty-five feet (25') measured from the edge of the waterway. No building shall be erected in these areas, (emphasis supplied.)
Municipal ordinances are construed upon the same basis as statutes. Rinker Materials Corporation v. City of North Miami, 286 So. 2d 552, 553 (Fla.1973). Although legislative intent controls the construction of statutes, that intent is determined primarily from the language of a particular statute. Department of Legal Affairs v. Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club, 434 So. 2d 879 (Fla.1983); St. Petersburg Bank & Trust Co. v. Hamm, 414 So. 2d 1071, 1073 (Fla.1982).
The language of the ordinances before us is clear and unambiguous and speaks only of “buildings” not “structures.” 1 The term “setback” is defined in terms of the distance between a “building” and the boundary lines of the lot. Additionally, section 47-6.7 states specifically that no “building” shall be erected in the setback areas. Property owners are entitled to rely upon the clear language of municipal ordinances. Ocean’s Edge Development Corp. v. Town of Juno Beach, 430 So. 2d 472, 474 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), pet. for rev. den., 436 So. 2d 101 (Fla.1983).
Nash’s tiki hut, as the trial court found, is not a fully enclosed structure, and therefore is not a “building” under the pertinent code provisions. Consequently, it cannot violate the relevant setback ordinances.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s declaration that Nash’s tiki hut is a “structure,” reverse the trial court’s order denying injunctive relief to Nash, and remand for entry of an order prohibiting the city from applying its setback ordinances to Nash’s tiki hut.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
DOWNEY and DELL, JJ., concur. . As we interpret these ordinances, all buildings are structures but not all structures are buildings.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
McCOY v. Hollywood Quarries, Inc., 544 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)…ovisions of the MTCSP. Although it is well-settled that legislative intent controls the construction of statutes, the courts must determine that intent primarily from the language of a particular statute, Nash v. Fort Lauderdale Board of Adjustment, 462 So. 2d 88 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985), and the courts must accept a statute as written. In re Homer’s Estate, 188 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966). Accepting the provisions of the MTCSP as written, we cannot ascertain whether the drafters intended to include temporary…
-
J.R.S. v. State, 483 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)…marily from the language of the statute, and where, as here, the language is clear and unambiguous, we need look no further than the statute itself. Reino v. State, 352 So. 2d 853, 860 (Fla.1977). See also Nash v. Ft. Lauderdale Board of Adjustment, 462 So. 2d 88 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); Puglia v. Drinks on the Beach, 457 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). The Florida Legislature has expressly provided that a judge has discretion to either impose the alternate sanctions of section 316.655(4) or order a prison sente…
-
Estes Express Lines v. Metro. Dade Cnty. Env't Quality Control Bd. & John Renfrow, 716 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)…nnot do otherwise than to hold that it has not.3 Inasmuch as no conditions to the lawful use of one’s property may be governmentally imposed in the absence of duly enacted legislation to that effect, see Nash v. Fort Lauderdale Board of Adjustment, 462 So. 2d 88 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); City of Naples v. Central Plaza of Naples, Inc., 303 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974); Rose. v. Town of Hillsboro Beach, 216 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968), we must conclude that, however worthy and attractive the respondents’ posi…
Authorities Cited
- ST. Petersburg Bank & Tr. Co. v. Hamm, 414 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 1982)
- Rinker Materials Corp. v. City OF N. Miami, 286 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 1973)
- Dep't OF Legal Affairs v. Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club, Inc., 434 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1983)
- Fort Lauderdale Bd. OF Adjustment & City of Fort Lauderdale v. Nash, 425 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
- Fitzpatrick v. State, 430 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
- Ocean's Edge Dev. Corp. v. Town OF Juno Beach, 430 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)