ESTHER KUPPERMAN AND FRED KUPPERMAN, HER HUSBAND, APPELLANTS,
v.
DANIEL LEVINE AND BARBARA LEVINE, HIS WIFE, APPELLEES

Fla. 4th DCA | 1985-01-09
No. 84-1177
ANSTEAD, C.J., concurs., LETTS, J., dissents with opinion.
462 So. 2d 90 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1985) Caution
Cited by 14 cases

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Synopsis

The Kuppermans appealed the dismissal of their negligence complaint arising from Esther Kupperman's fall in the Levines' home. The court reversed, holding that the complaint alleged sufficient facts to distinguish the case from Schoen v. Gilbert, where a mere change in floor levels was found not inherently dangerous, because here the plaintiffs alleged an uncommon mid-room floor grade change combined with deceptively uniform-appearing furniture.


Holding

The court held that the complaint alleged sufficient facts to distinguish it from Schoen because the plaintiffs alleged not merely a change in floor levels and dim lighting, but an uncommon mode of construction—a floor grade change in the middle of a room—combined with furniture specifically chosen to create an optical illusion of a level floor. However, the Kuppermans bear the burden of proving a causal relationship between the alleged deceptive condition and the fall.


Headnotes

[1] A difference in floor levels, even in dim lighting, does not inherently constitute a failure to use due care for the safety of an invitee.

[2] A homeowner has no duty to warn of an obvious condition, such as a difference in floor levels, as a matter of law.

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Key Quotes

“[A] difference in floor levels does not of itself constitute failure to use due care for the safety of a person invited to the premises and there is no duty to issue warning of such condition when it is obvious and not inherently dangerous.”

States the general rule from Schoen v. Gilbert that floor level differences are not inherently dangerous and impose no duty to warn

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Facts & Procedural History

On February 14, 1983, Esther Kupperman fell in the Levines' home. The Kuppermans alleged that a dining table area had chairs that appeared to be the s…

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Opinion of the Court
DELL, Judge.

DELL, Judge.

Appellants challenge the dismissal of their amended complaint for damages arising out of Esther Kupperman’s fall in appellees’ home.

Appellants alleged that:

On or about February 14, 1983, there existed upon Defendants’ premises an inherently dangerous and non-obvious condition, to-wit: a dining table around which the associated chairs all appeared to be of the same overall height, but which in reality were not, due to a change in floor grade. Such condition was caused by a combination of factors including: floor grade change, poor lighting, chairs with chair backs and seats of even height, some of which had longer legs to accomodate the change in floor grade, part way around the table, and all of which presented an optical illusion, thereby creating a latently dangerous condition.

The trial court granted appellees’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint with prejudice and on the authority of Schoen v. Gilbert, 436 So. 2d 75 (Fla.1983). In Schoen, the supreme court held:

[A] difference in floor levels does not of itself constitute failure to use due care for the safety of a person invited to the premises and there is no duty to issue warning of such condition when it is obvious and not inherently dangerous. ” Hoag v. Moeller, 82 So. 2d 138, 139 (Fla.1955). See also General Development Corp. v. Doles, 309 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975); Jahn v. Tierra Verde City, Inc., 166 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964).

Because a difference in floor levels is not an inherently dangerous condition, even in dim lighting, a homeowner has no duty to warn of such condition as a matter of law.

Id. at 76 [emphasis added].

In Schoen the court said that changing floor levels between rooms is so common a mode of construction that even dim lighting would not transform the difference in floor level into an inherently dangerous condition. Sub judice, appellants have alleged more than a change in floor levels and dim lighting. They also allege an uncommon mode of construction — a change of floor level in the middle of a room — and a choice of furniture designed to create the illusion of a level floor. On motion to dismiss our review is limited to the four corners of the complaint and the allegations must be taken as true. Connolly v. Sebeco, Inc., 89 So. 2d 482 (Fla.1956). Therefore we hold that appellants have alleged sufficient facts to distinguish this case from the facts presented on summary judgment in Schoen. However, appellants shall have the burden to prove a causal relationship between the deceptive condition which they allege and Mrs. Kupperman’s fall, and should they fail to meet this burden, summary judgment or directed verdict may be appropriate.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

ANSTEAD, C.J., concurs.

LETTS, J., dissents with opinion.

Dissent
LETTS, Judge,

LETTS, Judge,

dissenting.

Whether the variation in floor level occurs in one room or adjacent rooms, makes no difference to me. What I perceive here, which the plaintiff invited to dine evidently did not, is a step up, or down, in a private residence. So it was in Schoen, supra.

In addition, I disagree with the chair-baek-optical-illusion argument which is said to distinguish this case. If optical illusions constitute the magic formula for stating a cause of action, then heaven help all interi-or designers. Their “raison d’etre” is to create illusions, the most common optical example of which is an oversized wall mirror. The maligned bar-stool chairs before us now, were obviously purchased, or designed, so occupants thereof could sit at an appropriate height at the raised dining table, rather than beneath it with their chins on the surface.

In my view Judge Owen was emminently correct. This offering is in conflict with Schoen, as I am confident our Supreme Court will agree. I would affirm.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By (14 total)

  • Casby v. Flint, 520 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1988)
    …afety, stumble, fall, and recover.” 436 So. 2d at 76 (quoting Hoag, 82 So. 2d at 139). We recognize that accompanying circumstances may transform a change in floor levels into a dangerous situation, creating a duty to warn. In Kupperman v. Levine, 462 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985), the district court correctly found that the owner had a duty to warn of the change in floor levels hidden by an unusual interior design which created an optical illusion of a level floor. In Northwest Florida Crippled Children’s…
  • Gorin v. City OF ST. Augustine, 595 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)
    …on before determining whether the obvious danger doctrine applies or the condition is inherently dangerous as a matter of law. See Northwest Florida Crippled Children’s Association v. Harigel, 479 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Kupperman v. Levine, 462 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). Such considerations maintain the equilibrium between competing policy considerations of protecting proprietary interests and preventing harm caused by unreasonable and unrestrained use of property, while also recognizing that th…
    1 / 2
  • Krivanek v. Zennith Pasternack and Annette Pasternack, 490 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)
    …se from Schoen v. Gilbert, 436 So. 2d 75 (Fla.1983). See Northwest Florida Crippled Children’s Assoc. v. Harigel, 479 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Ainsworth v. Intercontinental Hotels Corp., 467 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Kupperman v. Levine, 462 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). Appellant also argues that she should be protected from liability based on the provisions of section 768.28(9)(a), Florida Statutes (1985), which provides that no officer, employee or agent of the state or any of its subdivisio…

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