MARILYN CASBY, PETITIONER,
v.
WARREN DOUGLAS FLINT AND RITA FLINT, HIS WIFE, RESPONDENTS
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The Florida Supreme Court held that a homeowner has no duty to warn invitees of changes in floor levels that are obscured by dim lighting or an excessive number of people, as such conditions are commonplace and not inherently dangerous. The court affirmed the dismissal of negligence claims based on such hazards.
The court answered the certified question in the negative, holding that a difference in floor levels obscured by dim lighting or overcrowding does not create an inherently dangerous condition or duty to warn as a matter of law. The trial court's dismissal was correctly granted because floor level differences are commonplace and not inherently dangerous.
[1] A difference in floor levels, absent accompanying circumstances that transform it into a dangerous situation, is not an inherently dangerous condition for which a homeown…
[2] Overcrowding in a room does not transform a common difference in floor levels into an inherently dangerous condition giving rise to a duty to warn.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a difference in floor levels does not of itself constitute failure to use due care for the safety of a person invited to the premises and there is no duty to issue warning of such condition when it is obvious and not inherently dangerous”
Establishes the foundational rule that floor level differences do not create a duty to warn
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMarilyn Casby slipped, fell, and was injured at the Flints' home due to a difference in floor levels that was obscured by an excessive number of socia…
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SHAW, Justice.
We have for review Casby v. Flint, 501 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987), in which the district court certified the following as a question of great public importance:
Where plaintiff slips, falls, and is injured because of a difference in floor levels, is an allegation that the difference was obscured either by (1) other social guests, or (2) by an excessive number of other social guests sufficient as an allegation of an inherently dangerous condition giving rise to a duty to warn, thus being distinguishable from Schoen v. Gilbert, 436 So. 2d 75 (Fla.1983)?
501 So. 2d at 690. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. Casby filed a complaint alleging that the Flints negligently failed to warn of a change in floor levels obscured by an excessive number of people. The trial court granted the Flints’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action for negligence. The district court affirmed relying on Schoen, in which we held that “[bjecause a difference in floor levels is not an inherently dangerous condition, even in dim lighting, a homeowner has no duty to warn of such condition as a matter of law.” 436 So. 2d at 76.
We held in Hoag v. Moeller, 82 So. 2d 138, 139 (Fla.1955), that “a difference in floor levels does not of itself constitute failure to use due care for the safety of a person invited to the premises and there is no duty to issue warning of such condition when it is obvious and not inherently dangerous.” We reaffirmed this rule in Schoen and held that
[t]he amount of interior lighting cannot transform a difference in floor levels into an inherently dangerous condition. “That type of construction is common and no one entering a home can assume that the floors of all rooms in the same story have the same level, blindly travel on the presumption, disregard his own safety, stumble, fall, and recover.”
436 So. 2d at 76 (quoting Hoag, 82 So. 2d at 139).
We recognize that accompanying circumstances may transform a change in floor levels into a dangerous situation, creating a duty to warn. In Kupperman v. Levine, 462 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985), the district court correctly found that the owner had a duty to warn of the change in floor levels hidden by an unusual interior design which created an optical illusion of a level floor. In Northwest Florida Crippled Children’s Association v. Harigel, 479 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), a display rack extended beyond a step down and distracted the. customer’s focus away from the step creating a negligent condition and giving rise to a duty to warn. Kupperman and Harigel each involved an uncommon design or mode of construction creating a hidden danger which a prudent invitee would not anticipate. In contrast, it is common knowledge that a room obscured by dim lighting, as in Schoen, or overcrowding, as in the instant case, may contain different floor levels.
The petitioner argues that her failure to anticipate the change in floor levels is a matter of comparative negligence which does not affect the sufficiency of her complaint. This misses the point, for the focus is not on this petitioner’s failure to observe, but on the absence of any duty on the part of the homeowner to warn of possible changes in floor levels.
A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused to them by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness.
Restatement (Second) qf Torts § 343A (1965). Multiple floor levels in a dimly lit or overcrowded room are not inherently dangerous conditions. They are so commonplace that the possibility of their existence is known to all. Warning of such common conditions goes beyond the duty of reasonable care owed to the invitee.
Accordingly, we find that the trial court correctly granted the motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action for negligence. We answer the certified question in the negative and approve the district court’s decision.
It is so ordered.
McDonald, C.J., and OVERTON, EHRLICH, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur. BARKETT, J., concurs specially with an opinion.
BARKETT, Justice,
specially concurring.
I agree that this case is controlled by Schoen, but I believe that Justice Adkins’ dissent in Schoen is the correct view.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (26 total)
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Krol v. City OF Orlando, 778 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)…ot constitute a hidden dangerous condition.” Circle K Convenience Stores, Inc., 556 So. 2d at 1208 (finding that an uneven parking lot surface located at a convenience store does not constitute a hidden dangerous condition); see also Casby v. Flint, 520 So. 2d 281 (Fla.1988) (finding that multiple floor levels in a dimly lit and overcrowded room in a home are not inherently dangerous conditions); Bowles v. Elkes Pontiac Co., 63 So. 2d 769 (Fla.1952) (concluding that uneven floor levels in public places do not…
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Circle K Convenience Stores, Inc. v. Ferguson, 556 So. 2d 1207 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)…2:30 p.m. on a dry and sunny day in the open parking lot where nothing obstructed a view of the surface of the parking lot. At trial, at the close of the invitee’s case, the trial judge directed a verdict for the landowner based on Casby v. Flint, 520 So. 2d 281 (Fla.1988) and Hoag v. Moeller, 82 So. 2d 138 (Fla.1955). Thereafter, however, the court granted invitee’s motion for new trial based on the argument that the jury could have found the edge between the concrete and asphalt constituted a hidden dange…
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Marriott Int'l, Inc. v. Zaira Perez-Melendez, 855 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)…of St. Augustine, 595 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 604 So. 2d 486 (Fla.1992); and Circle K Convenience Stores, Inc. v. Ferguson, 556 So. 2d 1207 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). Marriott also cites several cases from other courts: Casby v. Flint, 520 So. 2d 281 (Fla.1988); Schoen v. Gilbert, 436 So. 2d 75 (Fla.1983); Hoag v. Moeller, 82 So. 2d 138 (Fla.1955); Aventura Mall Venture v. Olson, 561 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 574 So. 2d 142 (Fla.1990); McAllister v. Robbins, 542 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 1…
Previewing 3 of 26 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Schoen v. Gilbert, 436 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 1983)
- Hoag v. Moeller, 82 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 1955)
- Nw. Fla. Crippled Child's. Ass'n v. Harigel, 479 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)
- Kupperman v. Levine, 462 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
- Viksne v. Malda Viksne, 462 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
- Casby v. Flint, 501 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)