HAVANATUR, S.A., A PANAMANIAN CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
747 TRAVEL AGENCY, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION; ESPERANZA VALDEZ AND INTERCONTINENTAL BANK, A NATIONAL BANKING ASSOCIATION, APPELLEES
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The payee of a certified check should be permitted to intervene in an action brought by the purchaser against the bank to recover the amount of the check, even if the motion is filed after the litigation has commenced but before final judgment.
A travel agency purchased a certified check, which was lost or stolen and not redeemed. The purchaser sued the bank, which admitted owing the funds. T…
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PER CURIAM.
The final order denying the appellant Havanatur, S.A.’s motion to intervene below is affirmed because no showing has been made that the trial court abused its discretion in rendering this ruling. The motion to intervene was filed during the final stages of the litigation below, just three days prior to the entry of the final judgment, with no explanation given as to the reason for the untoward delay. At that time the appellant had a pending lawsuit against the interested parties herein which adequately protected its rights. Under the circumstances, we cannot fault the trial judge for denying the motion to intervene and requiring the appellant to pursue his remedies elsewhere. Idacon, Inc. v. Hawes, 432 So. 2d 759, 761 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) and cases collected.
Moreover, the motion to intervene was denied after the entry of final judgment; “the general rule — universally—is that intervention may not be allowed after final judgment,” save “ ‘in the interests of justice’ ”, Dickinéon v. Segal, 219 So. 2d. 435, 436-37 (Fla.1969) (emphasis omitted) and cases collected; and there is no showing that the interests of justice required this intervention.
Affirmed.
SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge
(dissenting).
The appellee, 747 Travel Agency, purchased a certified check from the Intercontinental Bank payable to the appellant. After the check was lost or stolen and was thus not redeemed, the present action was brought by 747 against the bank alone to recover the amount of the check. The bank admitted it owed the funds to someone and did not resist the entry of judgment against it. In these circumstances, I find no basis for precluding the payee-appellant, which was the only actually adverse party involved, from intervening so that its rights to the proceeds could be adjudicated below. E.g., Riviera Club v. Belle Mead Development Corp., 141 Fla. 538, 194 So. 783 (1939), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 655, 59 S.Ct. 251, 83 L.Ed. 424 (1938) (intervention by interested party matter of right); Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.230; 39 Fla.Jur.2d Parties §§ 27-30 (1982).1
Moreover, since the motion was filed and heard before the entry of the final judgment, I do not understand the majority’s invocation of the rule, reflected in both cases it cites, Dickinson v. Segal, 219 So. 2d 435 (Fla.1969) and Idacon, Inc. v. Hawes, 432 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), that intervention may be denied if it is applied for after final judgment. Cases collected, 39 Fla.Jur.2d Parties § 30. (“A person claiming an interest in pending litigation may be permitted to intervene at any time. However, as a general rule it is too late to apply for intervention after a final decree is entered.”) Under the court’s view, a motion made immediately after the commencement of an action may be denied if the court simply fails to rule on it until after the litigation is over. I would reverse.
. “The fact that an intervenor has some other and adequate remedy for the protection of his property and rights is not a bar to his right to intervene.” 39 Fla.Jur.2d Parties § 29.
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In re the Marriage of Edward N. Claughton, Jr. v. Claughton, 625 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)…mely. See e.g., Hatcher v. Roberts, 478 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (motion to intervene untimely filed one day before final arguments on motion for summary judgment), rev. denied, 488 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 1986); Havanatur v. 747 Travel Agency, Inc., 463 So. 2d 404, 405 (Fla. 3d DCA) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to intervene filed “during final stages of litigation.”), rev. denied, 475 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 1985). More importantly, however, Lois lacked standing to intervene. Her inter…
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Sedra Fam. Ltd. P'ship v. 4750, LLC, 124 So. 3d 935 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)…rsally — is that intervention may not be allowed after final judgment,’ save ‘in the interests of justice’.... ” Harris v. Bristol Lakes Homeowners Ass’n, 126 So. 3d 1075, 1076 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (quoting Havanatur, S.A. v. 747 Travel Agency, Inc., 463 So. 2d 404, 405 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) and Dickinson v. Segal, 219 So. 2d 435, 436-37 (Fla.1969)). Lessees can “only redeem the property under or through [the mortgagor’s] rights,” and have “no independent right to redemption.” Burns v. Bankamerica Nat’l Trust Co.…
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Harris v. Bristol Lakes Homeowners Ass'n, Inc., 126 So. 3d 1075 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)…ciation, and Harris appeals. We affirm, as the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reconsider the order of dismissal because of the pending late-filed motion to intervene. See Havanatur, S.A. v. 747 Travel Agency, Inc., 463 So. 2d 404, 405 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). As noted in Havanatur, “ ‘[T]he general rule-universally-is that intervention may not be allowed after final judgment,’ save “in the interests of justice”, Dickinson v. Segal, 219 So. 2d 435, 436-37 (Fla.1969) (emphasis omit…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Dickinson v. Segal, 219 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 1969)
- The Riviera Club v. Belle Mead Dev. Corp. & The Rio Vista Hotel & Improvement Co., 141 Fla. 538 (Fla. 1939)
- Idacon, Inc. v. Hawes, 432 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)
- Doak v. Fed. Land Bank of Baltimore, 305 U.S. 655 (U.S. 1938)
- Rio Vista Hotel & Improvement Co. v. Belle Mead Dev. Corp., 305 U.S. 655 (U.S. 1938)