SEDRA FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, A FLORIDA LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, SPECTRACARE, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, MCJ REALTY, LLC, A FLORIDA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, MCJ MANAGEMENT, LLC, A FLORIDA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, MAGDA SEDRA, INDIVIDUALLY, MICHAEL SEDRA, INDIVIDUALLY, AND SPECTRACARE MEDICAL CENTER, LLC, APPELLANTS,
v.
4750, LLC, A FLORIDA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, APPELLEE
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The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of a motion to vacate a foreclosure sale, holding that the appellants failed to exercise their redemption rights under Florida law by not paying the full amount due before the deadline, and that a tenant lessee had no independent right to redeem and properly was denied intervention post-judgment.
Appellants had no valid redemption rights because they failed to pay the amount specified in the final judgment before the deadline, as redemption rights under Florida Statutes section 45.0315 are exclusive and require payment of the full judgment amount plus reasonable foreclosure expenses. The tenant lessee had no independent right of redemption and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying post-judgment intervention because intervention may not be allowed after final judgment absent interests of justice, which did not exist here.
[1] A mortgagor or holder of a subordinate interest may cure a mortgagor's indebtedness and prevent a foreclosure sale by paying the amount specified in the judgment, order,…
[2] The right of redemption is exclusive and is controlled by statute.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“At any time before the later of the filing of a certificate of sale by the clerk of the court or the time specified in the judgment, order, or decree of foreclosure, the mortgagor or the holder of any subordinate interest may cure the mortgagor's indebtedness and prevent a foreclosure sale by paying the amount of moneys specified in the judgment, order, or decree of foreclosure...Otherwise, there is no right of redemption.”
States the exclusive legal standard for redemption rights under Florida law, demonstrating appellants had the ability to redeem by paying the full judgment amount.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellants owned property that was foreclosed by appellee 4750, LLC. Appellants sought to vacate the foreclosure sale, claiming their redemption right…
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We affirm the denial of a motion to vacate the foreclosure sale of appellants’ property. While they claim that their redemption rights were thwarted by the ap-pellee’s failure to credit post-judgment rentals to the amount due or to require the payment of the amount of attorney’s fees, we disagree. The right of redemption is controlled by section 45.0315, Florida Statutes, which is exclusive:
At any time before the later of the filing of a certificate of sale by the clerk of the court or the time specified in the judgment, order, or decree of foreclosure, the mortgagor or the holder of any *936subordinate interest may cure the mortgagor’s indebtedness and prevent a foreclosure sale by paying the amount of moneys specified in the judgment, order, or decree of foreclosure, or if no judgment, order, or decree of foreclosure has been rendered, by tendering the performance due under the security agreement, including any amounts due because of the exercise of a right to accelérate, plus the reasonable expenses of proceeding to foreclosure incurred to the time of tender, including reasonable attorney’s fees of the creditor. Otherwise, there is no right of redemption.
(emphasis supplied). Regardless of any demands by appellee for attorney’s fees or other amounts, appellants could have redeemed by paying the amount of the final judgment. Parsons v. Whitaker Plumbing of Boca Raton, Inc., 751 So.2d 655, 656 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). They failed to do so.
As to denial of the tenant’s post-judgment motion to intervene, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying intervention. “ ‘[T]he general rule— universally — is that intervention may not be allowed after final judgment,’ save ‘in the interests of justice’.... ” Harris v. Bristol Lakes Homeowners Ass’n, 126 So.3d 1075, 1076 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (quoting Havanatur, S.A. v. 747 Travel Agency, Inc., 463 So.2d 404, 405 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) and Dickinson v. Segal, 219 So.2d 435, 436-37 (Fla.1969)). Lessees can “only redeem the property under or through [the mortgagor’s] rights,” and have “no independent right to redemption.” Burns v. Bankamerica Nat’l Trust Co., 719 So.2d 999, 1001 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (citing Quinn Plumbing Co. v. New Miami Shores Corp., 100 Fla. 413, 129 So. 690 (1930)). Because it was not a party to the original proceedings, the tenant still has a possessory interest which has not been foreclosed in the property. See Commercial Laundries, Inc. v. Golf Course Towers Assocs., 568 So.2d 501, 503 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). Therefore, the interests of justice do not compel the granting of its post-judgment request to intervene.
Affirmed.
MAY, C.J., WARNER and POLEN, JJ., concur.
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Vera de Sousa for Vag Land Tr. 1 v. JP Morgan Chase, N.A., 170 So. 3d 928 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015)…at the motion was filed after the final judgment of foreclosure was entered. “[T]he general rule — universally—is that intervention may not be allowed after final judgment, save in the interests of justice...,” Sedra Family Ltd. P’ship v. 4750, LLC, 124 So. 3d 935, 936 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The narrow exception to the rule prohibiting post-judgment intervention arises when the interests of justice so require. Wags Transp. Sys., Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 88 So. 2d…
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Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n ("Fannie Mae") v. Gallant, 211 So. 3d 1055 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017)…a. 2d DCA 2015)). See also De Sousa v. JP Morgan Chase, N.A., 170 So. 3d 928, 929-30 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015). Furthermore, intervention after final judgment is generally disfavored. See De Sousa, 170 So. 3d at 930; Sedra Family Ltd. P’ship v. 4750, LLC, 124 So. 3d 935, 936 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). Gallant acknowledges these general rules, but argues that the “interests of justice” support intervention in this case. We disagree. The events that transpired after Gallant purchased the property, namely CitiMortgage’s re…
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Dawson v. Hernandez, 300 So. 3d 248 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020)…the Merits The borrower argues the trial court erred when it vacated the satisfaction of judgment. The borrower contends that because it complied with the statutory requirements for redemption, Sedra Family Ltd. Partnership v. 4750, LLC, 124 So. 3d 935 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012), is controlling. The lender responds that: 1) Florida law provides for attorney’s fees to be included in a judgment for purposes of redemption; 2) the satisfaction of judgment was erroneous because it was entered pursuan…
Authorities Cited
- Dickinson v. Segal, 219 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 1969)
- Quinn Plumbing Co., Inc. v. New Miami Shores Corp., 100 Fla. 413 (Fla. 1930)
- Lucky Nation, LLC v. Al-Maghazchi (Fla. 4th DCA 2020)
- Commercial Laundries, Inc. v. Golf Course Towers Assocs., 568 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)
- Burns v. Bankamerica Nat'l Tr. Co., 719 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)
- Havanatur, S.A. v. 747 Travel Agency, Inc., 463 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
- Parsons v. Whitaker Plumbing OF Boca Raton, Inc., 751 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)
- Harris v. Bristol Lakes Homeowners Ass'n, Inc., 126 So. 3d 1075 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)