HERMAN A. WALLACE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Herman Wallace appeals the denial of his second Rule 3.850 post-conviction relief motion. The appellate court reverses the trial court's summary denial and remands for consideration on the merits of Wallace's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, plea agreement violation, involuntary guilty plea, and improper habitual offender sentencing.
The appellate court held that the trial court erred in summarily denying the motion because the prior denial did not adjudicate the issues on their merits—merely dismissing them for legal insufficiency or procedural reasons. The court reversed on all grounds except the denial of right to appeal, which must be pursued through habeas corpus rather than Rule 3.850, and remanded for an evidentiary hearing or record review showing appellant is not entitled to relief.
[1] A successive motion for post-conviction relief is barred only when the previously raised grounds have been adjudicated on their merits.
[2] Allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, violation of a plea agreement, and involuntary guilty plea are properly raised in a motion for post-conviction relief.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The rule which prohibits second or successive motions for similar relief only applies where previously raised grounds have been adjudicated on their merits, not where the motion was summarily denied or dismissed for legal sufficiency.”
Establishes the key legal principle that justifies reversing the trial court's summary denial—previous dismissals for procedural reasons do not bar reconsideration when facts are properly pleaded.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWallace filed a first Rule 3.850 motion on April 24, 1984, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, violation of plea agreement, and involuntary gu…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Legal Sufficiency cases and more on FLexlaw
RYDER, Chief Judge.
Appellant seeks review of the denial of his motion for post-conviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.
On April 24, 1984, appellant filed a motion for post-conviction relief alleging: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) violation of the plea agreement; and (3) involuntary guilty plea.
On April 30, 1984, the trial court issued an order denying the motion on the grounds that the allegations regarding ineffective assistance of counsel were legally insufficient because appellant failed to set forth facts to support the allegation, and that the other two grounds should have been raised on appeal. There is no evidence in the record that appellant appealed this order.
On July 3, 1984, appellant filed another motion for post-conviction relief which is the subject of this appeal. As grounds for this motion, appellant alleged: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) violation of plea agreement; (3) involuntary guilty plea; (4) error in sentencing appellant as a habitual offender; and (5) denial of the right to appeal.
On July 24, 1984, the trial court summarily denied appellant’s second motion for post-conviction relief on the ground that appellant had previously raised the same grounds by previous motion.
Although it appears from the record before us that this is appellant’s second rule 3.850 motion, the trial court has never considered the merits of appellant’s allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, violation of the plea agreement, involuntary guilty plea, and error in sentencing. The rule which prohibits second or successive motions for similar relief only applies where previously raised grounds have been adjudicated on their merits, not where the motion was summarily denied or dismissed for legal sufficiency. McCrae v. State, 437 So. 2d 1388, 1390 (Fla.1983).
Appellant’s allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel was initially denied because the facts were legally insufficient. Because the appellant provided supporting facts in his July 3 motion, the court should have considered this issue on the merits. Appellant’s allegations of failure to abide by the plea agreement and involuntary guilty plea are issues which are properly considered by use of a rule 3.850 motion. Cf. Counts v. State, 376 So. 2d 59, 60-61 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
Lastly, appellant’s allegation that he was improperly sentenced under the habitual offender statute was not raised in his initial motion and should have been considered on the merits. Cf. Gammill v. Wainwright, 357 So. 2d 714, 715 (Fla.1978); Massey v. State, 389 So. 2d 712, 713 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
Wallace’s use of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 to present the allegation that he was denied the right to appeal was improper. In order to invoke our review of this particular point, Wallace should have filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. However, in order to expedite this matter, to save judicial labor, we treat his entreaty as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We thusly deny the petition and affirm the trial court’s denial on this ground.
We reverse the trial court on its actions as to the remaining grounds and remand the matter to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing or, in the alternative, order the trial court to attach portions of the record which conclusively show that appellant is not entitled to relief.
GRIMES and LEHAN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Harris v. State, 818 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)…’s filing a timely, legally sufficient motion pursuant to rule 3.850 on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. Such a motion will not be considered successive. See Wright v. State, 741 So. 2d 1146, 1147 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Wallace v. State, 463 So. 2d 467, 468 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). Affirmed. ALTENBERND and FULMER, JJ., Concurs. . On its face, rule 3.170(Z) refers to the grounds specified in Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(b)(2)(B)(i)-(v). This is a scrivener’s error that failed to reflect…
-
Cabrera v. State, 721 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)…onviction motion has no bearing on whether the present motion was timely filed. Moreover, Cabrera’s present motion is not successive as his first motion was voluntarily dismissed before the trial court could rule on its merits. See Wallace v. State, 463 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (stating that rule prohibiting successive postconviction motions only applies where previously raised grounds have been adjudicated on their merits). See also Ranaldson v. State, 672 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). Therefore, we f…
-
Dino K. Crescenzo v. State, 987 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)…previously adjudicated on their merits.” Wright v. State, 741 So. 2d 1146, 1147 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (citing Browning v. State, 687 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)); see also Cabrera v. State, 721 So. 2d 1190, 1191 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Wallace v. State, 463 So. 2d 467, 468 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). We reverse the postconviction court’s order of dismissal and, based on the State’s previous concession that an eviden-tiary hearing is required on this claim, remand for an evidentiary hearing. WHATLEY and CANADY, JJ„ Co…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Counts v. State, 376 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
- McCRAE v. State, 437 So. 2d 1388 (Fla. 1983)
- Massey v. State, 389 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)
- Gammill v. Louie L. Wainwright, 357 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 1978)