JOSE A. CABRERA, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Jose Cabrera appeals the dismissal of his postconviction Rule 3.850 motion. The trial court dismissed it as untimely and for lacking a statement of facts, but the appellate court reversed, holding that the two-year filing deadline did not begin until the appellate court granted Cabrera's voluntary dismissal of his direct appeal, and that the motion contained adequate factual allegations.
The two-year time limit for filing a rule 3.850 motion does not begin to run until the appellate court issues its mandate; here, jurisdiction returned to the trial court on April 18, 1997, when the appellate court granted the voluntary dismissal of the direct appeal, so the motion filed April 3, 1998, was timely. A prior voluntarily dismissed postconviction motion does not bar a subsequent one because the first was not adjudicated on its merits. The motion contained a multitude of factual allegations and adequately stated facts.
[1] The two-year time limit to file a rule 3.850 motion does not begin to run until the appellate court issues its mandate, even if a timely notice of appeal was filed.
[2] When an appeal is voluntarily dismissed, jurisdiction returns to the trial court upon the dismissal, and the time limit for filing a rule 3.850 motion begins to run from…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“once a timely notice of appeal has been filed, the two-year time limit to file a rule 3.850 motion does not begin to run until the appellate court issues its mandate”
Establishes the controlling legal standard for calculating the postconviction filing deadline.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCabrera was convicted of two drug-related offenses on January 22, 1996, and filed a notice of appeal on January 26, 1996. On April 18, 1997, the appel…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Jurisdiction Of Trial Court cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Jose Cabrera appeals the dismissal of his postconviction motion filed pursuant to Flori-da Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. The trial court dismissed Cabrera’s motion as untimely and for failing to contain a brief statement of the facts upon which Cabrera relied. Neither of these reasons was sufficient to justify the order of dismissal. Therefore, we reverse and remand for the trial court to consider the merits of Cabrera’s motion.
Cabrera was convicted on January 22, 1996, of two drug-related offenses. He filed a notice of appeal on January 26, 1996. However, on April 18, 1997, this court granted Cabrera’s request to voluntarily dismiss his appeal. On August 1, 1997, he filed a rule 3.850 motion, but then voluntarily dismissed it. The present motion was filed April 3,1998.
The law is well-settled that once a timely notice of appeal has been filed, the two-year time limit to file a rule 3.850 motion does not begin to run until the appellate court issues its mandate. See Huff v. State, 569 So. 2d 1247 (Fla.1990). This rule is based upon the rationale that jurisdiction of the case does not return to the trial court until the mandate has been issued. In Cabrera’s direct appeal, however, no mandate issued because this court granted Cabrera’s request to voluntarily dismiss his appeal. The trial court erroneously reasoned that because Cabrera had voluntarily dismissed his appeal, the two-year time limit ran from the date of Cabrera’s conviction. To the contrary, it was not until this court granted Cabrera’s voluntary dismissal that jurisdiction returned to the trial court, and thus, the two-year time limit did not begin run until April 18, 1997. Accordingly, Cabrera has until April 18, 1999, to file a timely rule 3.850 motion.
The trial court dismissed Cabrera’s motion also because he had filed a prior rule 3.850 motion which had been voluntarily dismissed. Despite the trial court’s suggestion otherwise, the fact that Cabrera has filed and dismissed a prior post-conviction motion has no bearing on whether the present motion was timely filed. Moreover, Cabrera’s present motion is not successive as his first motion was voluntarily dismissed before the trial court could rule on its merits. See Wallace v. State, 463 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (stating that rule prohibiting successive postconviction motions only applies where previously raised grounds have been adjudicated on their merits). See also Ranaldson v. State, 672 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). Therefore, we find it of no moment that Cabrera filed a prior rule 3.850 motion.
Finally, the trial court’s conclusion that Cabrera’s motion failed to contain a brief statement of facts is belied by the presence of a multitude of factual allegations in the motion. We cannot agree with the trial court that Cabrera’s motion contained no brief statement of facts. Alternatively, if the trial court’s order is construed as finding Cabrera’s factual allegations facially insufficient, then the court should have denied the motion on its merits rather than dismiss it on procedural grounds.
Reversed and remanded.
FRANK, A.C.J., and BLUE and NORTHCUTT, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (11 total)
-
Small v. State, 941 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)…itation for filing motions for post-conviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 does not begin to run until an appellate court grants a petitioner’s request for voluntary dismissal of a direct appeal. See Cabrera v. State, 721 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). Accordingly, here the time limitation did not begin to run until appellant’s belated direct appeal was voluntarily dismissed on March 16, 2006, and appellant’s motion filed on March 28, 2006, was timely. We reverse the trial co…
-
Dino K. Crescenzo v. State, 987 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)…prior motion may not be dismissed if those grounds were not previously adjudicated on their merits.” Wright v. State, 741 So. 2d 1146, 1147 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (citing Browning v. State, 687 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)); see also Cabrera v. State, 721 So. 2d 1190, 1191 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Wallace v. State, 463 So. 2d 467, 468 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). We reverse the postconviction court’s order of dismissal and, based on the State’s previous concession that an eviden-tiary hearing is required on this claim, rema…
-
Bryant v. State, 737 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)…untary motion to dismiss without prejudice, without prejudice to his timely refiling it. As the motion was dismissed before the trial court could consider it on the merits, a subsequent motion will not be considered successive. See Cabrera v. State, 721 So. 2d 1190, 1191 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). GUNTHER, STEVENSON and GROSS, JJ., concur.…
Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Huff v. State, 569 So. 2d 1247 (Fla. 1990)
- Ranaldson v. State, 672 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)
- Wallace v. State, 463 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)