JOANN S. CARR, APPELLANT,
v.
WILLIAM H. CARR, JR., APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1985-02-20
No. BA-44
ERVIN, C.J., and SMITH and NIM-MONS, JJ., concur.
464 So. 2d 221 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1985) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

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Holding

The court held that the trial court erred in denying the motion to transfer venue because the general venue statute, not the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, controlled.


Facts & Procedural History

A former husband filed an action to establish a foreign divorce judgment and modify child visitation in Gulf County. The former wife, a resident of Le…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

This is an interlocutory appeal of an order entered by the Gulf County Circuit Court denying appellant’s motion to transfer venue. We reverse.

Appellee-former husband brought this action to establish a foreign divorce judgment and to modify certain provisions thereof relating to child visitation. The action was filed in Gulf County where appellee resides. Appellant, the former wife, made a limited appearance and moved to transfer the case to Leon County where she is a resident.

The Gulf County Circuit Court denied the motion, finding that venue was controlled by Section 61.1308, Florida Statutes. This statute, part of Florida’s Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, grants jurisdiction to Florida courts over child custody matters where certain conditions have been met. However, Section 61.1308 makes no mention of venue and the present action does not fall under the special venue provisions of Section 61.14, Florida Statutes, relating to modification of support agreements. Therefore, venue must be controlled by Section 47.011, Florida Statutes, the general venue statute. See, McIntyre v. McIntyre, 352 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).

Under the general venue statute, “actions may be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, or where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located.” § 47.011, F.S. (1983). Here, there is no property in litigation and the cause of action accrued in Glynn County, Georgia, where the parties last resided with the intent to remain married. Carroll v. Carroll, 341 So. 2d 771 (Fla.1977). Accordingly, proper venue lies only in the county of defendant’s residence which is Leon County. Radziwon v. Gutillo, 447 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984).

The cause is therefore reversed and remanded with directions that the Gulf County Circuit Court enter an order transferring the case to the Leon County Circuit Court.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

ERVIN, C.J., and SMITH and NIM-MONS, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Carr v. Carr, 489 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
    …gn decree and stipulation were entered into in 1975. Finding that the husband was a resident of Gulf County, Florida, and relying upon Section 47.011, Florida Statutes, and an earlier opinion of this court involving the same parties in Carr v. Carr, 464 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1st D.C.A.1985) (Carr I), the trial court concluded that venue should be transferred from Leon to Gulf County. The lower court erroneously relied upon the wrong venue statute. In Carr I, the husband brought an action to establish the foreign…
  • Tonkin v. Mary Ann (Tonkin) Sonnenberg, 539 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989)
    …sis added) Wells at 139. If subject matter jurisdiction were truly involved, it would not be possible to transfer the cause to another circuit. Williams. REVERSE; REMAND. DAUKSCH and COBB, JJ., concur. . § 47.011, Fla.Stat. (1987). Carr v. Carr, 464 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (UCCJA makes no mention of venue; venue thus controlled by the general venue statute). . § 61.1308, Fla.Stat. (1987). . § 28 U.S.C. § 1738A. . See, e.g., Lopez v. Avery, 66 So. 2d 689 (Fla.1953); Mocher v. Rasmussen-Taxdal, 18…

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