DARRELL EARL PARKER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Defendant Parker appealed his sentencing for burglary, challenging the trial court's imposition of a sentence exceeding the presumptive guidelines range. The court held that a defendant's failure to appear at a pre-guidelines sentencing hearing does not disqualify him from electing application of the sentencing guidelines at a later sentencing proceeding, and that such failure cannot serve as the sole basis for departing from the presumptive sentence.
A defendant's failure to appear at a pre-guidelines sentencing hearing does not disqualify the defendant from electing application of the Rule 3.701 guidelines for a sentence imposed after their effective date. Upon affirmative election, a defendant is entitled to application of the guidelines, and the court cannot depart from the presumptive sentence solely because the defendant failed to appear at the earlier proceeding.
[1] A defendant who affirmatively elects to proceed under the Fla.R.Crim.P. …
[2] A defendant's failure to appear at an initial sentencing proceeding does not disqualify them from electing application of the Fla.R.Crim.P. …
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a defendant's failure to appear for a sentencing proceeding scheduled prior to the effective date of the Rule 3.701 guidelines does not necessarily disqualify the defendant from electing application of the guidelines for a sentence imposed after their effective date”
Establishes the core holding that pre-guidelines failure to appear does not bar later election of guidelines application
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAfter pleading guilty to burglary of a structure, Parker failed to appear at a sentencing hearing scheduled in August 1983. He was taken into custody …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Departure From Presumptive Sentence cases and more on FLexlaw
WENTWORTH, Judge.
Appellant seeks review of a sentence imposed for the offense of burglary of a structure, asserting that the trial court erred in declining to impose sentence within the presumptive range established pursuant to the Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.701 sentencing guidelines. We find that the court did err in this regard, and we therefore reverse the order appealed.
After a guilty plea appellant was scheduled to appear for sentencing in August 1983. Appellant did not appear at the scheduled proceeding and was subsequently taken into custody. A sentencing hearing was held in April 1984, at which time appellant affirmatively elected to proceed under the Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.701 sentencing guidelines. The state contended that the guidelines should not be applied since they were not effective when appellant failed to appear at the initial sentencing proceeding.
The court sentenced appellant to a term of incarceration in excess of the presumptive guidelines sentence, expressly noting appellant’s earlier failure to appear.1 However, a defendant’s failure to appear for a sentencing proceeding scheduled prior to the effective date of the Rule 3.701 guidelines does not necessarily disqualify the defendant from electing application of the guidelines for a sentence imposed after their effective date. See Harms v. State, 454 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); also see Query v. State, 455 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Knight v. State, 455 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). Harms further indicates that upon application of the Rule 3.701 guidelines a defendant’s mere failure to so appear should not serve as the sole basis for exceeding the presumptive sentence “because to do so would permit the trial court to do indirectly, by deviation, what he cannot do directly by denying the election of the Rule....”
In the present case appellant was thus entitled, upon his affirmative election, to the application of the Rule 3.701 sentencing guidelines, and the court could not depart from the presumptive guidelines sentence for the sole reason that appellant had failed to appear at the initial sentencing proceeding.2 Insofar as the court exceeded the presumptive sentence solely because of appellant’s earlier failure to appear, the cause must be remanded for resentencing.
The order appealed is reversed and the cause remanded.
THOMPSON and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur. . In imposing sentence the court stated that:
... [Appellant’s] failing to appear should not now be allowed to elect him [sic] to be sentenced under the guidelines.
The Court notes that the defendant has asked to be sentenced under the guidelines. The Court notes that he is being sentenced outside of the guidelines.
... In any event, I have sentenced him and I have departed from the guidelines.
. As in Harms v. State, supra, in the present case the record does not suggest that appellant’s failure to appear was willful and intentional or otherwise motivated by a desire to secure the application of the Rule 3.701 sentencing guidelines.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Williams v. State, 500 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1986)…dered in computing the guidelines score and, thus, could not justify departure. Without expressing a rationale, the First District in Harms v. State, 454 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), review denied, 461 So. 2d 116 (Fla.1985), and Parker v. State, 465 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), has also held that a sentencing court cannot deny application of the sentencing guidelines based solely on a defendant’s failure to appear. The court below based its holding to the contrary on the fact that Williams acquiesced…
-
Monti v. State, 480 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)…ppear at his PSI interviews and at sentencing. Although this court has not addressed the issue, both the First and the Second Districts have held that a failure to appear, standing alone, is not a sufficient basis for departure. See Parker v. State, 465 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Williams v. State, 471 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). No rationale for this holding has been given by the First and Second Districts. This court agrees on the basis that failure to appear amounts to criminal contempt. Here, a co…
-
Williams v. State, 471 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)…o. 2d 850 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Bell v. State, 453 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). Appellant’s reliance on two decisions of the First District Court of Appeal is misplaced. In Harms v. State, 454 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), and in Parker v. State, 465 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), the court ruled that failure to appear at sentencing is a wrongdoing which, standing alone, is not a clear and convincing reason to depart from any presumptive guideline sentence otherwise applicable. In Parker, the court stated…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Knight v. State, 455 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
- Harms v. State, 454 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
- Query v. State, 455 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)