WILLIE LEE SMITH, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1985-03-27
No. 84-1262
FRANK, J., and BOARDMAN, EDWARD F., (Ret.) J., concur.
465 So. 2d 1372 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1985) Positive Treatment
Also reported at: 10 Fla. L. Weekly 825 · 1985 Fla. App. LEXIS 13201
Cited by 4 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Willie Lee Smith appealed his probation revocation sentence, challenging the trial court's imposition of a 30-month sentence under Florida's sentencing guidelines with enhancement. The court reversed and remanded because Smith, whose underlying offense predated the guidelines' adoption, did not affirmatively select to be sentenced under the guidelines, and his silence could not constitute such selection.


Holding

The court held that because Smith's underlying offense occurred before the guidelines were adopted, he was required to affirmatively select to be sentenced under the guidelines. Smith's silence and lack of objection during sentencing could not constitute an affirmative selection, and the trial court erred by failing to ask whether Smith selected guideline sentencing.


Headnotes

[1] A defendant whose underlying offense occurred before the adoption of sentencing guidelines must affirmatively select to be sentenced under those guidelines.

[2] Mere silence or acquiescence by a defendant during sentencing proceedings does not constitute an affirmative selection of sentencing under the guidelines.

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Key Quotes

“Appellant's underlying offense occurred before the guidelines were adopted; therefore, he must affirmatively select to be sentenced under the guidelines.”

Establishes the legal requirement that defendants with pre-guideline offenses must affirmatively elect guideline sentencing

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Facts & Procedural History

Smith was placed on probation in 1981 for carrying a concealed weapon. In 1983, he violated probation by failing to keep a mental health appointment b…

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Opinion of the Court
OTT, Acting Chief Judge.

OTT, Acting Chief Judge.

Appellant seeks review of his sentence imposed following the revocation of his probation. He claims the trial court erred in enhancing his presumptive sentence under the sentencing guidelines for á violation of probation.1 Because we find that appellant did not affirmatively select to be sentenced under the guidelines, we reverse and remand for resentencing.

On November 4,1981, appellant was placed on probation for carrying a concealed weapon. In 1983, a probation violation was charged. Appellant admitted he failed to keep an appointment and report for treatment at the County Mental Health Clinic. The trial court, however, allowed him to continue on probation. On February 15, 1984 (after the guidelines were adopted), appellant was again charged with violating certain conditions of his probation, this time by battering his mother. At the probation revocation hearing, appellant admitted the battery and again asked to be continued on probation. The trial court denied probation and sentenced appellant to thirty months in the state prison, which was the recommended sentence, with enhancement, under the guidelines. Thereafter, the trial court heard argument on appellant’s motion to mitigate. In denying the motion, the trial court determined that a lesser sentence within the guidelines was not warranted. This timely appeal followed.

It is quite clear from the record that the trial court went about calculating and entering an appropriate sentence under the guidelines, albeit with enhancement or departure. It is equally elear, however, that the trial judge never asked appellant whether he “selected” to be sentenced under the guidelines. While appellant stood mute during the sentencing process and made no objection to the imposition of the sentence, he did nothing to suggest he affirmatively selected to be sentenced under the guidelines. Appellant’s underlying offense occurred before the guidelines were adopted; therefore, he must affirmatively select to be sentenced under the guidelines. In re Rules of Criminal Procedure (Sentencing Guidelines), 439 So. 2d 848 (Fla.1983); Jordan v. State, 460 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Rodriguez v. State, 458 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).

Here, appellant’s silence cannot be deemed an affirmative selection of the guidelines. In so holding, we recognize that it is unlikely that mere silence or acquiescence will ever amount to an affirmative selection. Nevertheless, we reiterate our position in Jordan that we are not to be understood as holding that silence or acquiescence can never, under any set of circumstances, amount to an affirmative selection of the guidelines. See Jordan, 460 So. 2d at 478. Under the circumstances of this case, appellant’s silence did not rise to the level of an affirmative selection.

Accordingly, appellant’s sentence is reversed and remanded for resentencing, at which time appellant may affirmatively select to be sentenced under the guidelines.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

FRANK, J., and BOARDMAN, EDWARD F., (Ret.) J., concur. .

Specifically, appellant claims that the newly amended Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.701(d)(14), which provides for automatic enhancement of a sentence imposed after a revocation of probation, may not be applied retroactively. See Carter v. State, 452 So. 2d 953 n. 3 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). Because of our disposition of this case, we need not reach this issue. Nevertheless, had appellant affirmatively selected sentencing under the guidelines, we would have affirmed his sentence even though the newly amended rule may not be applied retroactively. Violation of probation is a valid reason for departing from the guidelines. Addison v. State, 452 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). The record, which reveals that the trial court relied upon this reason in departing from the guidelines, is sufficient for the purpose of providing clear and convincing reasons for departure. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.701(d)(11); Smith v. State, 454 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Wright v. State, 478 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
    …n as “there must be a clear and unequivocal choice made on the record.” Jordan v. State, 460 So. 2d 477, 478 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Cahill v. State, 467 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Kimsey v. State, 467 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Smitti v. State, 465 So. 2d 1372 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). Additionally, the mere fact that a seoresheet was prepared does not establish an affirmative selection. Finklea v. State, 470 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). On this record it is not clear whether appellant would have received t…
  • Ames v. State, 470 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)
    ….1983). This was error. When a defendant is placed on probation prior to October 1, 1983 and his probation is revoked after that date, the defendant must affirmatively elect to be sentenced under the guidelines for them to apply. See Smith v. State, 465 So. 2d 1372 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Jordon v. State, 460 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Mack v. State, 458 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984); Boyett v. State, 452 So. 2d 958 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) Aff'd. State v. Boyett, 467 So. 2d 997 (Fla.1985); Duggar v. State, 446 So.…

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