BOBBY OSBORNE, APPELLANT/CROSS APPELLEE,
v.
ELIZABETH MASSEY INVESTMENT CORPORATION, TRACOR MARINE, INC., YELLOW TAIL MARINE, INC., WILLIAM R. RILEY, PHOENIX ASSURANCE CO., LTD., ET AL., APPELLEES/CROSS APPELLANTS
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The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a trial court's grant of summary judgment dismissing a marine insurer from a suit, holding that Florida's common law rule permitting direct joinder of liability insurers applies to marine insurance policies, not just motor vehicle cases.
The court held that direct joinder of a marine liability insurer is permitted under Florida's common law rule established in Shingleton v. Bussey, and that this rule applies to marine insurance policies as well as motor vehicle liability insurance. The statutory prohibition on joinder (effective October 1, 1982) does not apply retroactively to causes of action arising before its enactment.
[1] A statute prohibiting the direct joinder of an insurer does not apply retroactively to causes of action that accrued before the statute's effective date.
[2] Under Florida common law prior to October 1, 1982, a third-party beneficiary could bring a direct cause of action against an insurer.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the statute, which was made effective October 1, 1982, does not apply retroactively”
Establishes that the 1982 nonjoinder statute does not govern causes of action arising before its enactment date.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAn underlying cause of action accrued on July 7, 1979. The plaintiff attempted to join Phoenix Assurance Company, Ltd., a marine insurer, as a defenda…
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BARKETT, Judge.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of appellee Phoenix Assurance Company, Ltd. (“Phoenix”), on the grounds that direct joinder of a marine insurer is not permitted under Florida law. We reverse.
The underlying cause of action in this case accrued July 7, 1979. Although section 627.7262, Florida Statutes (1983) (“Nonjoinder of insurers”) at the present time would prohibit the direct joinder of an insurer, the statute, which was made effective October 1, 1982, does not apply retroactively. VanBibber v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Insurance Co., 439 So. 2d 880, 881 (Fla.1983). Accordingly, this case is controlled by the law in effect at the time the cause of action arose. Id. at 883. That law is the common law rule of Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla.1969), which permitted a direct cause of action by a third-party beneficiary against an insurer. Phoenix argues, however, that the rule of Shingleton v. Bussey was addressed to motor vehicle liability cases and should not be applied to a marine insurer. We can see absolutely no reason to differentiate between the two for purposes of this issue. We agree with Quinones v. Coral Rock, Inc., 258 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972), wherein the court expressly held that under Shingleton v. Bussey a marine insurer could be joined as a defendant by a plaintiff alleging maritime personal injury. See Steelmet, Inc. v. Caribe Towing Corp., 747 F. 2d 689, 696 (11th Cir.1984). See also Sassoni v. Savoie, 327 F.Supp. 474 (E.D. La.1971) (Louisiana statute allowing joinder of insurance companies applies to marine insurance policies).
Moreover, in Beta Eta House Corporation, Inc. of Tallahassee v. Gregory, 237 So. 2d 163 (Fla.1970), the court applied the Shingleton v. Bussey rule to a homeowner’s liability insurance case and answered a certified question by saying: “The principles announced in Shingleton v. Bussey ... are applicable not only to automobile liability insurance but also to other forms of liability insurance...” Id. at 165.
Accordingly, we reverse the summary judgment of the trial court and remand the cause for further proceedings consistent herewith.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HURLEY and WALDEN, JJ., concur.
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Authorities Cited
- Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969)
- Gulf Stream Motors, Inc. v. Christina Cook & the Fla. Indus. Comm'n, 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969)
- Ara Williams VanBIBBER v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Ins. Co., 439 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 1983)
- Beta ETA House Corp. v. Gregory, 237 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1970)
- Steelmet, Inc. v. Caribe Towing Corp., 747 F.2d 689 (11th Cir. 1984)
- Virgilio Quinones v. Coral Rock, Inc., 258 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)