C. WESLEY KENT, III, APPELLANT,
v.
HERSHEL HARRISON, APPELLEE
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Kent sued Harrison for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on Harrison's campaign of harassing telephone calls following a verbal conflict. The court affirmed the directed verdict for Harrison, holding that while Harrison's conduct was intentional and offensive, it did not meet the high threshold of being so outrageous and extreme as to go beyond all bounds of decency.
The court held that although Harrison's conduct was intentional and designed to distress Kent, the behavior did not meet the threshold standard for intentional infliction of emotional distress because it was not so outrageous in character and extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency or be atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.
[1] The determination of whether conduct is so outrageous and extreme as to constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress is a question of law for the court, not a…
[2] Conduct must be atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The threshold test to be followed in assessing behavior claimed to constitute the "intentional infliction of emotional distress" is whether such behavior is "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency."”
Establishes the objective legal standard for intentional infliction of emotional distress
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceC. Wesley Kent and Hershel Harrison had a verbal conflict on a Sunday morning in Brevard County. Following this conflict, Harrison initiated and conti…
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FRANK, Judge.
The appellant, C. Wesley Kent, III, sued the appellee, Hershel Harrison, alleging that Harrison initiated and for several months continued a campaign of telephonic harassment in the aftermath of a verbal conflict which occurred between them on a Sunday morning in Brevard County. The sole issue before us, decided adversely to Kent in the lower court and here, is whether the disturbing conduct attributed to Harrison constituted the intentional infliction of emotional distress. The lower court, following our decision in Gmuer v. Gar ner, 426 So. 2d 972 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), directed a verdict for Harrison. The supreme court’s recent rejection of Gmuer in Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. McCarson, 467 So. 2d 277 (Fla.1985), however, does not alter the result in the present matter. In Ponton v. Scarfone, 468 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), we stated:
The threshold test to be followed in assessing behavior claimed to constitute the “intentional infliction of emotional distress” is whether such behavior is “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency.” In applying that standard, it is manifest that the subjective response of the person who is the target of the actor’s conduct is not to control the question of whether the tort occurred. Rather, an evaluation of the claimed misconduct must be undertaken to determine, as objectively as is possible, whether it is “atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” That burden falls to the judiciary — it is a matter of law, not a question of fact.
In testing the correctness of the lower court’s action, we treat the record before us in a light most favorable to Kent. Thus, we harbor no doubt that the telephone calls received by Kent were offensive and impaired him, his tranquility and the peacefulness of his home. We are no less persuaded that Harrison’s conduct was intentionally designed and undertaken to distress and annoy Kent. In fulfilling the responsibility assigned to us in Metropolitan, however, we cannot conclude that such behavior was “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency.” 467 So. 2d at 279. Moreover, Kent’s state of vexation, irritation and agitation cannot be the foundation for a finding that Harrison’s behavior is within the range marked out in Metropolitan by the standard of “atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Id.
Affirmed.
SCHEB, A.C.J., and HALL, J., concur.
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Stoddard v. Wohlfahrt, 573 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)…objectively as is possible, whether it is “atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” That burden falls to the judiciary — it is a matter of law, not a question of fact. Id. at 1011. This quote was also used in Kent v. Harrison, 467 So. 2d 1114, 1115 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), in which a defendant initiated and for several months continued a campaign of telephonic harassment in the aftermath of a verbal conflict. There, the court stated: Thus, we harbor no doubt that the telephone calls received…
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Normil Normius v. Eckerd Corp., 813 So. 2d 985 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)…ts the conclusion that Eckerd’s conduct was not “so [*989] outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency.” See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. McCarson, 467 So. 2d 277, 278-79 (Fla.1985); Kent v. Harrison, 467 So. 2d 1114, 1115 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). Concerning the other issues raised by Normius and the issue raised by Eckerd in its cross-appeal, we affirm without further comment. Therefore, the final judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and this matter i…
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Rosalind Nims v. Harrison, 768 So. 2d 1198 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)…n v. Scarfone, 468 So. 2d 1009, 1010 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (holding that “Scar-fone’s utterances, designed to induce [plaintiff] to join with him in a sexual liaison,” did not constitute intentional infliction of mental distress); and Kent v. Harrison, 467 So. 2d 1114, 1114 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (a “several months continued campaign of telephonic harassment in the aftermath of a verbal conflict” in a parking lot' did not make out a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress). These cases are di…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. McCARSON, 467 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 1985)
- Ponton v. Scarfone, 468 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
- Rosanne Gmuer v. Ambrose Garner, 426 So. 2d 972 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)